

# Consultation Feedback

## Programme for Change - Consultation

Programme Management Office



GREATER MANCHESTER  
FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE



# Contents

Contents .....	1
Executive Summary.....	4
1. Introduction.....	5
2. Background and governance .....	7
3. The aim and approach .....	9
4. Public & Partner Consultation .....	10
Scope .....	10
Activity .....	10
Findings, themes and ideas .....	5
5. Staff Consultation .....	14
Scope .....	14
Activity .....	14
Findings, themes and ideas .....	15
6. Trade Union Consultation.....	28
Scope .....	28
Activity .....	29
Findings, themes and ideas .....	29
Recommendations.....	30
Appendix 1 – Response from Unison Fire GM .....	31
Appendix 2 – Response from the Fire Brigade Union .....	70
Appendix 3 – Demographics .....	104
Appendix 4 - Volunteering response.....	109
Appendix 5 - Youth engagement response .....	157
Appendix 6 - Prevention response .....	177







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# Executive Summary

## HEADLINE MESSAGES<sup>1</sup>

- There was significant reach to communities across Greater Manchester through targeted engagement on social media, news outlets, established networks and through direct communication with all councillors and MPs, and other key stakeholders.
- There was a frequent offer to meet with groups and organisations across Greater Manchester, including local authorities and MPs, with limited take up.
- There was overall a low response rate from the public to the consultation.
- The comments from the public (including individuals, groups and organisations) and staff on the proposals were predominantly negative.
- The main issues amongst staff of GMFRS included the ridership numbers and increasing the role of the firefighter to include greater place based and partnership working. Operational firefighters also raised that they do not feel that they have the skills, training or expertise to deliver this work, as well as the potential conflict with operational duties – with there being a potentially detrimental impact on both operational incidents and training
- The main issue amongst the public was the reduction in overall number of fire engines in Greater Manchester, with repeat comments about not reducing below 48 (as quoted in the proposals) due to emerging risks of protracted moorland fires, high rise buildings, future developments and the threat of terrorism.
- Following the conclusion of the consultation period both Unison and the FBU provided detailed feedback which reflected the issues raised by staff.
- The proposed station mergers in Manchester, Bolton and Stockport were not a major area of concern for any specific group of respondent (Bolton received the most negative feedback of three mergers, with Stockport receiving the least).
- There was repeat comment from different staff groups that the evidence behind the operational modelling was more robust and detailed (and independently validated) than anything relating to prevention or youth engagement activities.
- 28 organisations or groups responded to the consultation, along with three local MPs submitting a formal response (Kate Green, Andrew Gwynne and Rebecca Long-Bailey).
- Organisations gave a mixed response to the consultation, with many focussing on a specific service or part of the organisation they've worked with, as opposed to the broader content of the OBC.
- Alternative proposals were received regarding the delivery of youth engagement services, prevention services and the volunteering – these were all internal suggestions. No significant alternative proposals were received from members of the public.

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<sup>1</sup> All of the information contained within this report is taken from data sheets that contain direct feedback from members of staff, public, partners and Trade Unions. If additional information is required about responses contact the Programme Management Office.



# 1. Introduction

- 1.1 The Outline Business Case (OBC) for the future of Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) was drafted during 2018 and the start of 2019, as part of the Programme for Change (PFC) – the programme carrying out the whole service review of the fire and rescue service in Greater Manchester.
- 1.2 The draft OBC considered areas from across the organisation, focussing specifically on laying the foundations for a stronger organisation that is focussed on keeping communities safe and delivering a sustainable, affordable, frontline first emergency service.
- 1.3 The proposals aimed to design a service that use firefighters' skills to the full, developing a service that is fit for the future for people across Greater Manchester, by targeting resources and focussing on core statutory activities. The proposals also aimed to meet a £12.8 million budget deficit for the next year.
- 1.4 The consultation on areas within the OBC was launched on March 29, 2019 and ran until May 31 and was aimed at multiple audiences at any one time.

## **1.5 The main areas for the consultation included –**

- A refocus on frontline delivery
- Integration with place-based teams in every locality, targeting resources and meeting needs of communities
- Maximising fire cover across Greater Manchester within available resources
- More devolved power to the frontline
- Re-investing in local stations and improved facilities
- Investment in fire engines and equipment
- Improved training and development
- Investment in supporting technology and systems

## **1.6 The OBC proposed to achieve this by -**

- Merging six fire stations into three, establishing new state-of-the art fire stations with opportunities for collaboration with blue light partners and for facilities for the communities. (Initial consideration was given to mergers at Bolton, Manchester and Stockport - the detail will be examined during the consultation).
  - Crewing levels of four firefighters on all engines, reflecting current practice in Greater Manchester and services across the country.
  - Removal of eight second fire engines from stations currently with two engines.
  - Maintenance of our position as one of the fastest responding fire services nationally, our average response times will still be more than a minute better than the national average.
  - A new delivery model for Prevention, Protection, Youth Engagement and Administration.
- 1.7 The consultation considers three main audiences; public consultation with local residents, groups and organisations, staff engagement with an internal audience and formal consultation with Trade Unions.



1.8 The approach for these different groups, as well as the scope for consultation differs slightly, depending on their involvement in the process. For example (although will be covered in more detail later in the report) -

- **Public consultation with local residents, groups and organisations;** people outside of the organisation were encouraged to respond to specific areas where our statutory duties in relation to managing risk are. However, if comments were received outside of these areas, they have still been considered as part of the consultation.
- **Staff engagement with an internal audience;** staff were encouraged to comment on any part of the OBC and were given multiple ways to feed back their views. These activities were non-statutory.
- **Formal consultation with Trade Unions;** conversations with representative bodies happened throughout the process and they were able to discuss and subsequently comment on any areas of the OBC.



## 2. Background and governance

- 2.1 In May 2017, Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service, under a local devolution agreement, became part of the Greater Manchester Combined Authority. The GMCA is the fire authority (Art 3(2) of the Fire Order) for the area of Greater Manchester, however fire and rescue functions are exercisable by the Mayor of Greater Manchester.
- 2.2 Following on from the Manchester arena attack and subsequent Kerslake report in March 2018, the Mayor of Greater Manchester Andy Burnham instructed a root and branch review of GMFRS.
- 2.3 The Programme for Change, was established to carry out this work and has been in place since early 2018 and have developed the OBC.
- 2.4 It is intended that the in coming months, GMFRS will develop a Local Risk Plan for Greater Manchester<sup>2</sup>, where it is envisaged that it will also contain the more detailed Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP).
- 2.5 This consultation on the OBC, is not an IRMP consultation, however the content of this process will contribute to and support the effective consultation on the future IRMP. The process and governance for the consultation responses is as follows -
- All responses to the consultation to be collated for the Change Leads from the across the different themed areas of work to consider the comments, make changes to proposals where appropriate and make further recommendations.
  - Comments from the consultation, along with the full responses from the Trade Unions are included within this report.
  - All comments and feedback are available to the Corporate Leadership Team to help to inform recommendations for the Mayor of Greater Manchester.
  - The Steering Group for the PFC and the Mayor of Greater Manchester will see the recommendations report and have access to all responses to inform final decision.
  - All public and partner responses will be published on gmconsult.org so that there is transparency in the process.
- 2.6 The consultation process itself will also follow best practice for public consultation (in addition to that laid out above), specifically taking into consideration;

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<sup>2</sup> The GM Fire Order defines the Local Risk Plan as the document which –

(a) is prepared and published in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework; and

(b) sets out – (i) The GMCA's priorities and objectives; and (ii) an assessment of all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect its community.

Section 21(7) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 requires fire and rescue authorities to have regard to the Framework in carrying out their functions.

The 2018 National Framework (s.4.6) sets out the requirement on each fire and rescue authority to produce an IRMP (and what it should contain)

The Local Risk Plan covers both the 'high level' / strategic Fire Plan concern, and also the more detailed IRMP information.

The Framework requires the IRMP to reflect effective consultation throughout its development and at all review stages with the community, its workforce and representative bodies and partner (section 4.6) and required FRA's to provide the opportunity for communities to help to plan their local service through effective consultation and involvement (section 7.12)



2.7 The Gunning Principles, which were coined by Stephen Sedley QC during a court case in 1985, which related to a school closure consultation (R v London Borough of Brent ex parte Gunning). Sedley successfully argued that consultation should allow people to be informed when;

- **proposals are still at a formative stage** A final decision has not yet been made, or predetermined, by the decision makers
- **there is sufficient information to give ‘intelligent consideration’** The information provided must relate to the consultation and must be available, accessible, and easily interpretable for consultees to provide an informed response
- **there is adequate time for consideration and response** There must be sufficient opportunity for consultees to participate in the consultation. There is no set timeframe for consultation, despite the widely accepted twelve-week consultation period, as the length of time given for consultee to respond can vary depending on the subject and extent of impact of the consultation
- **‘conscientious consideration’ must be given to the consultation responses before a decision is made** Decision-makers should be able to provide evidence that they took consultation responses into account

2.8 Other guidance that was considered during the consultation process;

- 2017 - The Consultation Institute – Charter for Consultation
- 2012 (updated 2018) – Cabinet Office - Consultation Principles: Guidance
- 2008 - HM Government Code of Practice (superseded by the guidance above, but still useful)
- As a principal authority - Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 (Point 138: Involvement of local representatives)



### 3. The aim and approach

- 3.1 In developing the approach and activity for the consultation not only was the guidance outlined above considered, it was recognised that not everyone will engage with the plan in the same way, nor to the same detail. However, anyone wanting to respond – whether internal to the organisation, a partner or a member of the public will want to feel that their contribution is meaningful and useful to the process.
- 3.2 With this context, the consultation was designed largely around enabling people means and tools to submit detailed qualitative responses, as opposed to quantitative responses, which can be sometimes perceived to be less engaging with respondents, as well as less useful in helping to shape a final proposal.
- 3.3 Equally, it is recognised that this is a very detailed and complex piece of work and opportunities should be provided to give people the chance to understand as much of the detail as possible, to help to get an informed response. This was demonstrated specifically through manager and staff briefing sessions so that staff felt as informed as possible to make a response.
- 3.4 It was also important to allow people suitable time to consider the OBC documents in full, recognising that as a complex and detailed consultation, it wouldn't be fair or reasonable to carry out a consultation that was less than the government recommendation of six weeks. For this reason, the OBC consultation was nine weeks long.

#### **OTHER CONSIDERATIONS**

- 3.5 As mentioned, there are three different audiences to consider for the consultation; public, staff and representative bodies. As the public were only asked to respond to certain questions, this inevitably guided the type of responses that were received. For example, staff were encouraged to comment on any area of the OBC, whereas the public were asked specifically around the tangible assets (fire stations, fire engines).
- 3.6 The rationale for this is because much of the OBC is an organisational process, whereas the operational management of resources, could relate to the future development of the Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP) of which there is a statutory duty to consult with key stakeholders.
- 3.7 Some of this report is repetitive, with key themes being referenced multiple times. This is to highlight the different themes that are important to different audience groups. If the feedback was categorised by theme alone, and didn't recognise the source of the feedback, this might lead some respondents to feel that their response hasn't been suitably considered.



## 4. Public & Partner Consultation

### Scope

- 4.1 The consultation with partners and the public focused primarily on the proposed changes to operational resources –
- Merging of six fire stations into three in Manchester, Stockport and Bolton
  - Reduction of eight pump fire engines across Greater Manchester
- 4.2 Other areas of the OBC were outlined briefly, with links to the fuller document where people could comment on wider organisational proposals, which related to relocation of work and projects.
- 4.3 When respondents commented on other areas outside of the online survey, these comments were still accepted and included within the analysis.

### Activity

- 4.4 The information below outlines the detailed activity that took place with partners and the public, to engage them before and during the consultation – helping to meet our requirements to involve people in the development of proposals.

#### Developing inclusive ways for people to respond

- 4.5 Whilst the primary method for people to respond to the consultation was via the online portal, other means were created to allow all communities to respond. A dedicated email address for the consultation was widely promoted, along with the postal address of Fire Service Headquarters.
- 4.6 The consultation was promoted primarily through social media, and the media coverage meant that print and broadcast media informed a wider audience.
- 4.7 All responses were dealt with in the same way irrespective of the route they were submitted.

#### Media and social media activity

- 4.8 On March 11, 2019 proposals for the future of GMFRS were announced<sup>3</sup> by the Mayor of Greater Manchester, Deputy Mayor Bev Hughes and Chief Fire Officer Jim Wallace. The consultation was launched on March 29, following on from the Combined Authority meeting. Both of these occasions were marked with press releases and posts on GMFRS social media accounts. Both of these press releases were covered by local media;

- |                           |                        |
|---------------------------|------------------------|
| ▪ Manchester Evening news | ▪ BBC Radio Manchester |
| ▪ Bolton News             | ▪ Hits Radio           |
| ▪ Tower FM                | ▪ Bury Times           |
| ▪ Wish FM                 | ▪ Rochdale Online      |
| ▪ ITV.com                 | ▪ BBC News             |
| ▪ Leigh Journal           |                        |
| ▪ ITV Granada             |                        |
| ▪ BBC NWT                 |                        |

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<sup>3</sup> The day before the papers were formally and publicly released on the GMCA website.



In terms of initial pick-up on social media announcing the content of the OBC;

Twitter posts impressions and engagements		
	<b>Impressions<sup>4</sup></b>	<b>Engagements<sup>5</sup></b>
Tweet announcing proposals	4,756	250

Pick-up on social media announcing the launch of the consultation;

<b>Twitter posts impressions and engagements</b>		
<b>Tweet</b>	<b>Impressions</b>	<b>Engagements</b>
Tweet announcing launch of consultation	4,921	113
Tweet sharing consultation launch press release	10,192	187

<b>Facebook post impressions and engagements</b>		
<b>Facebook Post</b>	<b>Impressions</b>	<b>Engagements</b>
Facebook post announcing launch of consultation and sharing press release	17,395	2,479

- 4.9 On April 10, a coordinated social media campaign was launched to communicate the proposals and promote the consultation. This included daily posts on Facebook and several times a day on Twitter (depending on other GMFRS activity or events<sup>6</sup>), these posts all contained a similar graphical style.

Twitter activity			
Date	Tweet	Impressions	Engagements
10/04/19	We need to modernise	3,769	75
10/04/19	New fire stations	5,393	266
11/04/19	Fleet of fire engines	3,592	54
11/04/19	Not sustainable	3,214	48
12/04/19	Place-based	3,889	63

Facebook activity			
Date	Post	Impressions	Engagements
10/04/19	Right place	7,845	1,123
11/04/19	21 <sup>st</sup> century	4,902	371
12/04/19	State-of-the-art	10,298	1,727
15/04/19	Fleet of engines	4,324	265
16/04/19	Sustainable	6,938	808
17/04/19	Place-based	3,907	322
19/04/19	Your views	4,046	165
20/04/19	Partners	1,905	91

<sup>4</sup> 'Impressions' – Number of times the post is seen

<sup>5</sup> 'Engagements' – Number of times a person takes action as a result of a post (likes / reposts etc)

<sup>6</sup> For example, posts were paused during appropriate national days, funerals that were being marked or current incidents or operational activity.



13/04/19	We want your views	5,003	60
15/04/19	Partners	3,723	68
15/04/19	Right resources	4,533	80
16/04/19	Mergers	5,225	212
17/04/19	Frontline-first	2,879	48
17/04/19	Modernise	3,332	37
18/04/19	Right resources	2,620	10
19/04/19	Place-based	2,828	18
19/04/19	Working conditions	7,920	239
20/04/19	Efficiency	3,341	34
20/04/19	Right resources	4,527	62
21/04/19	Respond faster	6,151	60
21/04/19	Have your say	6,045	52
22/04/19	Mergers	7,036	149
26/04/19	Integrate	3,593	44
27/04/19	Working conditions	5,356	107
27/04/19	Respond faster	5,208	76
28/04/19	Not sustainable	5,172	145
28/04/19	Your views	4,199	40
29/04/19	Modernise	4,603	68
29/04/19	Stations same place	3,959	59
01/05/19	Stations same place	3,287	58
03/05/19	Budget	2,903	32
03/05/19	Your views	3,748	28

21/04/19	Right place	5,902	511
22/04/19	Place-based	6,607	532
26/04/19	Right resources	6,133	661
27/04/19	Sustainable	5,906	800
28/04/19	When you need	2,623	294
29/04/19	Place-based	4,053	276
01/05/19	New stations	5,431	737
03/05/19	Right resources	4,775	427
05/05/19	Your views	4,775	281
06/05/19	Sustainable	6,810	799
07/05/19	Integrate	2,193	209
08/05/19	Right resources	4,374	489
10/05/19	Your say (boosted)	31,055	1,747
11/05/19	Fit for future	3,159	156
12/05/19	New stations	4,365	348
13/05/19	There when you need us	3,376	246
15/05/19	Sustainable	3,418	160
16/05/19	Communities	3,907	299
18/05/19	Fit for future	3,618	179
19/05/19	When you need us	4,053	336
20/05/19	Have your say	2,896	103
23/05/19	Sustainable	3,745	319
24/05/19	Have your say	2,601	38
25/05/19	Sustainable	3,439	126
26/05/19	Fit for future	4,365	228



05/05/19	Fleet of engines	5,452	73
05/05/19	Stations same place	5,682	111
06/05/19	21 <sup>st</sup> century	5,493	69
08/05/19	Budget	6,460	101
08/05/19	Your views	3,718	53
09/05/19	Right resources	3,790	60
10/05/19	Few weeks left	4,852	40
11/05/19	Flexible	4,630	48
11/05/19	Modernise	5,171	91
12/05/19	Incidents faster	4,253	53
12/05/19	Savings	5,476	60
13/05/19	Heart of community	5,124	69
13/05/19	Frontline first	6,837	137
14/05/19	All parts of org.	3,923	46
14/05/19	Blue light colab	3,341	47
15/05/19	Right skills	5,828	101
16/05/19	Few weeks	4,789	53
18/05/19	Few weeks	4,641	77
18/05/19	Invest	5,053	82
19/05/19	Frontline first	5,579	91
19/05/19	Emergency services	5,460	56
20/05/19	Sustainable	4,983	29
20/05/19	Incidents faster	6,383	73
23/05/19	Blue light	2,711	9
23/05/19	21 <sup>st</sup> century	4,498	75

27/05/19	New stations	3,360	121
28/05/19	When you need	4,848	342
30/05/19	Have your say	5,833	263
	Total:	191,785	15,899



24/05/19	One week	5,096	38
24/05/19	Faster	3,047	17
25/05/19	Sustainable	4,568	63
25/05/19	Flexible	4,017	41
26/05/19	Invest	4,112	44
26/05/19	Heart of community	6,478	91
27/05/19	All parts	5,863	63
27/05/19	Closer with partners	5,513	67
<b>28/05/19</b>	<b>Thread</b>	<b>25,542</b>	<b>194</b>
29/05/19	21 <sup>st</sup> century	4,553	36
29/05/19	Incidents faster	4,640	33
30/05/19	Last chance	4,758	38
30/05/19	Sustainable	5,718	40
31/05/19	Last chance	6,265	79
	<b>Total</b>	<b>341,345</b>	<b>4,840</b>

- 4.10 On May 28, towards the end of consultation, a Twitter thread was published outlining the key information about the proposals to make them easily accessible to the public. The aim of this was to summarise all of the headline information.
- 4.11 This received the most engagements and impressions of any Twitter post during the consultation. It was also shared with partners including local authorities to share and widen the reach)
- 4.12 The thread can be found here: <https://twitter.com/manchesterfire/status/1133305535254671360>
- 4.13 The analysis of GMFRS posts, show that 533,130 social media impressions were made during the consultation. This doesn't include the numbers of people who may have been aware of the consultation through other social media accounts, such as local media, partners or TU accounts.

#### **Working with public sector partners, including Councils and MP's**

- 4.14 Prior to the OBC going into the public domain, it was communicated to all Councillors, Members of Parliament, Greater Manchester Leaders and Chief Executives.
- 4.15 During the consultation, all Local Authorities were offered a face to face briefing with the GMFRS Corporate Leadership Team. Only Bolton and Stockport accepted this offer and the Chief Fire Officer attended their full Council meetings to provide greater context to the OBC and to answer any questions.
- 4.16 Updates were sent to Councillors from across Greater Manchester through the consultation, to encourage them to respond and spread the information out to their local constituents. The email update was sent to 637 Councillors, and 259 opened the email.



## **Engaging with partners**

- 4.17 Groups and organisations that had a community room booked in the next year, at one of the proposed merged stations, were contacted and encouraged to take part in the consultation. This was a targeted mailing list of over 100 people.
- 4.18 Information on the consultation was also sent to all of the partners on our mailing list. This list, of the around 933 groups and organisations within Greater Manchester was opened 494 times, this is 53.3% above industry standard for similar communications (which is 23.9%)
- 4.19 Members of the GMFRS Extended Leadership Team were encouraged to talk to partners and agencies that they work with about the consultation, signpost towards the consultation and the means to respond.

## **Involving young people**

- 4.20 Two members of the Youth Combined Authority approached the PFC team about getting involved in the consultation. A workshop was set up for the twenty member organisations of the YCA to talk directly to the Chief Fire Officer about the proposals. The session was subsequently cancelled when all members were invited to take part, and only the original two people signed up to attend.

## **Managing a petition**

- 4.21 Alongside the launch of the consultation, the Fire Brigades Union launched a petition which focussed on the reduction of operational resources. As there is no formal organisational policy for handling petitions, a weekly update figure instead was circulated to the Corporate Leadership Team, so that how the petition was picking up could be monitored.

# **Findings, themes and ideas**

## **Process for dealing with the responses**

- 4.22 This consultation attracted over 1,286 individual public comments through 402 online responses completed through gmconsult.org and 50 other email responses.
- 4.23 Of the 402 responses online, 58 were members of staff and 28 were from people representing an organisation or group. Some groups submitted multiple responses, so it is difficult to determine which (if any) is the response from an individual who has the authority to make a response on behalf of an organisation.
- 4.24 All of the comments collected were coded, both by sentiment and by subject area (based around the OBC chapter titles)<sup>7</sup>. This has enabled key themes to be identified and extracted from the data.

## **Quality Assurance**

- 4.25 All feedback was Quality Assured by analysts within the Research team from the Combined Authority. These are professionals who are unconnected with anything relating to the PFC or GMFRS.
- 4.26 In QA the process of dealing with the responses a number of comments were raised by the analysts, including –
- That the original coding had been overly generous, with some comments being coded as ‘neutral’ when they should have been ‘negative’

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<sup>7</sup> Coding categories were based around the chapters within the OBC. Where a chapter covers multiple areas (for example – ‘Fire Cover Review’ chapter covers all three station mergers, ridership numbers and the reduction of second pumps), then more codes have been used.



- Some comments had been coded 'neutral' when they were a statement of fact (reiterating a point or area within the document itself).

4.27 As a result of this feedback all neutral comments were reviewed by the analyst team and re-coded where necessary and a new category was added called 'statement of fact' to take account of those comments that didn't have a sentiment either way.

#### 4.28 Most raised areas of feedback -

##### **Removal of the second pump (259 comments)**

Broadly members of the public weren't concerned about the numbers of firefighters, but instead about the number of physical / visible fire engines in GM.

By far, the most comments came about reducing the number of pumps below the 50-52 that we're currently (usually) operating with.

##### **Non-categorised comments (176 comments)**

Funding – More should be being done to protect emergency services, questions about why the precept hadn't been raised (and making comparisons with the precept rise for free bus passes for 16-18 year olds)

Campaign and lobbying - Comments that the Mayor should be doing more on a national level to raise the profile and requirements of GMFRS to carry on delivering a high quality FRS.

Governance – Comments that the FRS needs a robust governance structure, taking into consideration locally elected representatives and not just an Officer led Steering group – either through a Fire Committee or another scrutiny panel.

##### **Fire Cover Review (other - 161 comments)**

The most other comments under FCR, were uncategorised (not mergers, 2<sup>nd</sup>'s or ridership). This included –

- General negative views on ANY sort of reduction; any the subsequent impact on long and protracted incidents.
- Perception that there has been limited consideration about how a reduction in operational resources will impact upon new and emerging risks; high rise, terrorism, general GM growth
- The modelling of resources doesn't take into consideration any unexpected, large scale incident (once in a life-time event), several mentions of the fire service being an 'insurance policy'

#### 4.29 Responses specifically from the online survey

4.30 All qualitative comments received via the online portal have been read and categorised both by subject area and sentiment. This exercise has shown that –

- 259 comments were received about the removal of the second pump, of which 219 of these were negative, 39 were neutral or a statement of fact and one was positive. This question garnered the most significant negative sentiment, of all of the areas within the public consultation.
  - *How am I paying the same council tax for the fire service and you're getting rid of fire engines?? Has the service been that poorly managed that you are now penalising the public?? How is less fire engines in the city centre a good idea*



- *Any reduction in fire cover will cost lives. Cuts to front line services are an absolutely terrible idea, especially this day in age with the constant threat of terrorism.*
- *I think that the fire service is better placed than me to know how many fire engines it needs.*
- *The fire services ability to react to any major fires or incidents such as terrorist attacks or major road, rail or air crashes will be severely restricted.*
- *Manchester continues to expand. The number of domestic dwellings is increasing at an incredible rate. Public venues are large. I'd keep the resource.*
- *One appliance to any incident is next to useless and an effective response involves numerous appliances. Removing local appliances and relying on crews from further afield is not an option. Find the funds from central government, not your frontline response!*
- *I work in the city and the landscape is changing massively and the population is increasing significantly. Why would you want to reduce fire engines if the population is getting bigger and I worry about all the high rise buildings that are being built*
- *Living and working in the Oldham area this would clearly have an impact particularly with the recent rise in moorland fires - this would reduce availability of appliances to deal with residential and commercial emergencies*
- *For the future risks of wildfires, terrorism, climate change a reduction in the face of such uncertainty is concerning.*
- The three proposed mergers received 339 comments cumulative (in three separate qualitative response boxes). Five of these comments were positive (none for Manchester), 71 neutral or statement of fact and the remaining were negative.
  - *You state merging stations yet overall fewer fire engines, it sounds like a your covering up losing engines and crews by stating we are building state of the art stations. Philips park has had tens of thousands of pounds spent on it the last five years alone! Waste of tax payers money closing it now.*
  - *There will be fewer Fire Engines to respond to emergencies in Bolton and to cover and support other areas when they are busy.*
  - *Anybody living, working and visiting Bolton will be less safe.*
  - *Insufficient local cover for mine and vulnerable families. Cost cutting rather than efficiency*
  - *Despite merging and providing better facilities, which is long overdue, reality is less fire stations which means less fire engines putting the public at higher risk of increased response times.*
  - *The roads are busy and congested enough. To move and close our station in bolton will effect my area massively as we are a 10/15 min drive to the bolton centre and that without traffic*
  - *Manchester is becoming more urbanised and busy at all times of the day. The sleeping risk alone has risen dramatically with more to come. The height of some of the buildings going up means that the Fire Engines initially turning up would be impotent for some time.*
  - *Whilst this would have no immediate impact on me, should there be a major incident in the city centre this merger would put significant strain not only on Manchester Central but surrounding stations for other incidents.*
  - *Stockport town centre is seeing a huge increase in the number of business premises and housing and, although a new station in a different location may increase response times to Brinnington, cuts to the number of engines and fire fighters will put people in these new developments at risk.*
- There was a total of 23 negative comments from the public survey about ridership numbers, despite not asking a direct question about it.
- The area which received the most positive comments was around the 'Future of Fire Stations' chapter, with six positive, nine negative and nine neutral or statement of fact comments. This was broadly referencing refurbishment of stations and appropriate equipment and training.
  - *Stations are dated and the opportunity to reflect current requirements is good*



- *If we have the chance to get a modern fire station, which I assume would have lower maintenance costs than two existing ones, with minimal (seconds) increase in response time, then do it!*
- In terms of other, non-operational related responses, the future of prevention service delivery was commented on 48 times, youth education 37 times and other reference to place-based working 29 times. Only two of these mentions were positive in relation to the proposals within the OBC. It is worth noting that these services weren't specifically highlighted for comment with specific questions, which could justify the low response rate.

4.31 Another area that was repeatedly mentioned, is the need to lobby / campaign at a national level to improve the funding situation for GMFRS.

- *Protest to Central Government about the funding cuts, do not reduce frontline efforts to make ends meet.*
- *Go back to Central government and demand the austerity cuts are reversed. Use your top officials to lobby local MPs and get proper funding.*

**4.32 Proposed Bolton Central / Bolton North merger** - 162 open text comments were received for this section.

Quantitative feedback is as follows and separates the responses from GMFRS staff and non-GMFRS staff. This includes groups and organisations.

	ALL RESPONSES		NON-GMFRS STAFF		GMFRS STAFF	
	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
Significant impact	174	43.18%	145	42.03%	29	50.00%
Some impact	74	18.36%	53	15.36%	21	36.21%
No impact	97	24.07%	89	25.80%	8	13.79%
Don't know	37	9.18%	37	10.72%	0	0.00%
Not answered	21	5.21%	21	6.09%	0	0.00%
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>403</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>345</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**4.33 Proposed Manchester Central / Philips Park merger** - 157 open text comments were received for this section.

Quantitative feedback is as follows and separates the responses from GMFRS staff and non-GMFRS staff. This includes groups and organisations.

	ALL RESPONSES		NON-GMFRS STAFF		GMFRS STAFF	
	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
Significant impact	158	39.21%	128	37.10%	30	51.72%
Some impact	97	24.07%	79	22.90%	18	31.03%
No impact	91	22.58%	83	24.06%	8	13.80%
Don't know	33	8.19%	31	8.99%	2	3.45%
Not answered	24	5.96%	24	6.96%	0	0.00%
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>403</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>345</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**4.34 Proposed Stockport / Whitehill merger** - 148 open text comments were received for this section.



Quantitative feedback is as follows and separates the responses from GMFRS staff and non-GMFRS staff. This includes groups and organisations.

	ALL RESPONSES		NON-GMFRS STAFF		GMFRS STAFF	
	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
Significant impact	143	35.48%	116	33.62%	27	46.55%
Some impact	78	19.35%	63	18.26%	15	25.86%
No impact	107	26.55%	97	28.12%	10	17.24%
Don't know	49	12.16%	44	12.75%	5	8.62%
Not answered	26	6.45%	25	7.25%	1	1.72%
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>403</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>345</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>99.99%</b>

**4.35 Removal of the 2<sup>nd</sup> fire engine** - There were two open text sections to this section. 'Please explain your answer' received 268 individual comments. When asked if people had any other comments about these specific proposals, 139 individual comments were received.

	ALL RESPONSES		NON-GMFRS STAFF		GMFRS STAFF	
	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
Significant impact	250	62.03%	200	57.97%	50	86.21%
Some impact	70	17.37%	63	18.26%	7	12.07%
No impact	30	7.44%	30	8.70%	0	0.00%
Don't know	28	6.95%	28	8.12%	0	0.00%
Not answered	25	6.20%	24	6.96%	1	1.72%
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>403</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>345</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

#### 4.36 Responses from MPs

There were three responses from MPs within Greater Manchester. A fourth MP asked GMFRS to provide a constituent with further information but didn't subsequently submit a response from himself. The responses were from – **Rebecca Long-Bailey, Kate Green, Andrew Gwynne**

4.37 Their feedback included -

- Understanding of the pressure that a Conservative government is putting on public spending
- Predominantly around operational issues (riding 4's, reduction in operational resources – 9 fire engines, 194 FFs)
- Change of shift system at non-SDS stations
- *Closure* of 6 fire stations, and the opening of three new ones
- Removal of *several / some* non-uniformed staff, with FF taking on the workload
- Increased future engagement with parliamentary colleagues

#### 4.38 Responses from groups and organisations



Responses were received from 28 organisations. The majority of these are from within the Greater Manchester area. Many are from organisations that are predominantly based in the geographical areas with proposals covered in the OBC.

- 4.39 Many of the organisations commented very specifically on a service or area of GMFRS that they have worked with and some respondents showed limited knowledge for the wider OBC.
- 4.40 Some teams within GMFRS produced material to encourage partners to respond to the consultation.
- 4.41 Some people submitted an organisational response, yet the response suggested that they weren't necessarily responding on behalf of an organisation, but more as an individual with a link to an organisation. There is no way to determine if people had the authority to reply on behalf of that organisation.
- 4.42 In addition, representatives from Manchester and Salford Labour groups had meetings with the Mayor to discuss Programme for Change, with their feedback also being considered.

Organisation	Summary of their response <sup>8</sup>
Age UK Stockport	Day centre near to Whitehill, so would want response times maximised Would welcome opportunities to work collaboratively and in a coordinated way around supporting people to live safely in their home
Atherton Labour Branch	Atherton Branch calls upon our Mayor, our Council Leaders, our MP's, the GMFS and the GMCA "to oppose these proposals and to do their upmost to resist any further cuts in this essential public service."
Bolton Community and Voluntary Services	Concern around reduction in operational resources within Bolton. Comments on the reduction of prevention services and the feasibility of referring vulnerable people into Safe and Well visits.
Bolton Lads and Girls Club	Specific mention to the reduction of youth engagement activities which will result in increased anti-social behaviour and crime in the area.
British Red Cross Emergency Response Service	Currently work in partnership with GMFRS & currently have an Emergency Response (ER) vehicle based at Manchester Central Fire Station. Our volunteers attend incidents alongside GMFRS. I am concerned that there may not be room for us at the new merged Fire Station.
Bury Council	Understanding of pressure of resources, alike to elsewhere in the public sector. Would welcome increased collaboration to maximise shared capacity and influence community behaviour; targeting resources and preventing demand
Greater Manchester Police (multiple responses)	Programme Challenger and the positive impact of the Crime and Disorder Co-ordinator On the Fire Cover Review – 'This is an operational decision for GMFRS'

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<sup>8</sup> All responses (where permission has been given) will be published on gmconsult.org in the future. Where organisations have submitted responses via email to the inbox, we have not had express permission to publish details of the response (hence not appearing on this list)



	Blue Light Collaboration – welcome discussions about – ‘Forcing Entry’ (MOU 2017), searching for missing people and in time – integration of assets to improve interoperability.
Lancashire Fire and Rescue Service	On the border with GMFRS so might affect turnout areas. Proposals around prevention will take the service back 20 years Prevention is difficult to measure, but compliments GMFRS current approach.
Lancashire Road Safety Partnership	Cuts to prevention has the potential to significantly impact upon proactive work such as Safe Drive, Stay Alive that aims to reduce collisions across the North West.
NHS Buzz Health and Wellbeing	Not sure what the future partnership arrangements are going to look like. The consultation materials are too detailed to expect members of the public to read.
North Bolton Residents Association	Negative feedback specifically around the merging of Bolton fire stations. Specific mention that an increase in fires will result in higher home insurance premiums for residents.
Oldham Council	Recognition of the current financial pressures. The consultation focusses on the operational element of the OBC, but they are particularly keen to comment on the negative impact of changes to the prevention service delivery. The work that GMFRS has carried out in prevention has been highlighted as best practice nationally and to move away from this in such as way could be reputationally damaging for GMFRS and GM.
Oldham safeguarding Adults Board	Concern around the reduction in dedicated prevention officers within the area and the subsequent negative impact on communities.
Pendleton Together	Concern around the reduction of second pumps in the Borough – especially considering high rise, growth and some buildings with AMC cladding on them. GMFRS has used community prevention to great effect.
Positive Steps	Concern that firefighters will have other priorities and not be able to fully engage with youth engagement activities.
Public Health, Bolton Council	The GMFRS Community Safety offer for Bolton has been greatly valued for its contribution to health and wellbeing and community safety, particularly for the most vulnerable populations. These staff are key community assets and have a wealth of knowledge and experience that simply cannot be replicated. GMFRS are in a unique position to contribute to the development of key programmes to promote health and wellbeing, such as falls prevention and work to identify and connect with the most vulnerable and at-risk groups.



Rochdale Boroughwide Housing	<p>Proposal to reduce the prevention offer (and deliver it in a different way) will have an impact on partnerships.</p> <p>Broadly supportive of station mergers, as long as there is no health and safety impact as a result of the reduction of ridership.</p>
Royal College of Occupational Therapists	The Royal College of Occupational Therapists welcomes the proposal to make prevention activities the responsibility of operational crews. Responding to fires is the priority but preventing fires should be seen as the first step and part of the continuum.
Salford City Council	<p>Salford City Council raised that GMFRS could learn from the experience of other emergencies services in moving to more place based working. Whilst welcoming place based working they questioned whether GMFRS would have the resources to do it effectively under the proposals in the OBC.</p> <p>Concerns were also raised about the reduction of 1 fire engine in Salford and Eccles. These concerns were linked to a number of issues, including high rise buildings in Salford, rising population and motorway networks.</p>
Salford Royal NHS Foundation Trust	<p>Whilst the document is extensive and largely not applicable to an NHS acute hospital, feedback is specifically on the leadership and coordination of the Safe Drive Stay Alive collaborative.</p> <p>Inaccurate figures for those reached by the Safe Drive, Stay Alive initiative and concerns about the available resource in front line staff to deliver prevention activities.</p>
Stockport Public Health Team	<p>Concern around short and long term impact of the changes to prevention service delivery.</p> <p>If prevention activities are carried out by operational crews, there will potentially be more pressing work to deal with (incidents) which might impact upon their own service delivery.</p>
Tameside Community Safety Partnership	Although the Partnership is certain that operational firefighters would be more than capable of carrying out this work, we believe that the fact that they could, at any time, be diverted to an operational incident, means that there effectiveness in this area will be significantly reduced.
Tameside MBC (Public Health)	<p>Serious concerns regarding the additional responsibilities being placed on a shrinking front line firefighter workforce, as well as a large reduction in support staff resource over the coming years, as proposed in the OBC.</p> <p>This particularly refers to the role in place-based teams and working, which is being handed over to Area teams and front line firefighters, however it is difficult to see where the capacity within these roles for this work will come from.</p>
The Chapman Barker Unit	Concern over the reduction of fire prevention interventions for vulnerable people, including for patients at the Chapman-Barker Unit (inpatient drug



	and alcohol detoxification unit), part of Greater Manchester Mental Health Trust.
The Training Co	Concern over changes to youth engagement, in particular Prince's Trust.
Trafford Housing Trust	Concern about the proposals for operational crews to provide the Safe and Well visits to vulnerable customers rather than a dedicated team.



## 5. Staff Consultation

### Scope

- 5.1 Staff from across Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service were encouraged to respond to any element of the OBC, Appendix document, summary document or internal presentation that was provided to support conversations around the proposals.
- 5.2 This staff engagement sought to enhance the conversations and subsequent feedback with Trade Unions. In no way did it aim to replace or undermine those formal conversations.

### Activity

- 5.3 In developing the activity to support staff to get involved in the consultation process, it was recognised that not everyone will engage with the plan in the same way, nor to the same detail, however all staff who want to respond will want to feel that their contribution is meaningful and useful to the process.

#### Initial staff information session

- 5.4 The day before the OBC was released into the public domain, two sessions were held for staff. The morning, a Corporate Leadership Team led session outlining the proposals to Managers from across GMFRS and the afternoon, a live-streamed session to all fire and rescue service sites in Greater Manchester, enabling all staff to listen to the Mayor talk about the proposals.

#### CLT roadshows

- 5.5 Members of the Corporate Leadership Team hosted roadshow events across different GMFRS sites. These six events were planned in different areas and at different times within the Watch rota to allow a range of staff to attend. In addition to this, the final event at Fire Service Headquarters was live-streamed across all GMFRS sites, through the intranet.
- 5.6 130 people attended the six events in total, with 91 devices tuning into the live-stream.<sup>9</sup> This latter figure is significantly higher than other internal, live-streamed events that have been done historically. Notes were taken during the events but haven't been reported on within this report.

#### Manager feedback

- 5.7 Members of the Extended Leadership Team (Station Managers and above and non-uniformed equivalent) were encouraged to talk to their teams about the proposals and were provided with corporate presentation to support these discussions.
- 5.8 To try and capture the discussion that took place during these events, managers were subsequently provided an online form to collect the key information, most discussed sections of the OBC and where the primary areas of concerns were. In total 79 responses were submitted by Managers (66 through the online form and 13 through via email) and approximately 330 members of staff were spoken to directly by their manager through these team sessions.

#### Staff engagement form

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<sup>9</sup> Unable to determine exact figures of those watching the live stream, as there may have been multiple people watching the stream through one device.



- 5.9 Working with the Fire Brigades Union, an online engagement form was developed which was sent to all GMFRS staff, and communicated regularly through the CFO update, intranet and through managers).
- 5.10 The engagement form allowed respondents to comment on specific areas of the OBC (by chapter) and was predominantly a qualitative survey to ensure detailed responses to get to the detail of the issues.
- 5.11 At the end of the survey, there were a few quantitative questions asking respondents how much of the OBC and appendix document they had read, and how much they agree with the content and overall accuracy of the OBC.
- 5.12 56 people responded to the online form. These 56 respondents provided 407 open text comments.

#### **Email address for enquiries**

- 5.13 A dedicated email address was set up, so that staff could both submit any enquiries into the inbox in advance of putting in a formal response, as well as submitting a final response if they chose to this route.
- 5.14 During the consultation, the inbox received x enquiries and all were responded to within the consultation period by appropriate colleagues, with the information that they had requested.

## **Findings, themes and ideas**

- 5.15 The manager feedback form was created to make sure that conversations that took place during team briefing sessions were captured and reported on, it also aimed to give members of staff another avenue to make a response.
- 5.16 Below are key themes that were raised, around each of the individual chapters of the OBC. It is a snapshot of the feedback and the points raised from staff through manager information sessions. Wherever possible, the feedback presented has tried to reflect the breadth and range of views of respondents.

Manager Responses	79 (66 online form and 13 email)
Total number of individuals spoken to	Approximately 330 members of staff spoken to

#### **5.17 Key areas of challenge**

- Riding 4's instead of 5's and the perceived subsequent unsafe practices of work
- The impact of increasing role of the firefighters role map to potentially include areas outside of the national agreement
- Reduction of pumps, firefighters and support doesn't feel like putting the 'frontline first'
- Asking operational crews to carry out the work of the prevention teams undermines their skills and expertise
- Concerns around workload and operational conflict were repeated raised
- Leadership needs to improve in terms of communication and accountability
- Staff would like further clarification on the data used, task analysis and role map
- The need for quality, hands on operational training as well as training to be able to deliver a quality prevention service
- More detail about what the proposals will look like on a day-to-day basis

#### **5.18 Most raised areas of feedback**

**Fire Cover Review (70 comments)**



Ridership figures – specifically about firefighter safety, pressure on OIC's and experience of a crew.  
Reduction in pumps – concerns around resilience, attendance times for 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> pump and impact on early decision making.

Feedback on data being used to determine proposals and the changing landscape and risks of GM

No real objection to station mergers, except for Manchester Central (why not quiet stations?)

Feedback the stations with specialist equipment should retain 2 pumps (due to training and skills) – request for info on special appliance review.

#### **Role of the Firefighter (70 comments)**

Non-SDS firefighters weren't felt to be represented in the OBC

Staff felt the proposals didn't accurately reflect the conversations that happened with the Mayor about the remit of the role.

Staff don't want prevention and protection to take precedence over operational response and training.

Concern that recruitment standards aren't robust enough to recruit the right calibre of people and that existing staff are being asked to do things that they weren't recruited for (or have the right skill-set)

Resistance to youth engagement work, perception that this would be difficult to manage operational priorities with it.

#### **Place based delivery (63 comments)**

Lack of clarity in the detail (and how it'll work in practice) unlike the FCR – this means staff don't have confidence in it.

Firefighters and Watch Officers are not specialists and do not have the appropriate skills to deliver a quality prevention service.

Partners have trusted and valued relationships with community safety teams that are valued, which would be difficult to re-establish

Lack of data to inform the proposal (for example, the FCR was externally validated) – there was no equivalent for prevention work

Feedback on specific chapters within the OBC -

#### **The Vision, Mission and Purpose**

5.19 Staff generally agree with the vision and purpose, but not its delivery. There is a strong emphasis that the OBC is not aligned with the vision. Staff feel unconvinced and raised concerns about the reality of implementation and how success will be measured.

- *Personnel were in general unconvinced, there was a feeling that this was a rehash of generic phrases and buzz words.*



- *Appear to be well thought out statements without having the funding and correct approach to carrying them out.*
- 5.20 Front line first is welcomed but riding 4's with less pumps doesn't reflect this, crew don't feel like operational resources are being prioritised.
- *The purpose of the PFC looks good in principle and sounds good, but the reality of the situation, with crews dropping to 4's is at odds with the message that the frontline is being prioritised.*
- 5.21 Prevention teams and CSAs feel undervalued. Comments include that the Mayor had previously acknowledged that CSAs are considered front line staff, but this is not reflected in the OBC. Feedback also included that CSAs and Admin teams felt that they should've been informed of the proposals prior to the live feed.
- *Staff feel that they have been "erased" out of the organisation and are even more invisible than before.*
- 5.22 Crews are not convinced the proposals will create a modern service, when there are such outdated systems and approaches. A modern fire service would also include more family friendly working.

### **The Role of the Firefighter**

- 5.23 The predominant theme is the outline of the current role map does not accurately reflect a firefighter's day or workload. It was also noted that non-SDS firefighters were not represented. Staff felt that proposals to increase responsibilities were unrealistic, with particular mention to reduced capacity as a result of less pumps and therefore increased operational response. The future role map was described as 'opaque' and lacking in detail.
- *The crews felt that the review of how firefighter spend their time was not really reflective of reality. It is viewed as being based on averages and with any time in motion study it doesn't account for the value of activities completed or the disruption caused by operational incidents that have a greater impact than the actual time attributed.*
- 5.24 Operational staff felt the proposals do not accurately reflect the conversations that happened about the remit of the role. Staff wanted to know how these discussions were captured and how the information has been used.
- *"FF have expressed an appetite for this", which appears in several places in the OBC, was universally questioned by station based personnel when undertaking consultation.*
  - *We are sceptical that firefighters have stated they wish to do more P&P. Our belief is they would wish to do a modest amount and instead focus time and energy on attaining the highest standards as Emergency Responders.*
- 5.25 There are concerns about firefighters not being qualified to carry out prevention and protection work, particularly in regards to vulnerable people and secondary schools. Currently, CSAs complete visits following safe and wells when operational crews don't have the skills or knowledge to help. Some welcomed prevention work, with the condition they are fully trained and that it does not take precedence over operational response and operational training.
- *Protection training needs addressing for all frontline staff as this will have a positive impact in firefighting.*
  - *Crews were concerned about what level of training will be available to support the expansion of the FF role, to include fire safety and more youth engagement work.*
  - *The most vulnerable people need time and experience, the Fire fighters do not have this... Due to lack of time and experience there could be a risk to Firefighters missing referral opportunities whilst completing visits with vulnerable people.*



- 5.26 Feedback suggests that there won't be the support in place to effectively carry out the broadening remit and the quality of the service will be lessened with no quality assurance in place. Crew may not have the appropriate skills to carry out the proposed work, and it is not aligned with the skillset they were recruited for. Questions were also raised about the recruitment process.
- *Are the recruitment standards robust enough to recruit the calibre of personnel able to meet the role of a firefighter?*
  - *The suggested new future role of a FF was felt to be "not fit for purpose" and "not aligned to the skill-sets for which Firefighters had been selected and recruited".*
  - *No thought given to the role we are primarily employed for or consideration given to the increase in role and workloads we have faced over the last 10-15 years that have included targets as well as expected completion deadlines, allowing no leniency for Fire Fighting/Calls.*
- 5.27 Crew also questioned how the proposals will align with the national FBU negotiations that are underway, looking at the national role map and EMR. Red1s were recognised as being important, but the impact on wellbeing needs to be considered.
- *Concerns about expansion of role from national negotiations e.g EMR ... brings with it significant potential risk to FF's mental well-being*
  - *How will this tie into the current FBU negotiations around pay and the FF role within the role map? Many of the items that the service have stated fit with in the current role map are debatable.*

### **Leadership and Culture**

- 5.28 Perception that current leadership is not transparent and lacking accountability. The main theme is the absence of communication across the organisation – through direct line management, corporately and strategically. Staff discussed a lack of clear strategic leadership and the need of investment into developing effective leaders.
- 5.29 There needs to be a greater precedence placed on ensuring the workforce are well informed. Staff feel unheard and not listened to. In addition to wanting more interaction with management and two-way engagement opportunities, staff mention the return of a CFO/CLT blog.
- *Currently the culture of leadership is not transparent, with little accountability, lines of communication.*
  - *All managers and leaders should be accountable in their roles, as many currently get away with poor levels of management, work and output.*
- 5.30 Repeat perception from staff that they feel that is nobody championing fire in a GMCA context leaving the Service 'feeling like an unwanted stepchild'. There is a lack of trust from staff and they are disheartened that senior management are not perceived to be standing up against the cuts.
- 5.31 However, there was also the view that staff are happy that issues in leadership and culture have been acknowledged.
- *Department are happy that issues with Leadership and Culture have been identified and actions being taken to improve both.*
- 5.32 Overall, the plan lacks detail about how the leadership and culture is going to change. What are the tangible changes? Staff are generally sceptical that any change will be actualised and impactful.
- *How are management going to be more approachable and what avenues are going to be available to feedback to LT? What about whistle blowers who raise concerns?*
  - *The review of leadership and culture show's lots of theoretical models, but there is a lack of detail of how the change is actually going to be achieve with lots of unknowns.*



## Fire Cover Review

- 5.33 Riding 4's is the main concern across the board, with firefighter safety being the most referenced issue. Crew also felt there would be no flexibility for unexpected absence or sickness. It was felt that one pump stations should be riding five, as should outlying stations with extended attendance times. Other services riding 4's was not deemed to be good enough rationale.
- *Real concerns about safety implications of riding 4's. Would rather see less pumps riding 5 to fit in with cost envelope.*
  - *4 people on a station will effect quality of training and if appliance do joint training, then this will: affect response times; increase fuel costs; increase carbon emissions; increase time wasted due to travelling.*
  - *When riding 4, where do probationers fit in, what about roles such as ECO's at large incidents, there will be no spare personnel in the systems, personnel will be either OIC's, drivers or B.A wearers. What about resilience in the cover, for relief duties etc?*
  - *Riding 4's is not a safe system of work, there could be no BA control. Also, this can place the IC under pressure to decide whether to help a casualty or maintain control of incident.*
- 5.34 The experience of crews was also raised when discussing riding 4's, with concerns for crew safety with firefighters with very limited experience.
- *Crews anxious that the make up of the workforce will become very inexperienced with the increase in recruitment. If riding with 4, the crew may have very limited experience. Previously when riding 4, the crews had more time in the job and were able to manage, fill the gaps.*
- 5.35 The reduction in pumps was another key theme. There were mixed feeling about the loss of pumps, crew raised concerns about resilience, attendance times for second and third pumps, and the implication on early decision making, especially if riding 4's.
- *The choices on which appliances to drop and their effects on attendance times are sound decisions that are hard to argue against.*
  - *...the response and attendance times reported are negligible and appeared to be extracted from another ideological world, however if correct, they are all pointless if we reduce the impact we can have on incidents at the early arrival stages, by reducing the ridership on appliances to 4's as proposed and then having to wait for further resources.*
- 5.36 Staff enquired into the data used to determine the proposals and raised concerns that a variety of factors had not been considered. There were comments around the changing landscape of Greater Manchester, including growing infrastructure as well as increased risk of flooding and moorland fires.
- *Did the planning assumptions consider reliefs, relief changeovers at protracted incidents; post fire activity; did locations of incidents for modelling change locations ie include city centre/rural incidents; night and day incidents; future growth of the city; special appliances, new BA guidance commitments and moorland incidents and rise of; RED1s; alternate crewing of specials and the delays in mobilising the appliances.*
  - *Task analysis is not fit for purpose. It is carried out in a sterile environment with competent crews and familiar surroundings. There is no external pressure that can be expected at a real incident and also no extreme situations.*
- 5.37 Overall, staff were not surprised by station mergers, with limited objections to it. Manchester Central received the most negative views.



- *...they do not dispute the merge of stations and wonder is there not an option to merge or close some of the quiet stations for example G31 (which was originally going to close when G30 moved to the new station), G41 Mossley, G22 Cheadle are all examples of stations where it must be asked: do the turnouts at these stations over a year justify a wholetime station?*
- *The Stockport station merger will not improve attendance times, it will only improve the number of incidents we will get to within 10 mins – the whole impact on performance detailed in this document is misleading to the public.*
- *Manchester Central is the busiest fire station in the county in an absolutely key location for response by all emergency services to the greatest risk we have in the county – the city centre. It is acknowledged that the land has significant value but, as a minimum, any sale should be linked in with the requirement to build a smaller station on the same site*

5.38 Some crews felt that stations with specialist equipment should retain 2 pumps as there would be significant impact on water and animal rescue. Others questioned whether additional pumps should take priority.

- *Qualifications at both the WIU stations can feed in to prop up all other locations but the reverse is not true. Large Animal rescue requires a min of 5 people and the consideration to a return of the SRT. Consider the effects in respect of pumps that 1 working job has.*
- *It is acknowledged that the TRU play an important supporting role but it is questioned about the validity of the maintenance of water and animal rescue skills considering the specific specialisms and time required for the maintenance of skills. There have been request for further information on the specialist appliance review and concerns as to how water and animal rescue feature in this.*
- *Do we really need 2 TRU units, or two water units etc what is most important, may save a pump or two?*

5.39 Non-SDS staff highlighted that moving to 12 hour shifts is considered an attempt to get 12 hour shifts through the door for all. More detail is required around the proposals for the non-SDS system. It was suggested that non-SDS stations could be closed or merged into SDS stations in order to maintain riding 5s.

#### **Place based delivery**

5.40 One of the prominent themes was the idea that firefighters and Watch Officers are not specialists and do not have the appropriate skills and capacity to deliver a quality and worthwhile service. CSAs in the role were described as experts that deliver an effective and efficient service. They have developed and maintain partnership agreements as part of a frontline delivery team. CSA influence is deemed to be much greater at meetings and are valued and trusted by other agencies. Staff also raised the point that in some cases, a fire engine outside a home is not appropriate.

- *The assumption that on duty crews can deliver youth engagement activities in place of full time specialist staff is flawed.*
- *Based on the poor level of S&Ws delivered by FFs, in terms of quality, how do we expect to deliver a high quality service expecting them to do a much broader role.*
- *Staff were not convinced they had the skills or capacity to expand their role beyond delivering what would effectively be a rebranded HSC.*
- *Some of our clients do not want a fire engine turning up on their doorstep i.e. Domestic Abuse visits where staff wear plain clothes and use unmarked vehicles.*

5.41 Station Managers would not have capacity to attend meetings, organise events and act as the link between hubs. Questions were raised about what would happen if crew were required to turn out, especially during meetings, school visits, working with vulnerable people and during youth engagement.



- *The main reference to individuals' roles around place based teams seems to be tokenistic meeting attendance and there is little reference to the ongoing maintenance that partnership agreements need.*
- *Needs to be meaningful. In theory it's fine, but if we're turning out part way though, we're not going to achieve anything meaningful.*

5.42 Some stations felt they are already doing this work in multiple ways but more clarification is wanted. In particular, the streamlining of the referral process and the ability to deliver targeted prevention and protection activities.

5.43 A recurring question across many aspects of the OBC is in regards to the validity of the data used and what will be in place to measure outcomes.

- *What evidence has been produced / provided to inform the decisions made regarding the introduction of this new delivery model. How has this been validated - FCR was externally validated? What research was undertaken to inform the decisions?*
- *How are we going to measure the success of the implementation of this new delivery model?*

### **Decision Making**

5.44 A reoccurring theme is the lack of belief in the consultation and the ability to influence outcomes.

- *Personnel feel powerless to influence the process of decision making and that senior management have already made their own minds up. They have no belief in the process.*

5.45 Staff cited a lack in clarity in governance and a lack of trust in decision making. Senior management of both GMCA and GMFRS need to work harder to develop effective working relationships. Strategic decision making should be more visible to staff across the organisation.

- *The barrier to decision-making is the GMCA. How can the Mayor and Deputy Mayor make decisions on Fire related issues when they don't have the expertise? ... The CFO needs to be able to lead the organisation and not be constrained by governance and politics.*

5.46 The move to enable firefighters and Watch Officers to be more autonomous and be able to make decisions without fear of retribution or reprisal is welcomed. However, there is a level of scepticism around the implementation and reality of this.

### **Supporting the front line**

5.47 The overriding view is that the OBC feels contradictory to a front line first approach.

- *Nothing in the proposals supports the frontline at all - cutting the frontline, not supporting and increasing the workload*
- *There isn't much evidence that states the frontline will be supported. It does appear the focus is heavily aimed at the frontline, but only to carry out extra work and pick up the pieces of the fall-out of staff cuts and redundancies.*

5.48 Support staff feel undervalued and there are concerns among many about the implications of reducing administrative staff and CSAs, both to the frontline and reputation of the service.

- *It feels like the support staff function is just a poor relation and under-valued.*
- *Crews strongly believe that we should retain the CSA's even if in a smaller capacity as they are much more experienced dealing with the tough cases we often come across. The crews feel there would be reputational risk to the service if we leave all the great work we do in the home to crews who do not have the right training.*



- 5.49 Enhanced training was welcomed by staff. Many noted that a shift away from computer-based training to more quality training is needed. There were concerns that training would not fix everything and questioned how it would be realistically delivered.
- *Distance learning is now the only form of training and as operational staff, hands on and interaction training works best.*
  - *Training is suggested as a 'silver bullet' throughout the OBC... however there is a lack of acknowledge that there is a risk that resource investment may be required as part of the wider Training review.*
- 5.50 There were concerns about the health and wellbeing support available to staff and the implications of the impact of the widening remit of the role.
- *Where is the health and wellbeing team now? There is only one of the original 3 left in the team this doesn't sound like support for the frontline.*
  - *OBC does not consider impact of reduced staff on increased workloads and disruption, and more complex or unachievable objectives on the mental health of staff, turnover, sickness and suicide rates. Support for mental health had improved, but perception is it has been reduced again.*
- 5.51 Investment in IT is welcomed, as there was a perception that the Service has some low standards in systems. Staff commented that self-service systems need to be simple and efficient, especially if admin support is reduced.

## STAFF ENGAGEMENT FORM

- 5.52 The staff engagement form was created with the FBU, and it aimed to give members of staff another avenue to make a response. There were 58 responses via the online form and 105 emails into the PFC inbox (the majority of these were queries to the content of the OBC, as opposed to a response with views, or alternative proposal).
- 5.53 Below are key themes that were raised, around each of the individual chapters of the OBC. It is a snapshot of the feedback and the points raised from staff. Wherever possible, the feedback presented has tried to reflect the breadth and range of views of respondents.

### 5.54 Key areas of challenge

- Riding 4's instead of 5's and the perceived subsequent unsafe practices of work
- The impact of increasing role of the firefighters and the large numbers of inexperienced crew and apprentices
- Reduction of pumps, firefighters and admin support doesn't feel 'frontline first'
- Concerns around place based working, firefighters doing the work of expert CSAs and operational conflict
- Leadership needs to improve in terms of communication and accountability
- Staff would like further clarification on the data used, task analysis and role map
- The need for quality, hands on operational training and manager development as well as training to be able to deliver a quality prevention service
- Lack of understanding around what place based working will actually look like

### 5.55 Most raised areas of feedback

<p><b>Role of the Firefighter (70 comments on online form, plus PFC inbox)</b></p>
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OBC doesn't accurately reflect how FF spend their time; concern around additional workload and capacity – priority for attending operational incidents and time for quality training.

Repeat query of statement that FF want to do more prevention, protection and youth engagement work; reality is that this was only a small portion who wanted the role to be reviewed / expanded with appropriate training and pay (only fire context).

Not trained to carry out specialist work; or trained to a high enough standard – plus added issue of being turned out, mid-activity.

Needs to be developed alongside national FBU negotiations

EMR broadly welcomed, but with sufficient training and recompense.

#### **Fire Cover Review (40 comments on the online form, plus PFC inbox)**

Ridership figures by far the most contentious issue raised by staff.

Inexperienced crew / apprentices and the workforce planning to manage this.

No major objections to the stations mergers, although Q's around the need for new stations.

Other reoccurring concerns around the OBC not taking suitable consideration of new developments (in particular high-rise), resilience at large and protracted incidents.

#### **Place Based Delivery (majority through the PFC inbox, plus 35 comments on the online form)**

Primary concerns; quality of service by FF, no time for quality relationships with partners, feeling that proposals are vague and no consideration for differing Districts approach.

OBC doesn't recognise the specialist involvement of CSA's and others with certain groups (youth engagement and complex cases).

Removal of safe and well targets are broadly welcomed.

PBW needs to be developed and delivered by the same teams to allow for continuous improvement.

Need to consider existing evaluation of current prevention service delivery.

Positives included – collaborative working with partners and upskilling staff (who are willing to embrace change).

Feedback on specific chapters within the OBC -

#### **The Vision, Mission and Purpose**

- 5.56 There were mixed views on the vision and purpose. While some agree with the vision, others feel it is contradictory and only based on financial savings.
- 5.57 Some felt that rather than just refocussing on response, core service functions in prevention, protection and response could be improved and streamlined. Prevention is outlined as being better than cure. Therefore, reducing prevention activities could be a false economy as it could result in more antisocial behaviour and deliberate fires.



- *The vision, mission and purpose seems to be an exercise we carry out every 5 years or so which has very little bearing on our staff. If the right people are selected for the service at point of entry and subsequently, the right people are promoted to the right roles, they will ultimately do what is right for the Service.*

## **The Role of the Firefighter**

- 5.58 There is a perception that the description of how firefighters spend their time does not accurately reflect their day or workload. Staff were generally concerned about the additional workload and impact on capacity, mentioning that time for quality operational training and attending incidents needs to remain as the priority.
- 5.59 Staff questioned the statement that firefighters want to do more prevention, protection and youth engagement work. Firefighters raised concerns that they are not trained to carry out the work of CSAs (who are specialists) and questioned the practicalities of being trained to a high enough standard. Others said that even with the training and knowledge, firefighters can be turned out during visits or may have to cancel visits at short notice, this impacting upon the quality.
- *CSAs could not see how operational crews would be able to spend the time needed dealing with complex cases, assisting key workers in other agencies to minimise fire risk working alongside them to actively manage the case.*
  - *The trust gained from the CSA's on safe and well visits is vital in gathering information and being able to provide the best help. The pressure of the CSA role on top of the work that crews already do will be too much and they will not be able to handle the workload. Crews will be far too stretched and vulnerable people will die because of it.*
- 5.61 Feedback highlighted that the role is being widened with no additional pay. The FBU national dispute was mentioned in relation to role map, MTFA and EMR. However, when turning out to Red1s previously, firefighters did not feel sufficiently trained or prepared.
- *EMR brings with it significant potential risk to FF's mental well-being and working in small isolated teams of four spread out in large fire station buildings, exacerbates that risk. Peer support is a crucial to maintain good mental health, not just 3rd party support.*
  - *Some of the tasks should not be included because these are parts of national negotiations (eg EMR and MTFA)*

## **Leadership and Culture**

- 5.62 Similarly to managers' feedback, key topics include lack of visibility and accountability of leaders and a disconnect between senior managers/HQ and front line staff. In particular, there is mistrust of the Mayor and GMCA. The concept of improving leadership and culture is welcomed, but how this would happen appeared to be vague.
- 5.63 Concerns were raised surrounding succession planning and the development process for staff, managers and leaders. Managers felt they should be given more responsibility. Staff feel that their skills are not being put to use and further training and development is welcomed.
- *The operational side of the service has never developed managers instead they are required to develop themselves, apply for promotion and then be put in post to do a job while being paid a development rate of pay. There is no attempt to identify potential managers/leaders and develop them into that position.*



## Fire Cover Review

- 5.64 Riding 4's and the perceived safety and operational implications is the most contentious issue raised by staff. The impact on response times and standards resulting from riding 4's combined with the reduction in pumps was also highlighted.
- 5.65 The numbers of inexperience crew and apprentices were mentioned on numerous occasions. There were questions regarding the special appliance review.
- *Task analysis is in a controlled environment; no traffic congestion interference or the realities of firefighting in a real environment with blocked hydrants etc*
  - *Comparing us to other FRs re moving to 4s isn't comparing like for like - our risk profile is different; 4s is cutting in stealth and avoids the headlines; although there is a responsibility to meet the budget - riding 4s is increasing risk to the H and S of FFs and the public adversely.*
  - *Riding 4's is not safe, crews suggested keeping fewer fire engines to ride 5's.*
  - *Just because other service's now ride 4's doesn't make it right or safe, and it will mean crews working outside recognised safe systems of work that have been developed through evidence based learning.*
- 5.66 There were no major objections to station mergers, but the need for new stations to replace existing ones was questioned, with suggestions of just closing one station and keeping the other open.
- 5.67 There are concerns surrounding city centre stations, in Salford and Manchester, due to the number of new developments. Staff also questioned resilience and risk planning around large incidents, such as high-rise and moorland fires.
- *Response planning map, in Manchester borough we have the largest density of life risk incidents which will increase due to the amount of developments in and around the city, and what we are doing is dramatically reducing the number of appliances and the number of fire fighters in these areas it just does not make sense.*
  - *If most stations are 1 pump and a high rise incident occurs then where is the immediate slack in the system.*

## Place based delivery

- 5.68 The primary concerns were related to the quality of the service that would be delivered by firefighters. Due to time constraints and the potential of an operational incident arising staff felt that they would not have the time to develop effective working relationships with partners.
- *Little detail on how place based delivery is going to be delivered, so crew didn't understand the full implications. How are WM's going to deputise for SM in place based teams? If they attend meetings, what about the shifts or turnouts interfering with building relationships within these teams.*
  - *Currently across Salford and Trafford the CSA's undertake between 100 and 140 specialised /quality visits to vulnerable stakeholders at average of 90 minutes each. 90 x 120 equates to 180 hours per month. Specialist visits can require time locking off - which seems to conflict with operationally available staff.*
- 5.69 There was a lot of confusion as to what the remit actually will involve, proposals were seen as being vague. It was also noted that there is no consistent approach across the city-region, every area has a different version of place based working.
- 5.70 The removal of corporate safe and well targets is welcomed. Safe and wells and prevention programmes need to be developed by people who deliver them to ensure they are fit for purpose. It was noted that safe and well visits have already undergone an evaluation and this should not be ignored.
- 5.71 There were concerns around capacity if EMR is introduced, then there might not be sufficient time to do place based delivery.

## Decision Making



- 5.72 There is confusion around the decision making process and where responsibility lies. Decisions take too long and staff don't feel they have any influence on decision making. There are concerns about what happens when a new Mayor is elected. Some felt that decisions are politically-led.

#### **Supporting the front line**

- 5.73 Staff welcome better support and agree that investment in training, technology and equipment will improve the quality of the service.
- *Current admin structure provides good support and wouldn't want that removing. Some areas require a lot of investment prior to admin support being removed but agree that these systems may improve productivity and reduce bureaucracy.*
- 5.74 Administration tasks should not be overlooked. If admin support is removed, then better systems need to be in place. Staff felt that improved IT systems will not solve any problems. Concerns about station managers' capacity to do additional administrative tasks was raised and staff questioned whether it is a good use of their time. Many highlighted the importance of non-operational crew on supporting the front line.
- 5.75 It was noted that in the OBC, front line first appears to only refer to operational staff. Staff felt that prevention teams and CSAs should be seen as front line staff.
- *Does not feel like the proposal are supportive of the frontline. Reduction in numbers and additional workloads currently undertaken by prevention and support staff does not seem supportive. Concerns over how some of this work will be delivered at a station level.*
- 5.76 Through the staff feedback form, respondents were asked a number of quantitative questions, specifically around how much information they'd read prior to making a response, and also to what extent they agreed (or disagreed) with the content and accuracy of the OBC.
- 5.77 When asked if they'd read the Outline Business Case -**
- 66.67% all of it, 17.65% more than half, 5.88% less than half – 9.8% having read none of it.
- 5.78 When asked if they'd read the Appendix to the Outline Business Case -**
- 43.4% all of it, 20.75% more than half, 30.19% less than half and 5.66% none of it

#### **When asked to what extent do you agree with the content of the OBC?**

- 0% strongly agree
- 1.82% agree
- 16.36% somewhat agree
- 20% neither agree or disagree
- 21.82% somewhat disagree
- 25.45% disagree
- 14.55% strongly disagree

#### **When asked to what extent do you agree with the accuracy of the OBC?**



- 0% strongly agree
- 1.92% agree
- 7.69% somewhat agree
- 23.08% neither agree or disagree
- 25% somewhat agree
- 30.77% disagree
- 11.54% strongly disagree

- 5.79 From a number of internal respondents, there was a feeling is that there are a number of inaccuracies (as the quantitative feedback above suggests), including the data used, the staff statements used to inform the content, as well as details of prevention and youth engagement.
- 5.80 The appendix to OBC was viewed as not being robust enough, with sections of the OBC not being based on evidence. It was noted that it appears to be based on opinion, not evidence. Respondents raised questions surrounding the transparency of the OBC, specifically that only evidence in favour of the proposals have been provided, meaning that it is difficult for people to make a more rounded judgement of the proposals.
- 5.81 Some comments agreed with the content covering the fire cover review but felt that other aspects of the OBC are not based on robust rationale. Staff felt that the '*wider family of the organisation*', or non-operational staff, are not represented in the OBC. Perception that there is a lack of understanding in regards to what non-operational teams actually do.
- 5.82 Conversely, there were responses that said that they understood savings were needed, but felt it was more important to deliver the statutory work of a FRS well, rather than fail at non-statutory work (such as prevention and youth engagement).
- 5.83 There were repeat comments that there should be the same level of risk analysis for prevention activities, as there is for operational activities (as outlined in the appendix document of the OBC)
- 5.84 Perception that the document presented staff reductions as an easy option and more radical solutions should be explored, with the thought that staff in non-operational roles should have been involved at earlier stages to have an opportunity to offer counter proposals.
- 5.85 A few commented that there were factual inaccuracies in the areas in which they are familiar with, which leads to them questioning other aspects of the OBC. For example – "*Some things have been left out (Special Appliance Review) and some things could have been better (Task Analysis, Admin review) and some areas don't appear to have any evidence to back up the plans (Prevention)*"

#### **ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTIONS**

- 5.86 There were no notable alternative suggestions made by members of the public or partners.
- 5.87 There were three substantial alternative suggestions raised by staff, which had been written as a collective by individual teams. These were all received through the Programme for Change inbox –
- Volunteering services
  - Prevention services
  - Youth engagement services
- 5.88 These proposals are available at Appendices 4, 5 and 6.



5.89 There were other suggestions raised through the online form, these contained significantly less detail and have been included, verbatim below -

- *If we are looking at saving money do we need a Station Manager at every station.*
- *Remove Churchgate House and use empty stations instead.*
- *One watch felt that money could be saved by reducing the number of officers required to attend incidents.*
- *It was felt that there was no need for subsidised food or a canteen given the current circumstances.*
- *With the potential of support staff being made redundant, why are retired officers on pensions being recruited to do jobs that could be done by others?*

5.90 There were also some suggestions on how to generate income for the service:

- *If we are to continue delivering advice to schools of all stages and ages, then why can't the Mayor look at allocating funds from the education budget?*
- *Is it beyond our scope to provide a service to businesses for them to employ us a consultancy, to ensure they all meet the required Industry standards relating to their businesses without having any conflict of interest?*
- *Adult Services or other agencies could pay for the cost of fire safety items after safe and well visits. Other agencies that are currently using our safe and well services could set up a joint funding to keep the prevention teams in their areas going.*
- *Deep Fat Fryers could be purchased elsewhere for much less than we currently pay for them.*
- *Private landlords should be fitting their own smoke alarms and if a CSA has to fit one on a safe and visit they should be charged.*
- *Charge other agencies for training from GMFRS.*
- *Charge people for using GMFRS facilities.*
- *Vulnerable people could be means tested and charged for fire safety items if they are in a certain pay bracket.*
- *Could our roles be joint funded as they were in the past (Trafford/GMFRS)?*
- *Maybe identify land or property to build affordable housing for emergency service workers to rent so the Fire service can start to generate an income.*

## 6. Trade Union Consultation

### Scope

6.1 On the Monday, March 11, 2019 the Chief Fire Officer announced the proposals contained in the outline business case, which marked the start of formal consultation with the Joint Trade Unions (JTU's).

6.2 The first formal consultation meeting with the JTU's was held on March 14, 2019 and continued on a weekly basis until May 30, 2019 just prior to close of consultation. The consultation period was initially set for a 9-week period; however, this was extended to 12 weeks in line with public consultation.

6.3 On March 20, early in the consultation process, agreement on the scope of the consultation was reached, this included

- The vision, mission and purpose
- The role of the Firefighter
- Leadership and Culture
- Fire Cover Review



- Place Based working
- Supporting the front line
- Decision making

6.4 In addition, extra time was afforded to the JTU's in order that points of clarity on the OBC could be raised and discussed. Where clarification highlighted factual inaccuracies within the OBC these clarifications were logged and fed back to the programme office for action/consideration.

## Activity

- 6.5 To ensure effective management of the consultation process an issues log was established and updated on a weekly basis. The contents of the issues log was then shared not only with those attending the consultation meetings, but also with the Chief Fire Officer in his role of SRO for the Programme.
- 6.6 Requests for additional information such as the Equality Impact Assessment and Communications Plan were provided to the JTU's, along with several pieces of historical data/reports all of which added depth to the dialogue. At the request of the JTU's hard copies of the OBC made available in the workplace, across a wide range of localities.
- 6.7 In addition to the schedule of weekly meetings, further meetings took place to discuss the role of the Firefighter, riding 4's and communications.
- 6.8 An important consideration from the Authorities perspective was how to keep the workforce informed and engaged, so that they might meaningfully contribute to consultation via their respective Trade Unions. To facilitate this the Chief Fire Officer was updated on emerging issues on a weekly basis, following which a weekly Communication brief was compiled and circulated. In turn, this provided the opportunity for employees to provide feedback to the JTU's at the weekly meetings.
- 6.9 The CFO wrote to the Trades Unions on April 18, summarising the progress to date, confirming the outstanding issues from consultation and requesting that the Unions shared any concerns about the consultation process or suggestions about how it could be improved.

## Findings, themes and ideas

- 6.10 At the close of consultation, Trade unions agreed to provide written responses; these were expected by Monday 10, June 2019, allowing a further week for the collation of these.

### Fire Brigade Union

- 6.11 The FBU wrote to the Deputy Chief Fire Officer (DCFO) on June 11, 2019 advising that it was their intention to provide a full written response (appendix 2). Subsequently an email was sent to the Mayor's office on June, 23. The FBU final response was received on July 5, 2019 (appendix 2).
- 6.12 From the FBU perspective, the key issues remain that of riding 4's and the role of a Firefighter. Whilst some positive discussion was held around the role of a Firefighter, in principle the FBU remain of the belief that these issues are the subject of national negotiation and therefore no substantial changes can be agreed at a local level.

### Unison



- 6.13 The Unison response was received on June 24, 2019 (Appendix 1). The section entitled “What do we want..” can be summarised as follows:
- No decisions to be made without further detailed information – Specifically a cost benefit analysis and equality impact assessment for the proposals
  - Meaningful consultation with the Trades Unions
  - A firm commitment to no compulsory redundancies and no privatisation
  - A commitment to reconsider the funding arrangements for GMFRS and the Mayors Budget and a call on the Government for fair funding for the Fire Service
  - A reinstatement of the Fire Committee so GMFRS is scrutinised by and accountable to local Councillors
  - Any changes should be subject to proper public consultation – informing residents of what this means and giving them a real say
- 6.14 We commit to ongoing meaningful consultation with Trades Unions and to provide further detailed information as proposals are confirmed and implementation plans are developed. The next joint trades union meeting is scheduled for July 10, 2019. Meetings with the trade unions will be scheduled thereafter to continue consultation. The focus of consultation activity for that meeting will be;
- 6.15 Responding to other substantive items contained within both the FBU and Unison written response to the OBC;
- Fulfilling the commitment to all efforts to avoid compulsory redundancies of non-firefighter staff by:
- Consulting on an approach and process to offer affected individuals the opportunity to apply for Voluntary Early Retirement (VER) or Voluntary Severance (VS);
  - Fulfilling all of our legal and statutory responsibilities regarding notification of redundancies to the redundancy payments service;
  - Specifying the potential number of redundancies and the time period over which those redundancies would become effective.
  - Ensuring potentially affected staff will be offered alternative roles within GMFRS in the first instance;
  - Ensuring that once these posts are filled then remaining potentially affected staff will be offered the opportunity to apply for roles within the wider CA, including at the ten councils and GMP.
- 6.16 Throughout this process affected staff will be offered one to one meetings with HR to discuss all options open to them and to avoid the need for any compulsory redundancies.

## Recommendations

The recommendations are -

- That the content of this report and supporting documents (which contain all of the detail of the responses), will be considered by the Corporate Leadership Team, Leadership Team and Change Leads (responsible for specific areas of work).
- Any alternative proposals will be given due consideration, and where suggestions are not viable, the Change Leads will explain the rationale as to why this is the case.
- That the content of this report will be used to inform the recommendations report that is submitted to the Mayor of Greater Manchester Andy Burnham and the Deputy Mayor of Greater Manchester Beverley Hughes.

Going forward, some of the feedback will also be considered when looking at the future development of a Fire and Rescue Plan for Greater Manchester and the development of the draft Integrated Risk Management Plan.



# Appendix 1 – Response from Unison Fire GM

## UNISON FIRE GM RESPONSE 'Programme for Change'

### Introduction

Our view is that the 'Programme for Change' amounts to little else than a PLAN FOR CUTS which will put the communities of Greater Manchester and Firefighters at risk.

The cut in central Government funding for public services since 2010 are brutal and have impacted our residents. However, we expected Andy Burnham as the Mayor of Greater Manchester and with sole responsibility for the Fire Service to stand up for our public services. Instead he has been silent on the funding crisis facing Fire and Rescue Services and by freezing the budget since his election has imposed a real terms cut on GMFRS because of cost of living wage increases which our members and colleagues deserved and desperately needed.

**Both Unison and the Fire Brigades Union (FBU) fear these cuts will have a significant impact on the safety of our communities.**

THESE CUTS WILL INEVITABLY LEAD TO:

- |   |                                    |
|---|------------------------------------|
| ↑ <b>Increased attendance times</b>     | ↑ <b>More preventable injuries</b> |
| ↑ <b>Increased risk to Firefighters</b> | ↑ <b>More preventable deaths</b>   |

### **What do our members do?**

Our members work across all areas of the Service and Greater Manchester to provide support to Fire Fighters and co-ordinate and deliver frontline work to in specialist functions. We know that Andy Burnham and the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime like to refer to our members as 'back office' – they are far from it. To describe our work like this dehumanises our members and fails to recognise their expertise, their commitment and the impact they have on keeping our communities safe and supporting operational activity every day.

Our members are involved in all areas of work including;



- Delivering frontline prevention work to vulnerable residents – stopping fires happening in the first place
- Checking water hydrants vital to Firefighters attending incidents
- Designing and running Bury Safety Centre and managing community training
- Working with young people to reduce antisocial behaviour and give them opportunities that means 7 Cadet units engaging young people every week, 2925 children receiving safety education in the last year and 300 hours of support to Pupil Referral Units
- Delivering the 'Safe Drive GM' programme to over 40,000 young people
- Repairing and maintaining fire stations and appliances
- Recruiting, training and managing over 300 volunteers who have given over £1.4million worth of hours to communities
- Carrying out fire safety enforcement visits – giving advice, serving enforcement notices and making sure our high rise buildings are safe
- Delivering training – to Firefighters, Managers, colleagues and the community
- Processing explosives licences – stopping irresponsible shops selling fireworks
- Helping young people aged 18-25 into education, employment or training through Princes Trust – that means 1449 young people have undertaken Princes Trust since 2015
- Pioneering water safety intervention to reduce water deaths including the recent installation of 20 throwline safety boards at danger spots
- Cleaning stations, providing catering services and making sure Firefighters have what they need when they need it
- Leading our Inclusivity work and making sure we represent and understand our communities
- Delivering key safety messages in schools across Greater Manchester all year round

We don't think this is 'Back Office' and we do think it's important - Prevention saves lives - this has been proven all around the country. We note that the approach which was arguably pioneered by GMFRS to expand the scope of what was previously a 'home safety check' focussed primarily on providing equipment to a **person centred fire risk assessment** (known as a 'safe and well' visit) enabling bespoke advice and support to be provided is being progressed nationally and is supported by NFCC. In this respect GMFRS appears to be taking a backward step and this will be addressed in more detail later in this submission.

The breadth and range of the work undertaken by our Members is not reflected in the OBC and we do not consider that the development of the proposals has effectively considered the



complex nature of the work, the impact it has on our Communities and the savings this work delivers across other public services.

Prevention is more than fitting smoke detectors, it's about identifying people most vulnerable to fire and designing interventions to support them, it's assessing and reducing risk, it's about educating people how to stay safe, it's supporting them when they need help and making sure they know what to do if they have a fire. It's about engaging with young people so they understand the risks and don't engage in antisocial or fire setting behaviour and are given opportunities to build their confidence, obtain qualifications and access education, employment and training opportunities.

Making sure that Firefighters can respond to emergencies means that they need the right training, the right equipment and the right support – they get this from being supported by our members – we have different roles but the same goal - protecting the public. The Programme for Change should be focussed on how GMFRS ensures we deliver the best services to the residents of Greater Manchester and we do that best by working together to meet the needs of all in our Communities.

## **Our Concerns**

### **The Process prior to the release of the Outline Business Case**

There was no adequate consultation with UNISON, The FBU or UNITE as recognised Trade Unions and there has been no proper engagement with the workforce.

Instead these proposals were developed behind closed doors by consultants (costing residents of Greater Manchester £270,000) and are based on flawed evidence.

In our view there is simply no robust evidence base for many of the proposals and the 'Outline Business Case' is littered with inaccuracies. The current proposals are under pinned by two key things;

- That Firefighters will do more work (although there will be less of them) and that this can be achieved within their existing terms and conditions. This is simply not true and some of the changes will need to be negotiated nationally but negotiation won't create more time or reduce emergencies.
- An 'Activity Based Costing' exercise which cost £55,000 and has already been disregarded.

There was no negotiation or even discussion with the Trade Unions on any of the options proposed.

Although a Trade Union Forum was convened and held on a regular basis the information provided to this Forum was limited and did not relate to any of the proposals contained within the OBC and our views were never sought in relation to this. This is clearly evidenced within the minutes of those meetings and in fact is obvious from the Agenda items<sup>10</sup>.

In our view there has been a failure to engage effectively with the Trade Unions and the wider workforce which left many of our members with little confidence that the subsequent consultation was intended to be or was a meaningful process. These concerns were subsequently exacerbated by the failure to deliver a clear communication plan which details how comments would be recorded or considered and a failure to provide answers to many of

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<sup>10</sup> The Agendas and Minutes of these meetings are not appended to this submission as they are in the possession of the Organisation and should in our view already have been made available to the Project Board



the questions asked. This is considered in more detail under the 'consultation' section of this submission.

The failure to consult or engage the Trade Unions at any stage in the development of the proposals is contrary to the principles set out in the GMFRS Organisational Change Policy – in our view this is one of the essential protections for our members in relation to the terms and conditions of their employment and as such is protected by the TUPE Regulations.

**No adequate explanation has ever been provided as to why the Organisational Change Policy has not been followed.**

This is in stark contrast to previous Organisational Change reviews which occurred prior to the transfer to the GMCA and which delivered considerable budget savings. We further note that this is directly contrary to the 'GM Employment Charter' which is being developed by the GMCA and promoted by the Mayor as the standard for Employers across Greater Manchester and which has 'Workplace engagement and voice' as a key principle. In fact the Mayor himself addressed this point in March when revealing the Employment Charter on the 6<sup>th</sup> March (a mere two days before informing UNISON of 113 proposed job losses) and stated;

*"Providing good employment is a win-win for Greater Manchester businesses. We know that those employers who are best at engaging and supporting their employees are the most successful."*<sup>11</sup>

**It is entirely unclear why these principles are not being followed in relation to employees within the direct control of the Mayor.**

The OBC refers to engagement with the Trade Unions in a number of areas for example;  
p.30 references close links with the Trade Unions being retained

P.31 refers to monthly meetings taking place to update on progress and states "the unions helped shaped the vision and mission contained within this document"

p.32 refers to engagement with staff and the Trade Unions being central to the development of culture

These references give the impression that Trade Unions have been informed about the process throughout and had the opportunity to comment. This does not accord with our experience as the methodology, timeframes and work streams were not shared with us in any detail if at all.

In respect of the assertion that the Unions were given the opportunity this is simply untrue – a presentation which included the Vision and Mission was provided to the Trade Unions at a Trade Union Forum on the 18<sup>th</sup> October and there was no opportunity for us to shape it in any meaningful way at the time. It is now clear from the Appendices that this had already been determined prior to that meeting (Appendix II - Report of Chief Fire Officer dated 20/09/18). The Unions were not provided with any detail of the thinking or rationale behind the Vision and Purpose.

In respect of Trade Unions being central to the development of culture, we understand that there was a workstream looking at culture utilising an external consultant and some

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<sup>11</sup> <https://www.greatermanchester-ca.gov.uk/news/greater-manchester-s-good-employment-charter-model-revealed/>



workshops were held with Managers, however, no detail of that work has ever been shared with the Trade Unions.

There are various references to the Staff Reference Group and it is our position that this is not an adequate means to engage the workforce in developing such significant change proposals. This was raised at the first Trade Union Forum held prior to the release of the OBC and our position in relation to the status of that group remains unchanged.

It is our understanding that expressions of interest were sought from all employees and a significant number of employees volunteered. From those volunteers a small group were selected by Management we understand following a sift by and recommendations from the Communications Team.

It cannot be said that this group are reflective or representative of the workforce and it is clear that they have not had any mechanism for seeking the views of their peers and colleagues. We note that the meetings held with this group are not included within the appendices of the Outline Business Case.

**It remains our view that any assertions that the work of this group can be taken as representative of other employees or all service areas is completely untrue.** There appears to have been an over reliance on the views of a small group of selected employees in preference to communicating and engaging with the workforce and meaningful engagement with the Trade Unions.

Prior to the release of the OBC we expressed concerns about activities for which the purpose at the time was unclear. This includes the 'Activity Based Costing' exercise which appears to have been used to justify many of the proposals for reducing staff across a number of areas. Trade Unions raised concerns during this process which commenced prior to any briefings with the Trade Unions which did not take place until late September.

We were subsequently assured that these had been found to be of limited value and would not be relied upon yet that they were still heavily relied upon within the Outline Business Case. Following subsequent confirmation the Activity Based Costing would not be relied upon, the Trade Unions asked that the elements of the OBC based on this exercise were clearly highlighted – this has not been done.

In relation to administration activities we were informed towards the end of the formal consultation period that an entirely separate review of 'Admin' had been undertaken led by personnel from the GMCA. The detail of this was only provided to the Trade Unions on the 22<sup>nd</sup> May and we had not been informed let alone consulted on this process when it was undertaken.

Again it is also clear from the Appendices that decisions appear to have been taken in advance of any detailed quantitative or qualitative analysis of the work undertaken by our Members and its value to our communities. An example of this can be found on p.426 (Appendix XX Activity Based Costing October 2018) which states in respect of Youth Engagement "we understand that this may be an activity that the service looks to stop". This appears therefore to have been determined without any analysis of the advantages of this work being undertaken, no discussion with the staff and managers responsible for that work and no analysis of the impact and this is despite the report making clear that income in excess of the cost of the team is generated.



We are surprised that the scant information that was been shared with the Trade Unions has subsequently changed with no explanation and questions we asked prior to the release of the OBC were not answered. An example of this is that at a briefing provided to the Trade Unions in January that did not form part of the formal consultation and was arranged as we understand because the proposals were intended to be discussed at the GMCA meeting in February and therefore would have become a public document.

In that meeting we were told the 'Strategic Drivers' for the Programme for Change are;

- To reduce the cost basis for the service
- Ensure there is a "frontline focus" on prevention and protection activity as a key element of service delivery
- Ensure alignment with the wider organisational changes of the GMCA (although it is not entirely clear what these are)

It is clearly disappointing to our members who have committed themselves to serving the public of Greater Manchester that there was and has been no mention of **improving the services delivered** by GMFRS to better protect our communities. Following the publication of the HMICFRS Report on GMFRS it is our view that any changes to the service should be designed to address those recommendations and ensure improvements to the quality of services delivered.

In January 2019 we were told that the projected financial savings required were;

2019/20 £6.5million

2020/21 £11.8 million

2020/2021 £13.5 million

At that meeting the Trade Unions queried what consideration had been given to increasing the fire element of the Council Tax precept. We have never received a response to that query and understand that a decision on the budget setting process and Mayoral precept was made in advance of the publication of the OBC and did not include any increase for fire.

**We are concerned that no explanation has ever been provided as to why an increase in the Fire element of Council Tax was not included in the budget setting process.**

Of equal concern is a moving figure of savings to be realised and there remains a lack of clarity as to what the necessary savings are to ensure a sustainable financial model in the future.

There was no Equality Impact Analysis done in relation to the proposals and how they will affect the most vulnerable in our communities. The only Equality Impact Analysis provided was dated after the OBC was finalised and in our view is woefully inadequate.

Whilst we consider that the Trade Union Forums held after the release of the OBC provided a limited opportunity for more meaningful discussions it is disappointing that a number of queries and issues were unresolved during this period. Most notably it was made clear at the outset that the Trade Unions expected there to be transparency in relation to questions posed by employees and the responses provided. In particular we expressed concerns on behalf of our members in relation to their confidence in an 'email box' for queries to be directed to based on their previous experiences of the TUPE transfer. As a result of the concerns of our members UNISON kept a separate log of all questions and queries raised by our members - this was



provided on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of May (attached at Appendix 1) with a request for the responses to be provided to us. To date those responses have not yet been provided.

There appears to have been a complete absence of involvement and scrutiny by elected Councillors. We share the concerns of the FBU that there has been a void of any democratic and transparent governance. The dissolution of the Fire Committee shortly after its formation removed the accountability to and scrutiny from the 10 Councils that make up the GMCA with no explanation - an early indication of the worrying trend which has followed. We agree with the FBU that it is fundamental to the future of GMFRS that any plans/decisions which impact our communities, firefighters and our members and the shape of our service in the future are transparent and open to scrutiny and challenge.

There appears to have been a failure to follow the Terms of Reference for the Programme<sup>12</sup> which clearly states that “The Corporate Issues and Reform scrutiny committee will receive reports on the progress of the review regularly and ahead of decisions being taken” and yet we are unable to locate any record of any progress reports being provided to this committee.

Devolution was stated as a means of increasing democratic accountability and yet in respect of GMFRS there now appears to be a democratic deficit with no means for Councillors to be engaged or to influence decision making.

## **The Consultation**

We have significant concerns about the Consultation Process both in relation to consultation with the Trade Unions (as set out above), our members and the external consultation process.

### The External Consultation

GMFRS is an emergency service and the only part of the GMCA involved in service delivery to the public – this delivery is 24/7 365 days a year and this requires both sufficient operational cover and adequate support for operational response.

GMFRS is a vital frontline service held in high regard by the public and we consider that the communities affected by significant changes that reduce the levels and type of services available should be subject to adequate and proper consultation.

At the outset of the Trade Union consultation we asked for the Communication and Consultation Plan to be shared with the Trade Unions and offered to help shape this. We received a hard copy of a 2 page document that effectively listed dates for consultation and referred to ‘key stakeholders’. It is not clear who these key stakeholders are or how they were determined but we are aware of some key groups that were not identified - for example the Greater Manchester Youth Combined Authority were only engaged following the intervention of one of our members working in Youth Engagement.

The information provided to the public consisted of a two page summary or the full outline business case which with appendices runs to 432 pages.

The external consultation does not accord with the Cabinet Office Guidance or the LGA Guidance both of which are clearly based on legal requirements arising from case law. The

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<sup>12</sup> Terms of Reference GMFRS Programme for Change FINAL DRAFT



basic principles for consultation are often referred to as the Gunning Principles<sup>13</sup> and consist of four rules designed to make consultation a fair and a worthwhile exercise. They are:

1. that consultation must be at a time when proposals are still at a formative stage;
2. that the proposer must give sufficient reasons for any proposal to permit of intelligent consideration and response;
3. that adequate time is given for consideration and response; and
4. that the product of consultation is conscientiously taken into account when finalising the decision.

These principles have been endorsed most recently by the Supreme Court in 2014<sup>14</sup> which further developed the application of the principles in terms of who was required to be consulted, how and on what basis. It is clear from this decision that where a decision will impact on certain groups more than others they should be identified and consulted in addition to general consultation. In the Haringey case it was made clear that the public should be provided with information about proposals such as a draft scheme or policy **and** also an outline of the realistic alternatives with an indication of the main reasons for the preferred option.

The external consultation has failed to comply with these principles in a number of ways;

- the information provided was inadequate – a choice between a 2 page summary which did not address significant parts of the proposals or a 432 page business case does not enable effective engagement with the proposals
- it cannot be said the proposals are at a formative stage after 12 months of development
- no alternative options were posed and the options that had been considered and discounted were not addressed anywhere in the consultation documents
- the consultation was run exclusively online and only promoted via social media channels with a limited following compared to the population of Greater Manchester
- the consultation failed to identify particular groups who may be affected by the proposals and ensure they had the opportunity to be consulted – in 2019 this is astonishing
- the consultation did not seek views on the proposals in general or invite alternatives and was restricted to seeking views on the closure of fire stations and reduction in appliances
- the consultation exercise failed to follow the published consultation plan which specifically stated that people could make their views known and ask questions through social media channels – yet no questions posed on social media by members of the public appear to have been answered and it is unclear how comments made on social media will be logged and considered

The organisation has failed to make clear its position in relation to the consultation and clarify whether this was statutory consultation or not and has provided conflicting answers to this question. Having stated that the exercise was not the statutory consultation required for the production of the IRMP when it was queried why the public consultation did not afford respondents an opportunity to comment on proposals within the OBC relating to Prevention and Youth Engagement the following response was provided;

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<sup>13</sup> Regina v Brent London Borough Council ex parte Gunning: 1985

<sup>14</sup> R (on the application of Moseley (in substitution of Stirling Deceased) v London Borough of Haringey



*“The reason for this, is that the primary focus of the external public consultation is around the operational elements that we have a duty to consult on, as opposed to internal organisational / business decisions which are being engaged over internally.”<sup>15</sup>*

The proposals in the OBC will have significant implications for specialist prevention interventions and Youth Engagement activity in particular the delivery of the Princes Trust programme and it is our view that the consultation is flawed by the failure to consult on these elements and to identify groups likely to be affected by the proposals.

The launch of the consultation during Purdah is contrary to the recognised and established guidance from the LGA and Cabinet Office and resulted in many Local Councillors being disadvantaged from effectively engaging. We have concerns that there has been a failure to engage and consult with elected members from across Greater Manchester and their views have not been sought as part of the consultation

There was no adequate opportunity for scrutiny from Local Councillors and many decisions appear to have been made by the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime who has no legal powers in relation to the Fire Service. The Joint Trade Unions have repeatedly asked for clarification of the governance arrangements for the Programme for Change specifically who is able to make decisions and where these are recorded including the power and remit of the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime in relation to GMFRS. These queries remain outstanding.

#### The Internal Consultation

The internal consultation has left many of our members feeling disenfranchised and with no confidence in the process.

The OBC was launched at an event which was live streamed and was the first time the vast majority of employees were given any indication as to the extent of the proposed cuts. For many this involved attending an event and watching a powerpoint presentation which effectively told them they were losing their jobs.

For an organisation that claims to care about employees wellbeing this was a failure in the duty of care to employees and there was no support put in place. Although the presentation itself did not provide numbers of jobs at risks this was subsequently sent out by the Communications Team on an email at 4:30pm after the event when there was no-one available to answer questions.

The impact of this is best demonstrated in the words of members;

*“Personally I felt that everything on Monday was insensitive. I was told in front of my peers and colleagues that Prince’s Trust could be more effective and ran by another organisation. Never have I been told that I’m underperforming, but to be informed that I basically have no job, was really upsetting, humiliating and has left me feeling sad and angry”.*

*“There has been no consideration for wellbeing or impact and in my view a massive lack of basic manager skills.”*

*“I think that for the whole organisation to find out at the same time of the fate of those departments cut, with no way to prepare, digest the information before its shared widely has had a huge detrimental impact on myself and my team!”*

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<sup>15</sup> Email from the Communication & Engagement Team dated 14/05/19



*“The humiliation and trying to remain composed and trying to prepare the team the best way possible, so they are not in the same position you’ve just been in, is bad management, thoughtless, rude and quite frankly insulting with a massive taint of disrespectful!”*

*“Undervalued, junior member of staff, no respect of the people who have worked out the PFC, disengaged, love my job and passionate about the fire service but at the moment unmotivated, no recognition for all the work we have done, now they have said all the work we have done is not worth anything, so they should of let us go there and then, feel the service has let us down”*

*“The proposals, and the manner in which ‘consultation’ has been carried out, have left me feeling let down by my employer, particularly given the absence of any significant and meaningful reference to the work I do in the OBC. I have felt anger, sadness, loss, betrayal and confusion. This has left me struggling to sleep at times, demotivated, anxious and low in mood.”*

There were basic failures in the planning of the event including a failure to identify employees who were on maternity leave and ensure they were invited to attend and a failure to identify employees who were absent from work due to sickness and provide them with information and support. The effect of this was that some of our members learnt their jobs were at risk from the Manchester Evening News.

The failure to effectively engage employees absent from the workplace continued throughout the consultation and we are aware of members who received no information or discussion. This concern was first raised by UNISON on the 14<sup>th</sup> March and we requested that a mapping exercise be undertaken to identify all employees who were absent from the workplace and ensure they were provided with the opportunity to participate in the consultation. An assurance was given that this was being communicated to Managers who would ensure that all employees were contacted but we are aware of a number of cases where this did not happen and it does not appear that there was any control or monitoring of this.

We are concerned that there was a disparity of treatment across employees and not all employees were given the opportunity to consider the detailed proposals during working hours and this in particular affected lower paid part time staff specifically cleaners and catering staff. Despite ensuring there were copies of the proposals in all work places, the management teams position was that employees working fixed part time hours would not be given paid time to read the detailed proposals and participate in the consultation but could ‘read the summary document’. Our objection to this was minuted and in our view this discriminatory approach is unjustified and disadvantaged a number of our members who should have been afforded the same opportunity to participate as full time employees. We repeatedly raised concerns about an over reliance on e-mail as a means of communication as it is not used on a daily basis by a number of our members and yet no formal arrangements were put in place to address this.

The failure to answer questions from our members is a significant concern and for many has meant they feel the opportunity to provide meaningful feedback has been missed.

### **Inaccuracies within the OBC**



Despite taking 12 months to develop it is our view and the view of our members that the OBC does not provide any adequate evidence base on which decisions can properly be based. It is clear that despite the extensive use of consultants there has been a failure to understand basic concepts and to use accurate statistics. At an event for staff early on in the consultation process the GMFRS Management Team acknowledged that there were inaccuracies and invited employees to raise these on the basis that clarifications could be published alongside the OBC. To our knowledge despite a number of our members highlighting inaccuracies these have never been addressed. It is not the role of the Trade Unions to correct inaccurate or misleading information but it is our view that there elements of the OBC where the statistics are so wrong that they are completely misleading for example the OBC states that 5000 students per year attend the 'Safe Drive Stay Alive' presentations when the figure is actually more than double this.

There is information presented about current roles that is completely incorrect for example the statement that undertaking prosecution activity is aligned to and carried out by Station Managers when this has always been done at a Watch Manager level.

The proposals for changes to Youth Engagement refer to an incorrect number of Cadet units and wrongly states the age group covered.

It became apparent through the Trade Union Forum that many of the financial assumptions are wrong – for example the costing of the 76 Firefighter posts to cover the removal of roster reserves at over £50,000 per post which has now been accepted as being in the region of £40,000<sup>16</sup>. This raises concerns over the accuracy of other financial calculations.

There are fundamental concepts relating to key services that appear to have either been misunderstood or have been deliberately misrepresented – the most significant being in relation to safe and well visits. These have been presented as activity outside the scope of the core business of GMFRS and this is both incorrect and misleading. GMFRS was involved in pioneering the 'safe and well' approach which has been adopted nationally and is the approach supported by NFCC<sup>17</sup> in partnership with the LGA, NHS and PHE. The evolution of this approach involved a GM partnership approach with the NHS focussed on reducing risks to the most vulnerable residents and was clearly aligned to the public service reform agenda<sup>18</sup>. The manner in which this key element of service provision has been misrepresented suggests that either the majority of the proposals are based on a fundamental misunderstanding or that there has been a deliberate misrepresentation for ideological reasons. In either case, the recommendations based on this cannot in our view be properly relied upon.

Although the OBC claims to be underpinned by a 'robust evidence base' it is entirely unclear what this evidence base consists of and where it can be found. The proposals themselves contain plenty of conjecture but very little link to any referenced evidence or tangible improvements.

The OBC states that the Kerslake Report cited "weaknesses in the Service's culture" and yet this does not appear to be substantiated within that report which contains minimal references to the culture of GMFRS. The references to GMFRS culture contained within the report are directly related to the use of standard operating procedures to ensure the safety of firefighters

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<sup>16</sup> Item 63 Trade Union Forum Action Tracker

<sup>17</sup> <https://www.nationalfirechiefs.org.uk/Safe-and-well-principles>

<sup>18</sup> <https://www.england.nhs.uk/blog/fire-and-health-working-in-partnership/>



facing extreme hazards and how this differs from the more autonomous approach afforded to Police Officers and Ambulance Staff. The Kerslake Report specifically states “*none of these cultures is intrinsically wrong they are just different*”<sup>19</sup>. There are 14 references within the 132 page OBC to the Kerslake Report, yet that report itself mentions GMFRS culture just twice.

As our colleagues in the FBU have repeatedly highlighted many of the assertions that the role of a Firefighter can be expanded significantly in Greater Manchester outside of nationally recognised pay negotiations is misleading. Again, this undermines the claims that the OBC is underpinned by any robust evidence and calls into question whether many of the proposals are achievable.

The OBC in our view lacks any cohesive approach and appears to result in Firefighters being required to do more work in all areas with no recognition of the potential impact of this and no indication as to what additional work will be prioritised.

The OBC fails to consider any work required in relation to Inclusivity with five references in total to inclusivity or diversity. This represents a failure in the eyes of our members to recognise the legal obligations of the GMCA in relation to its Public Sector Equality Duty. The Equality and Human Rights Commission succinctly describes the purpose of this duty as being;

**‘The broad purpose of the equality duty is to integrate consideration of equality and good relations into the day-to-day business of public authorities. If you do not consider how a function can affect different groups in different ways, it is unlikely to have the intended effect. This can contribute to greater inequality and poor outcomes. The general equality duty therefore requires organisations to consider how they could positively contribute to the advancement of equality and good relations. It requires equality considerations to be reflected into the design of policies and the delivery of services, including internal policies, and for these issues to be kept under review.’<sup>20</sup> (emphasis added)**

The failure of the OBC to consider the needs of different groups and individuals in even the most cursory way coupled with the failure to undertake adequate equality impact assessments is a dereliction of this duty.

It is notable that there is no reference to the role of the GMCA and the ‘programme of reviews being undertaken across GMCA’<sup>21</sup> and no consideration of how savings and efficiencies could be delivered on a whole organisation basis. This is of particular concern given that the GMCA appears to have subsumed former GMFRS Support departments that had previously been reviewed and delivered financial savings.

## **Response to the OBC**

This response should be read in conjunction with the comments and concerns raised throughout the consultation period and the submissions of our members. It is intended to be a summary of the concerns.

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<sup>19</sup> **The Kerslake Report:** An independent review into the preparedness for, and emergency response to, the Manchester Arena attack on 22nd May (5.206)

<sup>20</sup> <https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/advice-and-guidance/public-sector-equality-duty>

<sup>21</sup> Terms of Reference GMFRS Programme for Change Final Draft



## Setting the Direction of Travel

We are encouraged that the Chief Fire Officer recognises that the key purpose of GMFRS is to serve the residents of Greater Manchester and the value of the 'brand' that has been established as a result of years of commitment by our current and former colleagues to protecting and assisting the communities they serve. Our members have also been encouraged by the recognition by the CFO at staff events of their professionalism, dedication and commitment.

We fundamentally disagree however that this is "a bottom up, top down review" in which staff have been able to play any meaningful part. We agree that staff have indicated that there need to be changes and have an appetite to improve the services they deliver. Our members have always worked in a progressive way. We made this clear in a letter hand delivered to the Mayor on the 29<sup>th</sup> March 2018 (Appendix 2) the day he spoke to staff about "root and branch review" in which we made clear that our members were not resistant to change but needed to be involved in driving it. Unfortunately no response was ever received to that letter, no meeting was arranged with the Trade Unions and our members have not been engaged or given the opportunity to identify and shape changes.

It is disappointing that therefore that there is no acknowledgement of the failures to deliver planned organisational reviews most notably the Prevention and Protection review to accommodate the TUPE transfer to the GMCA and no acknowledgement of the considerable savings already delivered.

## Vision & Mission

The claim that the Trade Unions "*helped shape the vision and mission contained within this document*"<sup>22</sup> is incorrect and misleading. As set out earlier in this document it is our position that prior to the release of the OBC there was no meaningful engagement with the Trade Unions and this is evident from the Agendas and Minutes of the meeting which we anticipate will be published as part of the consultation responses. The unions were given no opportunity to input into the vision and mission and it is now apparent this had been determined before it was shared with the unions and when it was no comments were invited.

Whilst there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the proposed 'vision, mission and purpose' feedback from our members is that this is distinctly underwhelming and does not represent anything transformational or inspiring.

The manner in which this has been developed seriously undermines the claims that the approach has been one of 'whole service engagement' and the development of a culture of 'listen, learn and change'. There has been no engagement with the workforce on the development of the vision and mission and it is evident from the Appendices (Appendix II - Report of Chief Fire Officer dated 20/09/18) that the development of this appears to have been an afterthought within the programme rather than at the outset as a driver for change. There is no clear rationale for why this fundamental element was not considered until 6 months into the "root and branch review" and was only developed a month before the proposals were originally due to be finalised.

It is accepted that our members and colleagues feel that there has been a lack of clear vision and direction in the last two years, however, the OBC does not provide any context to this, which in our view and based on what our members have told us is intrinsically linked to the

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<sup>22</sup> Para 205 OBC



transfer to the GMCA and subsequent lack of direction, governance and progress. We do not accept the assertion that our members and colleagues lack or have indicated a lack of purpose as claimed<sup>23</sup> and note that this directly contradicts the findings of the 'Cultural Enquiry' that there is a clear sense of purpose<sup>24</sup>. In our view, our members are very clear that their purpose is to serve the public of Greater Manchester whether through direct service delivery or essential support for those who do.

There is no clear explanation as to why there is a departure from the nationally recognised and consistent approach of 'preventing, protecting, responding' and concerns that the focus of the new mission on responding to emergencies undermines the nationally recognised effectiveness of prevention.

It is clear that there has been no attempt at 'whole service engagement' and we consider that there should be full and comprehensive engagement with the whole workforce before the vision or mission is finalised. If this does not occur it will simply be a 'top down' imposed set of words that an increasingly demoralised workforce is unlikely to be engaged or inspired by. We note with concern that there appears to have been no attempt to engage the public in relation to their views and expectations and this should also be considered as the 'vision and mission' should form the basis of our compact with the communities we serve.

There are concerns that despite the vision referring to a 'modern and flexible fire and rescue service' this is directly contradicted by the proposals within the OBC that are backward looking and will result in a less flexible organisation unable to ensure deliver effective and quality services across its range of statutory functions.

### Leadership & Culture

Our members are clear about the importance of strong and effective leadership across all layers of the organisation and an inclusive and respectful culture of trust and in general terms the findings of the Cultural Enquiry resonate with our members.

It is disappointing that the Trade Unions were not engaged at all with the Cultural Enquiry to the extent that we were not even notified it was taking place let alone invited to participate. This reflects what appears to be a worrying trend to exclude the representative bodies and undermine any attempts for collaborative working.

We note that the Cultural Enquiry which appears as an appendices is the only clear recognition of the impact of the transfer to the GMCA on the culture and morale of staff. The transition to the GMCA has been unsettling and disruptive for GMFRS and as yet there have seen no obvious benefits to the organisation. Instead, governance and decision-making powers, which were previously clear, are less clear. Our members have told us they feel that GMFRS no longer has its own identifiable leadership team to 'fight its corner' and that GMCA staff and others who do not understand elements of the business have disproportionate influence over its direction. The OBC briefly acknowledges this feeling amongst some staff in paragraphs 171 and 172 but does not give the matter any real consideration or address it in the recommendations.

It is notable that the OBC makes no reference at all to the 'all employee' survey conducted at the end of 2017 as part of work commissioned by the GMCA and undertaken by Fuschia Blue

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<sup>23</sup> p7 OBC

<sup>24</sup> P227 Appendix VII



in relation to Organisational Development. The results of that survey (which was only shared with the Trade Unions after formal requests as part of the consultation) make clear that the scale of challenge relating to leadership and culture is not restricted to GMFRS but is a GMCA wide problem evidence in responses to the question about the GMCA culture – described variously as ‘fragmented, divisive, siloed, confused, fractured and disparate’.

The OBC contains oblique references to service integration and alignment with the GMCA and yet is entirely silent on any changes that are required in the GMCA from a senior level to facilitate this being effective.

The OBC states that it wants to build a Service, which has a culture of trust, respect and accountability, together with effective leadership throughout the organisation. This unfortunately has not been demonstrated in the development of the OBC.

Our members have told us repeatedly that the mantra of “frontline first” is considered to be divisive and has marginalised many people and only served to exacerbate existing tensions which are highlighted in the OBC between Senior Managers and the wider workforce. It has also in the experience of some of our members licensed behaviour by a small minority of colleagues which do not accord with the values and behaviours framework of organisation and previously would have been challenged or addressed. In our view this is reflected in the findings of HMICFRS that *“Disappointingly, some people we spoke to seemed to find the poor treatment of staff by other colleagues amusing”*<sup>25</sup> and our members consider there is a direct causal link to the approach taken in relation to staff engagement by the Mayor and Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime and the language used at those and all staff events.

Our members are clear that the public of Greater Manchester are the priority and the purpose of GMFRS is to ensure their safety. We believe that this is a commitment also shared by our Operational Colleagues and the FBU. This is not reflected in the “frontline first” mantra which makes no reference to the public that everyone in GMFRS is there to serve.

Our members have told us that the language used throughout the OBC has devalued and diminished the work that they do and the approach taken to communicating the proposals did not demonstrate effective leadership. This is clearly evidenced in the section of this response relating to the Internal Consultation.

The culture of the organisation in our view should be one where all employees contributions are recognised and valued and everyone is treated with respect and consideration.

We are concerned about the lack of consideration of Inclusivity within the Organisation. The OBC contains one reference to Inclusivity and only four to Diversity and this is an area which in our view should be at the forefront of any work undertaken in relation to Leadership and Culture. This lack of consideration shows an abject failure to understand some of the challenges facing the Organisation and the work that is required to ensure that all employees are supported, feel valued and are able to bring their whole self to work. It is notable that this has also been a key concern for HMICFRS who have identified a need for urgent action to be taken - again this calls into question the claims of the OBC to be based on ‘robust evidence’ if HMICFRS in a short inspection identified this as a priority and the Programme for Change failed to do so over a 12 month period.

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<sup>25</sup> HMICFRS Report p.32



Our members have been instrumental in progressing this area of work in the Organisation over the last two years through work to develop an Inclusivity Strategy, leading on Positive Action in recruitment, leading on the development of all of the current Staff Networks and for many years working with underrepresented groups in our Communities. The OBC fails to recognise the work that has already been undertaken, the work that is required and does not consider the impact of cutting the number of proposed posts. This is an area that requires urgent reconsideration and prioritisation.

### Fire Cover Review

We have concerns that the proposals to close fire stations and reduce the number of appliances available at all times of day pose a risk to our communities and our operational colleagues.

We support our FBU colleagues in their resistance to implementing a system of work through riderships of 4 that will increase the risk to Firefighters and leave them facing an impossible choice of acting to protect the public or acting in accordance with recognised safe systems of work against well-established guidance which is clear that *“...it is essential to avoid situations which could motivate or pressurise firefighters to act unsafely in the interest of saving life.”*<sup>26</sup>

The safety of residents should be the main priority of GMFRS and we are concerned that comparisons to the national response times are misleading and do a disservice to the communities we are here to serve. It also directly contradicts the proposed vision of a modern and flexible fire and rescue service if the ambition for the service is simply to exceed national response times which reflect the significantly longer response times in rural areas.

We believe that the impact of these proposals have not been made clear to the public – for example that for a house fire with persons reported in accordance with the CAST methodology nine Firefighters will be required which would mean under the OBC proposals in excess of 12 minutes before the required number of Firefighters would be in attendance. This has not been made clear to the public.

It has been publicly stated on a number of occasions by the Mayor and Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime that there was inadequate evidence to support the IRMP which was suspended. The reason for this has not been made clear. It is our understanding that the same methodology was used for modelling the IRMP and the Fire Cover Review and much of this work was undertaken by our members. The key difference appears to be the application of ‘professional judgement’ which is referred to in the appendices of the OBC but it is not clearly documented what or how this professional judgement has been applied.

It is in our view significant that HMICFRS did not have any concerns about the IRMP or the manner in which it was developed but rather stated;

**Greater Manchester FRS has a good understanding of the risks to its local community. It used this understanding to create its current integrated risk management plan (IRMP), which covers the years 2016–20. The IRMP includes proposals to change the fire cover arrangements and meet financial targets.**

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<sup>26</sup> Review of Standards of Emergency Cover – Technical Paper C – Response & Resource Requirements



**The service's IRMP for 2016–20 provides clear summaries of the key risks. These include demographic changes, growth in housing and employment, and increases in transport. The IRMP guides the direction of the service and is in line with the requirements of the national framework.<sup>27</sup>**

It is entirely unclear why when this objective analysis by the recognised Inspectorate of Fire and Rescue Services based on a robust inspection methodology has concluded there are no concerns over the IRMP the work undertaken on the Fire Cover Review can be said to have been necessary. It is unclear how much this exercise has cost in monetary terms but it is clear the suspension of the IRMP has resulted in a failure to make identified and agreed savings over the last 18 months.

The Trade Unions have been informed that the modelling used to underpin the OBC has factored in the projected growth in population for Greater Manchester but how this has been done is not clearly evidenced. A common sense view dictates that when there are currently proposals to build “a town the size of Lancaster”<sup>28</sup> on the outskirts of the city centre (which has already seen significant population growth in the last ten years - a trend which is projected to increase) the removal of fire stations and reduction of fire appliances serving this area poses an obvious risk.

It is difficult to reconcile the proposals within the OBC with the evidence that accidental dwelling fires are increasing and there has been an increase in fire related fatalities with the claim that this is to create a service “fit for the future”. If the ambition of GMFRS is simply to have response times “faster than the national average” and only meet response times on 80% of occasions in our view it will not be able to describe itself as an organisation ‘fit for purpose’ never mind the future. We aren’t sure when the ambition for Greater Manchester was to be just a bit better than ‘average’ - our communities deserve better than this and certainly do not deserve a lower standard than London and Birmingham.

### Role of a Firefighter

We support the FBU in their position that nationally recognised negotiation mechanisms should not be undermined. The failure of the OBC to clearly set out the scope of possibilities for expanding the role of a Firefighter on a local level is of concern and results in the proposals within the OBC being misleading. Similarly although there references to changes in the role map being properly remunerated there is no consideration as to the financial impact this would have and how increased costs would be achieved. This is of particular concern given the claim to want to put GMFRS on a sustainable financial footing and the failure to increase the Council Tax precept for the last two years to reflect just the cost of living increases awarded as a result of national pay negotiations.

The OBC is predicated on Firefighters doing more in all areas; more training, more prevention, more protection, more youth engagement with fewer staff and appliances in an area with an increasing population so an obvious consequent increase in attendance at incidents.

Again despite claiming to have a robust evidence base, the OBC does not clearly articulate how this can be achieved within the time available to Operational Crews, nor is there adequate

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<sup>27</sup> HMICFRS Effectiveness, efficiency and people 2018/19 An inspection of Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service published 20/06/19

<sup>28</sup> <https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/manchester-housing-chinese-loan-collyhurst-16455486>



consideration of the impact that this will have on the quality of service provision in any area. The OBC refers to targeting prevention work better and then fails to consider how mobilisation to an emergency incident will impact on the quality and effectiveness of visits and affect the recipients of the service.

The OBC refers to a desire to “stop working in silos” but contains no references as to where this view has been formed and what these ‘silos’ are. GMFRS has a strong record of partnership working and developing innovative practices. The proposals to devolve management and delivery of **all** prevention activity to local teams is directly contradictory to any claim to prevent silo working and our members are concerned this will lead to inconsistency in the range and quality of work delivered.

The expectation that Firefighters will be expected to play a greater role in the provision of place-based prevention and protection activity (including youth engagement) with a view to cutting specialist non-operational staff currently undertaking co-ordination of this work and delivery in the most complex cases fails to recognise the nature of much of the work done by CSAs and how Crews and Community Safety teams currently work together. There has been little acknowledgement of the knowledge needed for these activities, the experience that will be lost and the training requirements that will be needed in order for Crews to carry out these roles. There is a lack of knowledge, for the average fire fighter in certain areas of activities such as protection, this was highlighted in the protection recruitment, which took place approx. 2 years ago. Although this has been picked up in point 323 in the OBC there is no clear recommendation as to how long training will take and how it will be delivered within the proposed level of resourcing in the OBC.

The OBC fails to recognise or acknowledge that the majority of prevention activity is already delivered by Operational Crews and therefore fails to identify how these proposals will in any way enhance and improve the services delivered to residents. The claims within the OBC and at the launch event that Firefighters have stated they want to do more prevention work and ‘there is a clear appetite to undertake all elements of the role...currently delivered by non-operational staff’ is not substantiated by the notes of visits by the Mayor and Deputy Mayor provided to the Trade Unions and does not appear to relate to the current evidence base which suggests 95% of prevention work is already undertaken by Firefighters.

The OBC also fails to make clear that Place Based Working is not yet in place, and there will not be a common approach to this across Greater Manchester.

The proposals in relation to the delivery of Youth Engagement by Firefighters are entirely unclear and again the OBC fails to recognise the extent that Firefighters are already engaged in this work delivering school visits to every primary school in Greater Manchester. There is no consideration in the OBC as to the increase in workload if Operational Crews are expected to also deliver educational interventions in secondary schools and how this can realistically be achieved. There is no detail as to what ‘fire related youth engagement’ activity will involve and what training will be required to deliver this.

In our view the proposals to increase the workloads of Operational Crews are undeliverable within existing capacity and there is no consideration in the OBC as to how this increased



workload will be apportioned against the current purported capacity this is particularly significant given the stated desire to reintroduce emergency medical response.

### Place Based Working

There are numerous references in the OBC to place based working and yet no acknowledgement of the work that has already been undertaken by GMFRS in relation to piloting this and no evaluation of the same.

A key concern is that the OBC fails to recognise that this model of delivery is not yet established and there is an over reliance and over simplification of the links between this and GMFRS services. The suggested role of Protection in relation to place based working demonstrates this point and suggests that those preparing the OBC have not thoroughly considered the 'Greater Manchester Model: Further, Faster'<sup>29</sup> as it is apparent that other Regulatory Services (key partners for Protection Activity) do not form part of the proposals or model for place based working.

It became clear at the Trade Union Forum dedicated to this topic that there has been little analysis undertaken of how referrals currently work between GMFRS and partner agencies and the proposals seem to indicate a cyclical referral system is likely to be introduced.

The use of Station Managers to support place based working does not appear to have been analysed in sufficient detail in relation to capacity, effectiveness and efficiency. On the information provided in the OBC in relation to Station Manager numbers it is clear in our view that it will not be possible for attendance at all 'hubs' which undermines the premise of the proposals for more targeted and integrated working. In particular there is no analysis of the impact of operational cover on how GMFRS will be able to contribute to place based meetings and the relative cost of a Station Manager in supporting this. In addition the presentation delivered to staff which sets responsibilities in relation to place based working to area delivery teams does not appear to have any clear links with existing role maps and does not define the nature of the work involved.

There is no consideration in the OBC to the likely training needs required to ensure operational staff have the necessary skills and knowledge to participate effectively in partnership working.

It is clear that those residents who are most at risk, likely to be discussed as part of a multi-agency approach and consequently generate referrals from place based hubs will be amongst the most vulnerable and in need of more specialist advice it is our view that this cannot be effectively delivered by Firefighters in the context of other demands on their time.

### Prevention

GMFRS has previously been recognised as a Trailblazer in Prevention activity and much of this work has been aligned to the Public Service Reform Agenda. The failure of the OBC to recognise the development of Prevention work, consider the work being undertaken nationally and undertake any qualitative analysis is a source of considerable concern.

Partnership working has been the cornerstone for the development of prevention initiatives and has included significant work with partners in Health and Social Care<sup>30</sup> and others across

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<sup>29</sup> Appendix XVI The Greater Manchester Model: Further, Faster - Reforming Public Services

<sup>30</sup> <https://www.gmmh.nhs.uk/download.cfm?doc=docm93jjm4n2834.pdf..>



Greater Manchester as well as leading the development of national approach to partnership working with the NHS<sup>31</sup> and others through the 'Working Together' national guidance documents agreed and produced by NHS England, the Chief Fire Officers Association, Public Health England, Age UK and the Local Government Association in 2016.

This existing and established approach to partnership working is not reflected in the OBC which fails to recognise the value of working with national partners currently undertaken by the Central Support Team and the impact of local partnership working delivered by the area prevention teams. This approach to partnership working generates significant activity aligned to risk factors in April 2019 this generated over 1000 safe and well visits and 200 referrals to fit protective equipment for people at risk of Arson.

The OBC appears to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of effective partnership working – for example it refers to 'many partnerships are formed informally locally' (para 275) rather than through a formal documented partnership. This is the benefit of effective partnership working on a local level where a formal partnership is not always appropriate or possible – developing an understanding of the role of each organisation and working together where appropriate to meet the needs of residents.

Again there is a lack of evidence for the claims that the service has spent a disproportionate amount of time and energy on partnerships that do not benefit GMFRS. The partnerships developed and delivered through Prevention align closely to the known risks of fire and other emergencies – for example the Safe Drive Stay Alive collaboration developed through the Safer Roads GM partnership. The links between fire risk and other vulnerabilities and needs is clearly established and it is well evidenced that those likely to suffer with health & wellbeing issues on a wider scale are also those at highest risk of fires and they tend to be vulnerable people. This was recognised in the independent evaluation of 'safe and well' as a concept undertaken by New Economy in 2016<sup>32</sup>

The role of GMFRS in developing and delivering partnerships has been recognised on a local and national level and has been replicated by other Fire and Rescue Services for example the long standing partnership with Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust<sup>33</sup>. It is notable in our view that the OBC does not provide any evidence or analysis to support the claims in relation to partnership working.

The OBC claims that the proposals will prioritise both strengthening and development of relationships with place based delivery teams and integration and collaboration with other blue light services but contains no adequate detail as to how this will be achieved with less resources across all functions.

The removal of dedicated and specialist Community Safety staff will leave the most vulnerable people in our communities at risk. The prevention teams often come across people who are not known to any other partner agencies. They regularly connect residents with other appropriate care support measures, to not only ensure that they are as safe as

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<sup>31</sup> <https://www.england.nhs.uk/blog/jacquie-white-3/>

<sup>32</sup> GMFRS Safe and Well Visits: A Cost-Benefit Analysis New Economy 22/06/16

<sup>33</sup> <https://www.penninecare.nhs.uk/news-and-events/news/2018/02/event-marks-success-of-fire-and-mental-health-partnership/>



possible from risk of fire but that they can also live safely and independently at home for as long as possible.

Community Safety Teams (CST) work with a variety of people from young carers, hoarders, drug and alcohol users to heavy smokers, older residents, people with mental health conditions including Alzheimer's and Dementia. The reason for a lot of their success is their ability to be able to spend time with people who may need a bit longer to have things explained to them something which firefighters (remaining available for incidents) will not be able to do.

The proposed changes will undo much of the good work which has been done by GMFRS staff over the past 10 years. This work has helped to reduce fire deaths and injuries, road traffic accidents (through education), reduce death by drowning, improve the knowledge of the public relating to CPR and defibrillator use, reduce ASB, (particularly around the bonfire night period), safeguarding the most vulnerable in society and will be undone if the cuts are allowed to continue.

There has been concern from Partners about the prospect of a fire engine visiting vulnerable occupants and delivering a five-minute intervention or not being able to turn up due to being called to an incident. There are also questions with regard to Firefighters flexibility and reliability to be able to deliver effective interventions to all schools whilst remaining available for emergencies.

Partners have expressed concerns about fire engines turning up on the doorstep of someone who has had domestic abuse issues. Staff in plain clothes and unmarked vehicles often undertake these visits – the proposals within the OBC make no consideration of these sensitive and complex cases.

Whilst GMFRS are looking to cut Prevention activity, other Services are currently investing in Community Safety and Prevention teams. It is notable that following a period of significant vacancies in the Prevention teams the HMICFRS report has identified that this area requires improvement in relation to targeting vulnerable residents – the work that is primarily done by Prevention Specialists who have been under resourced since the transfer to the GMCA. The proposals within the OBC will only exacerbate this. Conversely Merseyside were rated as 'Outstanding' in this area following a period of investment and an effective approach combining Operational Crews with more complex work being undertaken by Specialist Staff. It appears that GMFRS is moving further away from modern, flexible and progressive approaches to Prevention.

It is our view that the proposals within the OBC will be damaging and unsustainable to deliver improvements and to ensure the most vulnerable residents receive an appropriate and high quality service it is vital that some resource be allocated to the continuation of specialist support staff to deliver this work. Every £1 invested in prevention saves partners £2.51 in responsive interventions. In 2016/17 prevention work with vulnerable residents saved the NHS alone £851,738. The cost of removing specialist teams who carry out targeted work with the highest risk residents will cost already stretched partners and impact on the quality of life of residents.

The proposals within the OBC do not appear to align with the Priorities within the Greater Manchester Strategy and the removal of specialist prevention teams is likely to exacerbate the



already behind target priorities of reducing hospital admissions due to falls and admissions to residential and nursing care<sup>34</sup> key indicators of Priority 10 of the Greater Manchester Strategy.

The proposals in relation to other areas of Prevention work in particular co-ordination of campaigns and work to tackle other emergencies lack any evidence as to how this will be a more efficient and effective means of delivering this essential area of work. The OBC fails to recognise the impact of this work which has been well evidenced and demonstrated elsewhere and provides no detail as to how consistency of approach will be achieved. The OBC is inaccurate in many of the statistics provided and this has not been addressed. The work undertaken in relation to Safe Drive Stay Alive and Drowning Prevention has received little consideration and we would draw attention to the feedback of key partners in relation these initiatives which clearly set out the impact of removing a dedicated resource would have.

### Protection

There is relatively little reference to the work undertaken by Protection and the importance of this area following the fire at Grenfell. However, there appears to be little detailed analysis of the work required to ensure the safety of residents and the relationships with other areas of the organisation.

It is reassuring that the role of our members in these teams appears to have been recognised and we would urge formalisation of these roles at the earliest opportunity as our members working in this area have been in temporary positions in some cases for in excess of five years.

Although the proposed structures suggested the recreation of the Business Safety Advisor Apprentices there is no indication as to how this will be delivered and supported in the context of significant cuts to other support services and in particular youth engagement.

### Youth Engagement

The OBC contains an inadequate level of detail on the proposals for Youth Engagement which in our view is at best disingenuous and at worst dishonest given that following the release of the OBC the GMCA Communications & Engagement Team released a table stating that 22 posts in this area at risk. Similarly the claim that “*We will refocus youth engagement activity on fire-related interventions*”(p.52) is misleading as youth engagement activity is already fire related.

It is clear that whilst the OBC refuses to state it clearly, that GMFRS youth engagement programmes are clearly under ‘threat’ of removal. This appears to have been determined well in advance of the publication of the OBC and any discussions with the Trade Unions and employees and without any analysis of the quantitative and qualitative benefits of this work. This is evident from the appendices accompanying the OBC as p.426 (Appendix XX Activity Based Costing October 2018) states in respect of Youth Engagement “we understand that this may be an activity that the service looks to stop”. This appears therefore to have been determined without any analysis of the advantages of this work being undertaken, no discussion with the staff and managers responsible for that work and no analysis of the impact and this is despite the report making clear that income in excess of the cost of the team is generated.

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<sup>34</sup> Greater Manchester Strategy Implementation Plan and Performance Update Report of Andy Burnham Mayor of Greater Manchester 18/06/19



GMFRS has a long and proud association in youth engagement, the GMFRS brand and reputation is positive within the communities of Greater Manchester and is attractive to children and young adults. Experience has shown that many of the young people and disadvantages groups who have worked with the service have felt they were viewed 'differently', when representing the service and that people looked at them with respect. The social impact and value that these programmes provide is amazing and needs to be capitalised on, not cut to make short term savings.

We note that the work undertaken by the current Youth Engagement teams directly aligns to the Greater Manchester Strategy Priority 2 'Young People Equipped for Life'. There is no clear rationale provided for removing the Princes Trust Programme which has already assisted over 1500 young people into education, employment or training since 2015 when the corresponding target in the Greater Manchester Strategy is currently not being met and was rated 'red' in the latest performance report<sup>35</sup>.

It is unclear how the current costs of the Princes Trust provision have been determined and we understand from our members that this element of the Organisation is currently being levelled with 'corporate recharges' amounting to £15,000 per employee. Despite requesting information in relation to this it has not been received and we are concerned that any financial analysis of this team is fundamentally flawed.

The OBC fails to provide any sufficient explanation of the existing youth engagement offer which in respect of other youth engagement interventions. Over the twelve month period from April 2018 to March 2019, the Targeted Youth Engagement Team;

- Engaged with 2925 children across Greater Manchester;
- Carried out educational prevention/harm reduction interventions with just over 2,000 of them;
- Delivered alternative curriculum programmes with four Pupil Referral Units/Behaviour Schools. Sixty-six vulnerable and at risk young people spent 300 hours based on a Fire Station as part of these programmes;
- Managed seven cadet units with the support of GMFRS volunteers to provide this programme to 112 Community Fire Cadets attending on a weekly basis;
- Carried out educational behaviour change interventions with children and young people who set fires (FireSmart)
- Delivered a number of the above sessions jointly with operational firefighters
- Provided consultancy and support to operational and Prevention colleagues on all youth engagement-related issues (including carrying out risk assessments)

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<sup>35</sup> Greater Manchester Strategy Implementation Plan and Performance Update Report of Andy Burnham Mayor of Greater Manchester 18/06/19



- Acted as local first point of contact for safeguarding concerns regarding children and young people
- Assisted young people to engage in GMFRS activities e.g. Pride, Manchester Parade, operational training exercises, GM Youth Combined Authority, Fire Station Open Days and Charity Car Washes

These interventions are targeted towards the most vulnerable children and young people across Greater Manchester; that is those in care, those outside mainstream education, and those working with Youth Offending Services. Again this work directly aligns with Priority 2 of the Greater Manchester Strategy.

The current cost of this service is in the region of £25,000 for each Local Authority area. In Stockport and Tameside alone intervention has been undertaken with 1270 children and young people across the Firesmart, ASB and Arson Prevention, the Cadet scheme and seasonal prevention work - this represents an average cost of £19.68 per young person a year.

The OBC makes numerous references to Firefighters undertaking more youth engagement activity but fails to specify what this will involve and how it can be delivered in relation to the priorities of the Greater Manchester Strategy and statutory safeguarding responsibilities. Nor is there any consideration as to how this will be a more effective and efficient method of delivery than the existing model. It is our view that a considerable number of the existing proven interventions simply will not be possible to deliver.

The work of our members in Youth Engagement is not 'nice to do' but forms part of the organisations statutory duties in relation to fire safety and preventing fires. The lack of engagement with young people in the consultation and failure to undertake any equality impact assessment is a significant concern.

**A full cost benefit analysis and impact assessment should be undertaken before any changes are agreed to this service and young people must be consulted.**

#### Essential Support Function ('Admin')

The status of the OBC in providing any robust evidence base for the current proposals relating to administrative support and the cutting of 27 posts is entirely discredited by the acceptance that the Activity Based Costing exercise undertaken was inadequate and the subsequent confirmation it has been disregarded and will not be relied upon.

There is simply no evidence available to support the assertion that 27 posts can be removed from the structures and replaced by enhanced digital solutions.

It is notable that the current ratio of employee to administrative support staff within GMFRS is 1:0.04 – in stark contrast to the provision of business support officers to the Mayor's Office which has an equivalent ration of 1:5<sup>36</sup>.

The OBC seems selective in its reliance on the feedback of staff as having reviewed the notes of the visits carried out by the Mayor and Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime it seems clear

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<sup>36</sup> Mayoral General Budget and Precept Proposals Report of Andy Burnham, Mayor of Greater Manchester 19/02/19



that consistently there was a call for increased administrative support for all frontline staff not a reduction.

The OBC has failed to consider or analyse the breadth of work undertaken by administrative support teams across the organisation and failed to identify significant seasonal workloads - for example Explosives Licensing and booking Treacle related visits.

The proposals for administration are arguably where the lack of cohesion within the OBC is most evident - it obviously fails to account for the proposals elsewhere within the document. For example there is no acknowledgement that an increased workload in relation to Prevention, Protection and Youth Engagement for Firefighters will increase the amount of administration required. It fails to acknowledge the impact of the proposals on the workload of managers and it is fanciful to suggest that moving administrative work onto managers is efficient – cutting an administrative post may make a financial saving but expecting managers to undertake the work is far from efficient.

The OBC fails to recognise the specialist nature of some of the work and the knowledge required to underpin this work - this is particularly relevant to administrative support related to legal and enforcement functions such as Water and Protection administrative support, Resourcing and supporting the Command Support Room.

Our members have submitted detailed responses on the work they undertake and the volume of this work in addition to the impact this has on those working in frontline roles that they support.

The Trade Unions requested that information be provided as to the processes that have been identified as capable of being replaced with more effective digital solutions as set out within the OBC. This information was requested on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of May and has never been provided which further undermines confidence that there is any sound evidence base on which these proposals are based.

**The proposals for administration support lack any evidence and require significant further analysis.**

#### Other areas

There are a number of areas which are either not addressed or not covered in sufficient detail within the OBC which is a cause for concern to our members.

#### Cleaning & Catering Staff

The only mention of these essential functions appears in para 85 of the OBC which states “we will explore whether facilities services such as catering, cleaning and security could be better delivered by specialist providers or through more collaborative arrangements” but not detail of what this may entail or when it will be explored is provided.

We are grateful that the Mayor publicly clarified that this did not mean any privatisation of these services<sup>37</sup> and presume that this means that any outsourcing to private companies has also been ruled out.

Our members who work in these areas of the service are as important and should be as valued in the same way as any other employee. We are concerned that they have not been given the

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<sup>37</sup> @AndyBurnhamGM tweet 12/05/19 17:30



same opportunity to engage in the consultation in the same way as others in the Organisation and that this vague reference is unhelpful and unsettling.

### Volunteering

There are no clear references within the OBC to volunteering and it is entirely unclear what the proposals are for the team undertaking the co-ordination of volunteers. This has caused considerable concern to our members working in this area.

### Leigh Technical Services

It is entirely unclear how the proposals affect those working at Leigh Technical Services departments in a number of roles. It is hard to see how there will not be implications for our members working in this area including administration staff and yet there has been no indication as to the extent that the proposals contained in the OBC will affect this area.

### Training & Development Centre

The proposals for the closure of Manchester Central Fire Station are clear. Following the briefing on the 8<sup>th</sup> March and the staff event on the 11<sup>th</sup> clarification was sought as to whether there was an intention to close this site. No formal clarification has been provided but it has been intimated that the intention is to sell this site along with the Fire Station. If that is the proposal it should have been clearly identified within the OBC.

The OBC references exploring opportunities for income generation through assets like TDC and we consider this should be escalated as there is the potential to draw in significant income from room hire which is not currently charged on a similar basis to other public sector venue hire. This would assist in the funding of essential staffing posts in that area.

### Other Support Services

The Trade Unions have repeatedly asked for clarification as to which teams and services are within the remit of GMFRS and no explanation to this has been provided. It now transpires that the GMCA has subsumed the majority of support services without any formal consultation or notification for employees and in direct contradiction to what they were told as part of the TUPE transfer.

It is now entirely unclear which employees are in scope for redundancy – at the point of TUPE transfer GMFRS employed in the region of 450 non-operational staff which meant that the proposed cuts of 113 posts was a reduction of 25%. Through discussions at the Trade Union Forum it has been stated that there 160 non-operational GMFRS employees in scope in terms of redundancy which is a cut of 70%. There has been no clarification as to how this has been determined.

It seems apparent that the GMCA has benefitted from all of the efficiencies made by GMFRS prior to the TUPE transfer, added additional workload for our members in key services through an increased employment base and is now recharging GMFRS for these services without any corresponding reduction in cost. The clearest example of this is the Communications and Engagement Team which has been part of a service review and had an increased budget and structure but GMFRS is recharged over £420,000 almost half the cost of the team for a much diminished service.

### The Financial Position



The OBC contains no assessment of the impact of previous years of cuts. The Mayor and the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime have told the workforce that under the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Authority the service was financially mismanaged. In our view this is unfair and misleading as under the GMFRA;

- £28 million of savings (– a 25% budget cut) were delivered between 2009/10 – 2015/16
- A plan was agreed in 2016/17 for further savings of £14m by 2020 based on a 1.99% Council Tax Precept increase – keeping GMFRS as the third lowest Fire Service for Council Tax contributions (amongst precepting Authorities)
- £8 million of savings had been delivered by the time the IRMP was suspended.
- Over £1.25 m of savings were delivered from Management and Support Services by 2017/18 by working with the Trade Unions on reviews – these services have now mostly been swallowed by the GMCA “

HMICFRS did not identify any concerns with the financial management of GMFRS stating *“The service has a good track record of making savings, although the savings identified in its IRMP have not been realised”*<sup>38</sup>.

Whilst a significant proportion of funding for GMFRS is derived from central Government and there have been sustained cuts to this funding these have been known and anticipated for some time and were factored into the IRMP. The decision to freeze the Council Tax element of the GMFRS budget despite a known increase in the pay budget due to cost of living increases and pension changes, suspending the IRMP and delaying reviews has worsened the cuts that will harm our communities.

We are concerned that there is and has been little transparency in relation to the financial position of GMFRS following the transfer to the GMCA and that some of the existing recharges are disproportionate and unreasonable. For example it appears that the cost of financial support services for GMFRS have increased by almost £200,000 following the transfer to the GMCA and now cost £808,996<sup>39</sup>. Similarly there is a £399,781 recharge for ‘additional support services’ that didn’t exist prior to the transfer to the GMCA and the costs of the HR service have increased.

It is of great concern therefore that despite repeated requests to look at how savings and efficiencies could be made by looking at the whole organisation the GMCA has refused to consider this despite 7.2% of the GMFRS budget for 2018/9 being allocated to GMCA recharges.

**To put this into context the cutting of 113 predominantly front line posts in GMFRS is projected to save £4.8 million whilst £7 million is being spent in recharges to the GMCA with no proposed reductions.**

We also note with concern the proposals that in addition to the £270,000 already spent on consultants the OBC proposes to incur a further £0.972 million on ‘external project team costs’ with no clear rationale or justification for doing so.

When considering savings and efficiencies cost benefit analysis is important in our view. The OBC does not contain any element of cost benefit analysis in relation to the work delivered by GMFRS and it does not appear that any cost benefit analysis has been undertaken following the transfer to the GMCA.

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<sup>38</sup> HMICFRS Report p.22

<sup>39</sup> Summary Spreadsheet ‘Corporate Recharges’ provided at Trade Union Forum on the 23/05/19



The OBC claims to have been developed in accordance with the Green Book Treasury Model, however, it is less clear how this has been done in practice. The Treasury Green Book Model makes clear that there should be emphasis on the robustness of delivery plans and cost benefit analysis – both of which are notable in their absence from the OBC.

The Treasury Green Book makes it clear that following a long list of options, these should be narrowed down using social cost benefit analysis or social cost effective analysis. This should then assist in identification of a preferred option. It is clear that this is a significant element of the Green Book approach as set out in Chapter 2;

### **Valuing relevant costs and benefits**

**2.10 Social CBA requires all impacts – social, economic, environmental, financial etc. – to be assessed relative to continuing with what would have taken place in the absence of intervention, referred to in the Green Book as Business As Usual.**

**2.11 The relevant costs and benefits are those for UK society overall, not just to the public sector or originating institution. They include costs and benefits to business, households, individuals and the not-for-profit sector. Assessing the costs and benefits across all affected groups matters as a relatively low-cost public sector option, such as a new regulation, may have significant costs for businesses or households.**

It is surprising therefore that no such evaluation appears to have been undertaken and the only reference to ‘cost benefit analysis’ is in relation to an independent evaluation of Emergency Medical Response that demonstrated for every £1 spent £6 was saved to partners<sup>40</sup>. This presumably underpins the desire for this work to be undertaken by Firefighters again in the future.

It is less clear however, why the results of other cost benefit analysis exercises have not been included.

Based on the last Cost Benefit Analysis undertaken by GMFRS for 2015/16<sup>41</sup> the benefits to the public from expenditure on GMFRS are;

- ✓ £1 invested in response provides £18 of savings in life and property.
- ✓ In 2015/16 GMFRS saved lives which are invaluable but on Government costings saved £249.8
- ✓ GMFRS saved £802 million in saved property.

This is based on having an effective and efficient emergency response function.

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<sup>40</sup> P.22 para 150

<sup>41</sup> GMFRS Cost Benefit Analysis Report 2015/16 available at [authority.manchesterfire.gov.uk/.../162.22.09.16.Cost%20Benefit%20Anal...](http://authority.manchesterfire.gov.uk/.../162.22.09.16.Cost%20Benefit%20Anal...)



As outlined earlier in this document every £1 invested in prevention saves partners £2.51 in responsive interventions. In 2016/17 prevention work with vulnerable residents saved the NHS alone £851,738.

The cuts proposed will not just affect our residents but will place increased strain on other services and inevitably cost more in the long run.

**A full cost benefit analysis of all areas of proposals within the OBC should be undertaken alongside equality impact assessments before any decisions are made.**

### **The Impact**

It is common sense that these cuts will harm our communities. In our view the proposals are at best disingenuous and at worst dishonest as they imply that the service will not suffer but this is what is being proposed

- |                                   |   |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| X 194 less Firefighters - 15% cut | X 115 less support staff up to a 70% cut                  |
| X 9 less Fire Engines             | X Stopping targeted prevention work                       |
| X 3 less Fire Stations            | X Stopping Volunteering activity                          |
| X Longer response times           | X Reducing Youth Engagement work & stopping Princes Trust |
| X Reducing Riderships to 4        | X Cutting administrative support to Firefighters          |

This is at a time when 2017/18 saw

↑ **Accidental dwelling fires increase by 2.77%**

↑ **21 fire related fatalities**

↑ **Other incidents increased 19%**

In our view this will mean

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| X Preventable fires will increase                                      | X Princes Trust Delivery will stop                            |
| X Firefighters taking longer to get to emergencies every second counts | X Vital reassurance work after serious fires will stop        |
| X Delays in rescues and an increase in serious injuries                | X Vulnerable people will be left at risk of having a fire     |
| X Partnership work to assist the most vulnerable will stop BB          | X Safety visits to schools and community training will reduce |

**What do we want....**

**No decisions to be made without further detailed information**



It is clear from the feedback from our members, our colleagues, the public (12,281 signatures to the FBU petition and comments on social media) and locally elected Councillors that there is widespread concern about and opposition to these proposals.

The current plans for cuts should be abandoned and revised proposals developed with the workforce and Trade Unions in line with the stated commitments to fully engage people.

The OBC does not provide a sufficient evidence base on which to inflict long lasting and irreversible damage to a vital public service. A full review of the gaps in the OBC should be undertaken alongside a cost benefit analysis and equality impact assessment for the proposals before it can be relied upon.

In the short term, the IRMP which has been assessed by HMICFRS as being effective and robust (resulting in a score of Good in the category of 'Understanding the risk of fire and other emergencies') should be reinstated to reduce reliance on reserves and deliver savings.

The control of GMFRS should in line with the Constitution, be clearly placed with the Chief Fire Officer with the authority to develop and deliver alternative plans developed in conjunction with the Trade Unions in line with the Organisational Change Policy.

### **Meaningful consultation with the Trade Unions**

We were excluded from the development of these proposals and have not been given the necessary information to provide meaningful feedback. We need the threat of immediate redundancies removing and to be able to work with GMFRS management to look at how savings can be made – we have done this successfully between 2009 and 2017. The exclusion of the Trade Unions has only occurred since the transfer to the GMCA.

### **A firm commitment to no compulsory redundancies & no privatisation**

Many of our members are living with the fear of losing their jobs and homes because of the way the cuts to support staff were communicated.

We need this threat lifting and the reassurance that there will be no compulsory redundancies and for a voluntary scheme to be agreed as a matter of urgency.

The voluntary redundancy scheme should be opened to deliver short term savings in recognition that the numbers of support staff will need to reduce to some degree but not at the level currently proposed.

A category assurance should be provided that Cleaning and Catering services will not be outsourced or privatised.

### **A commitment to reconsider the funding arrangements for GMFRS and the Mayor's budget and call on the Government for fair funding for the Fire Service**

It is too late to consult the public on if they were prepared to pay more for the Fire Service in their Council Tax – as little as 5p a week would have made a huge difference to the cuts being imposed. The GMCA has subsumed most GMFRS Support services – and increased the budget for their own areas – up to £1million for a new Communications Team, taking on more office space – rented from the private sector at an advertised £161 per square metre.

We know funding is tight but efficiencies should be considered from all areas.



Consideration should be given to reassigning some funding from other areas of the Mayoral General Budget as a minimum to meet the costs of pay award increases.

**The re-instatement of the Fire Committee so GMFRS is scrutinised by and accountable to Local Councillors**

We are concerned that there is currently no democratic involvement or influence in relation to GMFRS and control of the service has been effectively delegated to the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime – a post which is not accountable to the electorate or Local Councillors.

It is our understanding that there is no legal basis for this within the GMCA Constitution and this is a breakdown in democracy in the governance of GMFRS – it is not what employees of GMFRS or Councillors were told would happen. We alongside the FBU believe it fundamental to the future of GMFRS and the safety of our communities in Greater Manchester that any decisions taken that shape the future of our service are scrutinised, transparent and open to challenge.

**Any changes to be subject to proper public consultation - informing residents what this means and giving them a real say.**

Make sure that meaningful and accessible information is available to all members of our communities and they are able to have their say.

We remain committed to working collaboratively with GMFRS Management to identify more effective and efficient ways of working and deliver financial savings but not in the manner proposed within the OBC which will cost lives.

**GMFRS Section**

**UNISON Manchester Branch**

**21/06/19**

**APPENDIX 1 OUTSTANDING MEMBER QUERIES SUBMITTED AT TRADE UNION FORUM 02/05/19**

Query	Question	Email sent to Pfc Y/N	Date Sent to Pfc
Where does the Community Safety Training and Development Team fit in with this – they are in the P&P directorate but haven't been invited to the Prevention meeting as it is assumed they are 'Training'.	Questions about the move on the 1st April a) How are these being progressed? b) How do these fit in with the OBC? c) Who will the Prevention Teams report to? d) How will Prevention influence the workstreams that are being set up? e) What is the remit of the workstreams and what are they developing given that the business case is still being consulted on?		



There are no specific questions about Prevention and Youth Engagement work. It is lumped into 'other' and is free text. As a former Consultation and Engagement Officer I am aware of the limitations of this and how difficult it makes analysis. It also could be perceived that consultation on this particular topic is not wanted.

Why are there only three questions being asked to the public? The OBC is a 400+ page document with significant and wide-spreading changes.

Y

04/04/2019

Will they consult with us on the new proposal and how?

Are young people being consulted effectively as they be directly affected by the proposals in the future?

The business case mentions that the Bury Safety Centre will carry on with business as usual but how will it link in with the place based hubs, the Station Managers and the Firefighters.

Temporary contracts:- Whose those end , can they be protected for the individual in that post or would it have to be offered internally?

What capacity is there to service the rapidly expanding city and also expansions and developments in other Boroughs such as Bury, Rochdale the Airport?

Can we have details about how you have consulted council leads , Key partners and Councillors? What information was provided to them or explanation of potential impact to their service / area (LOC plans etc)

In the OBC 5 green book posts stated - What are they, what is their purpose?

How can we send in questions



Has an impact assessment been done on the affects of this on Prevention, Protection and YE (public)

How will they achieve no complusary redundancies?

If the 'axe' should fall, what is the minimum notice period to be given? (legal protection).

Why is the role of Prevention Service Delivery Manager vacan when it is important to have a senior manager to consult with?

How can we link in with partners to do joint visits as required at specific times?

What happens if I am in a temporary role (substantive being admin) but my temporary role is in the new structure (in the OBC)?

Have you revisited why a prevetnion team was introduced in the first place and why do you consider FF's now have the capacity, skills and knowlegde to be able to take this forward?

Are you looking at the cost associated with CGH as a central hub (i.e. rent, additional space, staff)? Could this be reduced?

Why are other departments receiving a bigger budget with the same amount of staff?

When are you including volunteers within this consultation, allowing them feedback?

Is feedback from CLT meetings going to be fed back to staff?

What did you mean when you mentioned GMCVO volunteer coordination?

What is happening with cleaners

Not many FF's are computer savvy and do not want to have more admin tasks. What training will be provided to enbale this function to work?



Why has an interim structure been put in place when this is only a consultation process?

Reducing admin post by 27. Why does it not mention who / which departments are affected?

In the structure (ELT Slides 1/4/19) who are the prevention delivery teams?

In a 24 hour period for FF's, (on slide) where is the % when RED 1's are included?

How much time is available for FF's to undertake prevention and Youth engagement work?

Where will the additional training for FF's come from?

How will time be allocated to FF's to complete / follow up?

How does GMFRS to fulfil their aim of avoiding compulsory redundancies?	Y	10/04/2019
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The Target Operating Model sees a reduction a reduction of 113 posts - which posts specifically?.	Y	10/04/2019
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Staff feedback has highlighted that our prevention activity could be targeted better at those who are most vulnerable. What about the less vulnerable or the vulnerable who will be missed?	Y	10/04/2019
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Our youth engagement activities will be driven by placed based teams. – Will management be picking up youth engagement.	Y	10/04/2019
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What is the current Admin Structure and what does it cost?	Y	09/04/2019
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What is the proposed Admin structure and what does it cost?	Y	09/04/2019
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How many vacancies do we currently have within Admin (P&P, ER, Contact Centre, Leigh, Estates, PA's)?	Y	09/04/2019
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Within the Value Added Stream, what work streams are being kept and which one are being removed (classed as non-value added)? Which are being removed to be replaced by technology?		09/04/2019
	Y	
What grade is classed as management post (E grades in Hub not counted as managers but Contact Centre is)?	Y	09/04/2019
Looking at the interim Management Structure, the Change Lead for Business Support has been advertised as an Expression of Interest, who will be the AM or equivalent?		09/04/2019
	Y	
What is the breakdown between Managers and Team Leaders within the proposed Administration Hub and Areas?		09/04/2019
	Y	
How many new roles have been created in the restructure?	Y	09/04/2019
		09/04/2019
If there are new roles, will the opportunities be open to everyone or will they be ring-fenced?	Y	
Have other F&RS been consulted in addition to Scotland? For example, Station Managers in Surrey F&RS struggled without admin support in terms of sickness and excessive workloads.		09/04/2019
	Y	
What is the breakdown of low, medium and high cost savings (Activity Based Costing – Appendix). Can we have a copy of the detailed workbook?		09/04/2019
	Y	
The Activity Based Costing for Officers quotes £137k for procurement analysis, budget management and administration – could this be picked up by the Area Admin teams rather than Central Admin?		09/04/2019
	Y	
How will the centralisation of admin support work, will there be any relocations?		09/04/2019
	Y	
What will the role be of admin on the Areas?		09/04/2019
	Y	



It appears that operational works streams are all being moved onto Stations and placed based working? yet the administration appears to be moving out into a central function? what is the rationale behind this?	Y	09/04/2019
The proposed structure shows 13 FTE Area Admin – are there any Managers posts included in this?	Y	09/04/2019
Are part time positions included within the 13 x FTE's?	Y	09/04/2019
Within the OBC who are the Operations Managers? Is the Operations Manager a GM/SM? Will they have capacity to manage the Area Admin teams?	Y	09/04/2019
Are TDC Admin included within the 13 FTEs?	Y	09/04/2019
Cleaners - the OBC refers to 'Land and Property', when do you envisage this happening?	Y	09/04/2019
IT - what systems and IT are being invested in? What workloads will this remove from the current admin teams and what time frames for these systems?	Y	09/04/2019
IT - what is the cost for these systems?	Y	09/04/2019
Is there any consideration or consultation for a wider reduction in the 'F' grade roles / Managers to see how best fit to the organisation in terms of delivering the new model?	Y	09/04/2019
Could this be considered within a working group within this proposal if the reductions are delivered?	Y	09/04/2019
Have any 'G Grade' (non-managerial) positions been considered within the reductions? With the potential of specialism roles predominantly already within GMCA?	Y	09/04/2019



Has any consideration been given to the role and responsibilities of Admin Manager or is all the evidence based on ABC costings? Could consideration be given to a reduction rather than removal of ALL posts?	Y	09/04/2019
Cleaners - what is the discussion with cleaning staff when they are already reading a public document without consultation and asking Managers who are trawling through 550 pages of proposals?	Y	09/04/2019
ABC costings – can you please confirm what this refers to in terms of Admin? Is this one of the spreadsheets we completed or the online exercise that some of us completed?	Y	09/04/2019
Can we have a have a copy of the admin report produced by the external consultants?	Y	09/04/2019
Have the FBU been consulted on operational managers picking up line management responsibility for non-operational staff (green book)?	Y	09/04/2019

## APPENDIX 2: LETTER TO ANDY BURNHAM 29/03/18



Greater Manchester Fire & Rescue  
Branch  
c/o 146 Bolton Road  
Swinton  
M27 8US

Andy Burnham,  
Mayor of Greater Manchester

Branch Chair: Jonathan Cooper  
Branch Secretary: Jenni Seex

Date: 29<sup>th</sup> March 2018



Dear Mr Burnham,

I am writing to you on behalf of the UNISON GMFRS Branch following the events of recent weeks and clearly most significantly the publication of the Kerslake Report and subsequent announcements in relation to the 'root and branch' review of the Fire Service

The GMFRS Branch of UNISON is the biggest Trade Union representing non-operational staff and our members work across all areas of the fire service both supporting and enhancing the work undertaken by operational colleagues. The service would not and could not run without ICT ensuring there are effective communications, without the vehicle mechanics ensuring the appliances are safe and roadworthy, without the Hub deploying resources to the right place, without payroll ensuring people are paid for their work, without stores staff ensuring uniform and equipment is sent to the right places. We wouldn't be able to train new recruits or existing staff effectively if there was no means of feeding them or cleaning training centre. There would be no equipment to provide without Finance delivering procurement and payment for goods and services, no proper facilities without Estates arranging repairs to roofs and testing of electrics and gas, no safe systems of work without the Health & Safety team training Managers and driving improvements. The administrators who order paper and book visits along with a host of other activities that keep things running smoothly, the PAs who organise and support the Corporate Leadership Team to be in the right place at the right time and free those senior leaders up to be able to lead and make decisions. We have members in frontline roles which directly deliver our statutory prevention duties assisting our most vulnerable residents to be safe in their homes, people in corporate performance who ensure that we properly report on our activity to the Home Office.

Having personally worked for the organisation for 6 years and taken an active role in UNISON for the last four, I have seen the efforts made by a number of people at every level to create a unified workforce where everyone has a role in supporting the front line and ensuring that there is a strong sense of 'team' and the care and consideration for others that this brings. There is a real sense of 'family' in GMFRS where everyone pulls together when it matters and we all rely on each other - that's reflected in most people's work on a regular basis.

It is in that context that I felt compelled to write to you to set out the concerns of our members in relation to recent announcements and in light of their experiences over the last 12 months.

Clearly the work undertaken in the review of the response to the horrific attack at the Arena on the 22<sup>nd</sup> May 2017 and publication of the Kerslake Report creates questions and raises areas for improvement that you as the Mayor of Greater Manchester and having responsibility for GMFRS must address. The events on that night were terrible and impacted everyone in the City and the Region including those who work for GMFRS. In addition to our professional roles, the majority of us live within Greater Manchester and no one was untouched by the terror that was unleashed on our city that night. I have not spoken to anyone who was unaffected and many people were there or had family or friends who were. As citizens and public servants of Greater Manchester we were unified in our abhorration and grief. I think everyone understood and was supportive of the work you commissioned following those events. I think it is also right to say that we recognise that there are times when change is needed and must be made.



However, our members are concerned that given the announcements made following the publication of the review that the whole service is being judged on the events of one night which is not representative of the services that we deliver consistently to the residents that we are here to serve.

It is also right to point out that prior to the publication of the Kerslake Report and the announcement of a 'root and branch' review we had in recent weeks been advised of a series of 'high level' reviews which were to be undertaken and led by the GMCA. I can also say that as a TU representative I have not been clear as to what that would involve and nor have our members been. It would appear that those proposals have now been overtaken by the announcement this week and I and our members are hopeful that today will provide some clarity on what is now involved.

You have rightly earned a reputation for a commitment to transparency and many of our members have contacted me to say that they hope that that transparency will be built into any review.

I also know that our members feel strongly that any review into the culture of the organisation should take into account the impact of the transfer of the service into the GMCA. When you attended Fire Service Headquarters shortly after your election you were met with people who were enthused and excited about the potential opportunities that were offered by devolution and a new way of working. Sadly that enthusiasm has been eroded in the following months and morale has plummeted.


I am regularly contacted by members who feel demoralised and uncertain as to what is happening, who feel unable to be effective in their role because there is no clarity as to who is making decisions on what basis. We have members working in teams which are carrying significant vacancy rates but are seemingly not able to be filled for reasons which are not clearly articulated.

Following the invitation to today's events some of the concerns that have been expressed to me directly from members who are unable to attend are;

- we the Fire Service who I feel have lost their Identity being swallowed up in this massive conglomerate now GMCA
- Over the past 12 to 18 months since the GMCA took over, the workload on HQ support services has been increased without any further staffing which is putting people under undue pressure
- How can my work be judged on the decisions of senior officers in relation to a specific incident

This is against a backdrop of following the transfer to the GMCA distinctions being drawn between different terms and conditions which I am concerned that that is both divisive and damaging. Many people feel that the 'CA' does not understand what they do and the complexities of GMFRS and the diversity of support roles, what we deliver and how we ensure that there can be an effective response service. The feedback I have had this week is largely a mix of anxiety and concern and a sense of frustration that people are being judged without any understanding of the work that they do. There is no clarity about decision making processes and this creates uncertainty for everyone as well as inertia that prevents highly committed people being able to do their jobs effectively.





I have stated before to members of the Senior Management Team that our members are not resistant to change in fact we are best placed to inform and drive it but people feel that their voices need to be heard and thus far they haven't.

I would therefore ask on behalf of all UNISON members that you ensure that the workforce are fully engaged in any review and that the basis of this is transparent. I would also ask that you consider meeting with all of the Trade Unions who represent employees in the Fire Service to listen directly to the experiences of our members.

Yours sincerely,

Jenni Seex

Branch Secretary – UNISON GMFRS Branch

cc UNISON GMFRS Members

John Maxwell, UNITE

Karl Sorfleet, Gary Keary, Fire Brigades Union

Paul Etches, FOA

## Appendix 2 – Response from the Fire Brigade Union



## Executive Summary

The Fire Brigades Union represents the vast majority of firefighters and firefighters (control) of all roles and is the professional voice of those who deliver the fire and rescue service to the communities of Greater Manchester.

The Outline Business Case (OBC) makes a number of proposals, some of which the Fire Brigades Union supports, some we do not. There are a number of fundamental errors made by the author/s which when rectified alters the proposal, these errors are explained in more detail in the main body of the document.

There are a number of assumptions made which the FBU believe have not been properly considered or risk assessed, this document attempts to address that. For example:

### Role of a Firefighter.

The firefighters rolemap is nationally agreed, there is no ability for local discretion to be exercised by local employers. The National Joint Council for Local Authority Fire and Rescue Services (NJC) is the body which decides the firefighter rolemap and any desire to amend that rolemap has to be considered, after a formal proposal by the stakeholder or local employer, by the NJC Role map Sub Committee. For clarity, the term firefighter refers to all firefighting roles up to the level of Area Manager.

### Fire Cover Review.

This is clearly a pivotal issue for GMF&RS and any decision to alter current fire cover provisions must be fully risk assessed, the FBU do not believe that this has been properly undertaken nor has essential issues such as crewing levels been addressed.

### Place Based Delivery of Prevention and Protection Services.

The FBU offer broad support for this initiative.

### Leadership and Culture.

The FBU agree with the findings of this element of the OBC and seek further dialogue with the Mayor and his team to continue improving consultation and staff engagement as this is the bedrock for decent firefighter morale and good industrial relations.

### Decision Making.

The FBU reserve comment on this element pending further consultation and dialogue in the formation of the requisite Fire Plan, which in a combined authority/Metro Mayor arrangement takes the place of an IRMP.

### Supporting the Frontline.



This is an extremely important element of the report which the FBU welcome. Mention is made in the report of the Grenfell Tower fire, the Manchester Arena attack and the moorland fires, which are clearly very important incidents and demonstrates the complexity and dangers of the firefighter job, but the tragic loss of Stephen Hunt who died fighting the Oldham Street fire, is as important. The FBU expand why this is such an important issue in the report.

#### Future Delivery Model.

Mention is made here of two strategic issues of great import, the previously mentioned Fire Plan and the Targeting Operational Model, both of which are currently in development. These proposals seem at this juncture to be the risk assessment element of risk planning and should inform all strategic policy making considerations, including this one.

The FBU reserve comment for the requisite consultation on the two aforementioned policies.

#### **Recommendation.**

**That the GMCA Mayor, Police, Fire and Crime Commissioner (PFCC) and GMF&RS work with the FBU to continue building on the early successes of the governance arrangement and improved industrial relations within GMF&RS and not cut the numbers of firefighters and fire appliances that protect the communities of Greater Manchester.**

#### **Background**

Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMF&RS) has had a tumultuous recent history, culminating in the threat to sack and re-engage the entire workforce on to lesser terms and conditions of service. The move to the Metro Mayor system of Governance offers a unique opportunity to reshape how fire and rescue services should be governed, with relations with Mayor Andy Burnham and his team significantly improved on those before his tenure and early indications for future arrangements being particularly positive.

It was a positive step that the Mayor stopped the implementation of the most recent Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP) to allow an evidence based approach to be conducted, this document plays an important part of that process.

There are many areas of this Outline Business Case (OBC) that the FBU can and will support; however cutting firefighter numbers, reducing fire appliance numbers and reducing the emergency fire cover we provide to the communities of Greater Manchester is never going to be supported by the FBU as it increases the risks to our communities and our members alike.

However, it is extremely disappointing that the Fire Brigades Union and other representative bodies were excluded from playing an active part in the formative stages of the 'Fire Cover Review' which led to the development of the OBC. It appears that Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) placed more importance on feedback gathered from informal, unstructured conversations with staff members.

Although a Trade Union Forum was established and did meet regularly, this forum was never given access or the ability to influence and advise the Fire Cover Review (FCR) or OBC. It was in the latter part of 2018



when the FBU were informed that '3 options for change' had been developed and sat with the Mayor's Office, however the FBU were told that these options could not be shared At that time. It was December 2018 when the FBU were informed that of the 3 Options provided to GMCA, that a 'preferred option' had been selected, however again this was not shared with the FBU. This refusal by the employer to meaningfully engage with the FBU led to the Union writing directly to the Mayor on the 21<sup>st</sup> December 2018. As a result of receiving no response to this correspondence and having received an initial briefing on Programme for Change from service managers which lacked any real detail on the 10<sup>th</sup> January 2019, the FBU again wrote to the Mayor on the 14<sup>th</sup> January 2019 stating:

*'It is the case that there are areas of this proposal which cause the Fire Brigades Union great concern, given this and to allow for clear communication I would be grateful if a meeting could be arranged at the earliest opportunity between yourself the Deputy Mayor, myself and Les Skarratts.'*

Unfortunately, no meeting was arranged and it was not until the 7<sup>th</sup> March 2019 that the finalised OBC was finally shared with the FBU.

Undoubtedly the development of the OBC was heavily influenced by consultants external to the Fire and Rescue Service, the FBU have noted reports of the costs associated to the hiring of these consultants being in the region of £270,000 who in is money that obviously would have been better served invested into the frontline service.

The FBU question the worth of the work done via these consultancies having been able to access through a request a presentation from the consultants responsible for undertaking the 'Activity Based Costing' (ABC). This presentation only served to further raise our concerns about the work being carried out and the validity of the evidence being collated. The FBU were surprised to be informed during this presentation that the ABC exercise had already concluded and that the entire Grey Book (operational) input into this exercise amounted to 3 members of staff. The FBU questioned at the time, and on a number of occasions since, how feedback from 0.3% of the auditable workforce could be considered an acceptable level to evidence a report, the data of which is quoted on a significant number of occasions within the OBC. It has, through the formal consultation process, been acknowledged by all parties that this exercise should be disregarded. However, despite the FBU'sd concerns the OBC remains unchanged and as such in the FBU's view is an unreliable and unsafe source of information.

The Fire Brigades Union also have concerns about the quality of consultation both internal and external which has been undertaken in relation to the OBC. Our communities were only offered 2 formats through which to gather information, these being a two page summary or the full outline business case including appendices which runs to 432 pages. This external consultation process was conducted wholly on-line, therefore greatly restricted access for many residents of Greater Manchester, the FBU is doubtful that this external consultation exercise complies with legal requirements and guidance.

The quality and level of consultation with other key stakeholders is also of concern, most notably with the elected councillors from the 10 Boroughs of Greater Manchester. The launch of the consultation during Purdah only served to hamstring elected representatives from effectively engaging in this process, in addition the change of councillors who sit on the scrutiny committee part way through this consultation period was concerning and undoubtedly this lack of consistency will have hindered the ability of elected members to meaningfully monitor, oversee and engage with this process.

Throughout the consultation period the FBU have raised concerns regarding the Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) which was provided alongside the OBC, we considered this EIA to be wholly inadequate and we believe that through consultation agreement was reached with the employer that this document



was not fit for purpose. It was eventually confirmed by the employer that despite the FBU's concerns regarding the inadequacy of the assessment, this EIA was to be considered an overarching assessment and that further EIA's would be provided which considered the detail of the proposed changes; these EIA's have been requested but at this time have not been provided. It is extremely difficult for the FBU to consider and respond to the impact of the services proposals on certain staff and on the most vulnerable sections of our community when the required documentation has yet to be provided.

The FBU believe that equality, fairness and inclusivity are key to the progress of the Fire and Rescue Service in Greater Manchester, unfortunately this OBC, lack of adequate EIA's and a haphazard consultation processes leave doubt that these important principles are at the forefront of GMCA's considerations.

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) has recently inspected GMF&RS and found the Service lacking in certain areas, the FBU will refer to them within this document.

This document is the FBU response to the OBC and is intended to offer an evidence based voice to some of the proposals that the FBU believe would increase risks to firefighters and the people we serve. We do so professionally and wherever possible we attempt to offer alternatives.

We ask the reader to take the time to read the OBC in its entirety.

## **Introduction**

Greater Manchester is the second most populated urban area in the country with 2.78 million people living in the Greater Manchester area. The population of Greater Manchester grew by 7.7% between 2006 and 2016.

The Greater Manchester economy generates £57.8 billion of gross value added (GVA) on an annual basis accounting for 37.7% of the GVA in the North West. There are 1.27 million working people in Greater Manchester and the area has the potential to grow at an average of 2.2% per year between 2015 and 2035 realising circa 190,000 additional jobs. These are clearly important and exciting times for the Greater Manchester area and the FBU firmly believe this is not the time to jeopardise this and subject projected growth to a crisis of confidence by slashing the Fire and Rescue Service that not only protects its citizens but also its property, property that provides for the businesses and jobs that are required for the projected growth.<sup>42</sup>

The HMICFRS identified that currently GMF&RS is a busy yet extremely efficient Service with 11.6 incidents attended per 1000 head of population compared to the average for England of 10.5.

But importantly the cost of GMF&RS per person per year is £18.77 compared to the average for England F&RS's of £22.38, with the number of firefighters employed per 1000 people being 0.5 compared to 0.6 for the rest of England F&RS's. Evidence that GMF&RS is lean yet efficient, this is jeopardised by the planned cuts to the workforce and loss of emergency fire cover.

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<sup>42</sup> [https://www.greatermanchester-ca.gov.uk/media/1580/key\\_facts\\_2017final.pdf](https://www.greatermanchester-ca.gov.uk/media/1580/key_facts_2017final.pdf)




Public perceptions		
	Greater Manchester	England
Perceived effectiveness of service Public perceptions survey (June/July 2018)	90%	86%

Response		
	Greater Manchester	England
Incidents attended per 1,000 population 12 months to 30 September 2018	11.6	10.5
Home fire risk checks carried out by FRS per 1,000 population 12 months to 31 March 2018	11.9	10.4
Fire safety audits per 100 known premises 12 months to 31 March 2018	1.1	3.0

Incidents attended in the 12 months to 30 September 2018



HMICFRS Report 2018/19

Cost		
	Greater Manchester	England
Firefighter cost per person per year 12 months to 31 March 2018	£18.77	£22.38

Workforce		
	Greater Manchester	England
Number of firefighters per 1,000 population As at 31 March 2018	0.5	0.6
Five-year change in workforce As at 31 March 2013 compared with 31 March 2018	-18%	-14%
Percentage of wholetime firefighters As at 31 March 2018	99%	70%

Percentage of female firefighters as at 31 March 2018  
 ● Female firefighters ● Female residential population

Percentage of black, Asian and minority ethnic firefighters as at 31 March 2018  
 ● BAME firefighters ● BAME residential population

Please refer to annex A for full details on data used.

HMICFRS Report 2018/19

It is simply not sound public financial management to invoke further cuts to the emergency services that protects the strategies for growth and prosperity of an area such as Greater Manchester, fires in buildings lead to loss of lives but also to a loss of jobs and livelihoods due to the loss of business and industry.

The recent history of the UK Fire and Rescue Service has been without doubt bleak. Nationally, over 12,000 firefighter jobs have been lost in the last 10 years. In 2002,

GMF&RS employed 2148 firefighter and 66 emergency fire control staff, in 2018 that figure had dropped to 1285, a loss of 863 firefighters (40%), 603 of those jobs lost since 2010 with all emergency fire control jobs lost to North West Fire Control (NWFC)<sup>43</sup>.

This is in large part the result of the austerity measures that have devastated our Fire and Rescue Service, with the Tory mantra being that as incident numbers are dropping, less firefighters are needed. That is nonsensical and the absolute antipathy of risk management planning.

<sup>43</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/fire-statistics-data-tables#workforce-and-workforce-diversity>



The subsequent loss of vital emergency fire cover and the massive reduction of firefighter numbers has resulted in a dramatic increase in how long fire appliances take to arrive on scene at an emergency incident, what is called the 'response time'.

In 1995 the average time for a fire appliance to attend a primary fire (house, bungalow, flats and other dwellings) was 4 minutes and 45 seconds, today it is a shocking 7 minutes 14 seconds, more information on response times can be found further in the document.

For lives and property to be saved, two things are required; a speedy attendance at an incident and enough firefighters to be able to resolve the incident as safe as is possible, this is called the 'speed and weight of attack'. If one of the two is lacking then lives will be lost, the FBU is concerned that the loss of fire cover and firefighter jobs proposed in this document will result in the increase of loss of lives and property.

A number of recent tragedies have, or will shape the future of the Fire and Rescue Service, the tragic Grenfell Tower fire, the Manchester Arena attack and the tragic loss of our member and friend Stephen Hunt, the latest GMF&RS firefighter to sadly lose their life in the line of duty at an incident in Oldham Street.

#### **Role of a Firefighter**

This section of the OBC refers to improvements in the fire safety of buildings and furniture manufacture meant that Fire and Rescue Services are spending less time responding to fires. Incidents in GM, it is reported, have fallen by 50% over the last 15 years; quite frankly this misuse of statistics is tiresome and doesn't assist genuine decision makers in risk assessing the very Fire and Rescue Service that protects the people of Greater Manchester.

If the reader looks at the evidence over the last 10 years, the tenure of austerity, the statistics show a different picture.


#### ***Incidents attended by Greater Manchester by incident type.***

Year	Total Incident s	Total Fires	Total Primary Fires	Dwelling s	Other Building s	Road Vehicle s	Secondary Fires	Chimney Fires
2009/10	37,298	18,252	7,126	2,936	1,492	2,311	11,081	45
2010/11	37,718	18,276	6,420	2,777	1,470	1,756	11,804	52
2011/12	33,962	15,688	5,923	2,718	1,377	1,427	9,723	42
2012/13	29,619	12,117	5,056	2,454	1,116	1,190	7,006	55
2013/14	29,464	13,112	4,620	2,231	974	1,123	8,458	34



2014/15	27,418	11,669	4,603	2,261	925	1,102	7,021	45
2015/16	31,653	12,361	4,932	2,428	1,016	1,187	7,393	36
2016/17	34,488	12,412	5,100	2,289	995	1,558	7,289	23
2017/18	32,898	12,781	5,158	2,347	1,032	1,555	7,566	57

<https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/fire-statistics-data-tables#dwelling-fires-attended>



The reader can see over the period of the greatest cuts in fire cover and firefighter numbers in Greater Manchester in living history, incident numbers have stayed steady and over recent years have steadily climbed.

The OBC also refers to ‘unpredictable’ environmental incidents such as the floods and moorland fires recently experienced in Greater Manchester, this reveals the misunderstanding of risk management planning by the author as incidents such as floods and moorland fires are entirely foreseeable, they happen relatively frequently in terms of risk management and as such GMF&RS have a requirement to plan for them, cutting fire cover is not the expected result of responsible risk management planning in the face of such evidence.

***‘An effective fire and rescue service will identify and assess the full range of foreseeable fire and rescue risks its community faces. It will target its fire prevention and protection activities to those who are at greatest risk from fire. It will make sure businesses comply with fire safety legislation. When the public calls for help, the fire and rescue service should respond promptly with the right skills and equipment to deal with the incident effectively. Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service’s overall effectiveness requires improvement.’***

(HMICFRS Report 2018/19)



But the most fundamental error in this section is the issue of GMF&RS's understanding of the firefighter rolemap. The OBC seems to copy an NJC Circular NJC/10/08 in that it almost exactly replicates the circular by stating

*'Paragraph 125 - The role of the firefighter is set out in the Fire and Rescue Services Role maps document, which was issued by the National Joint Council in August 2005. The role maps and national occupational standards contained therein were developed in October 2001 and May 2003'.*

However the next paragraph in the OBC erroneously states

*'Paragraph 126 – Whilst the role maps are applied nationally, specific activities within the roles can be determined locally in order to meet the needs of the service based on its IRMP'.*

That is incorrect and it would have assisted GMF&RS to have considered the very next paragraphs of the NJC Circular NJC/10/08 which confirmed that;

- '4 At its meeting today the National Joint Council recognized that it may be in the best interests of the UK fire and rescue service for rolemaps and/or national occupational standards to be reviewed and if necessary revised from time to time, as appropriate.*
- 5 Accordingly, the National Joint Council has decided to create a small sub-Committee specifically to consider any proposed changes put forward either by the external bodies responsible for the development of such issues or by either side of the National Joint Council including the Middle managers Negotiating Body.*
- 6 The sub-Committee, which will include Middle Manager Negotiating Body representation, will meet as and when necessary in order to make recommendations to the National Joint Council and/or Middle Managers Negotiating Body as appropriate.'*

The Fire Brigades Union wish to make it clear that we have been engaged in discussions regarding broadening the role of a firefighter for a number of years and are actively engaged at a national level in such negotiations in respect of a national pay claim. The national employers have made it perfectly clear in correspondence to the Union what new work they seek FBU members to undertake in relation to improving firefighters pay.

In paragraph 136 of the OBC the misunderstanding of the issue of the rolemap is replicated in that it states

*'Taking all of the above into account, and on the basis that specific activities within the rolemap can be determined at a local level, we have listened to feedback and intend to work with firefighters and the FBU to put in place training and equipment to allow firefighters to take the responsibility for.....'*

This is plainly wrong yet goes on to refer to a number of activities, all of which are not within the firefighter's role, and as aforementioned nor is it within the gift of GMF&RS or GMCA to vary the firefighter's role outside of the method described above.

The OBC goes on to request at paragraph 137 that the FBU, as a matter of urgency, clarify the role of firefighters in respect of:

- Undertaking testing, training, exercising and responding to Marauding Terrorist and Firearms Attack (MTFA) incidents.
- Working with North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) to provide an emergency medical response (EMR) in relation to cardiac arrest.



- Providing a response to Health and Social care partners where FRS resources can assist in supporting people to continue to live in their own homes by delivering the moving and handling of patients.
- Responding to falls in the home to reduce Hospital admissions.
- Working to supplement the Children and Young People offer and increasing activity with Fire Cadet Schemes.
- Providing cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) training to the communities and businesses of Greater Manchester.

The FBU can clarify that these activities are activities classed as new work and are matters of national negotiations which must remain within the NJC.

Similarly, Safe and Well activity rises are the subject of extensive national dialogue within the NJC.

Emergency Medical Response is a key issue for the NJC and detailed work has been undertaken by the NJC and sub-committees thereof to identify and resolve issues that the recent trials identified. That work will be rolled out on the successful conclusion of that national dialogue.

The FBU are committed to broadening of the role of the firefighter but stress that the dialogue and subsequent agreement on this issue can only take place within the National Joint Council.

### **Unwanted Fire Signals Policy**

The GMF&RS policy of not sending appliances to certain premises protected by Automatic Fire Alarms is not a policy that the FBU can support. This policy has not been sufficiently risk assessed and is contrary even to the position of the Chief Fire Officers Association (CFOA).

This policy has not been the subject of consultation with the FBU and we are not persuaded that this policy has not increased risk to community members and firefighters alike.

### **Leadership and Culture**

The Fire Brigades Union have from the outset challenged the way GMCA formulated the OBC, again it is clear with the 'Leadership and Culture' section that the FBU and other representative bodies were given no opportunity to properly engage in a process that could influence the outcome.

The FBU have challenged GMCA directly in regard to a section of paragraph 206 which states

*'An example of this is the way the unions helped shape the vision and mission contained within this document'.*

It was made clear that the FBU found this statement to be absurd, disingenuous and inflammatory given that we had been given no opportunity *'shape the vision and mission'* of the OBC.

This section again references on a number of occasions GMCA's reliance and utilisation of a 'Staff Reference Group', the FBU and other representative bodies have placed on record their most serious concerns in relation to this non-representative and anonymous group. It is very disappointing that GMCA



appears to favour the feedback of unaccountable individuals over elected Union officials, who in the case of the FBU represent over 96% of uniformed employees.

It is appreciated that the OBC in paragraph 164 recognises the ‘truly unique’ challenges faced by firefighters in the operational environment on a daily basis. Given the OBC acknowledges that

*‘The challenges faced by both incident commanders and firefighters when they attend the scene of an incident are **extremely testing**. Issues in sometimes **critical lifesaving situations**, include: incomplete incident information, recognising and reacting to changing circumstances, committing teams into high risk environments where there are unknown risks and hazards as well as dealing with highly emotional and often distressed members of the public...’ (FBU emphasis).*

It is incomprehensible that the organisation would take conscious steps to increase risk to firefighters in this field; however the FBU consider GMCA to be doing exactly that through their plans to close stations, remove fire appliances, increase attendance times and reduce firefighter numbers. All of these detrimental actions will negatively impact on the ability of firefighters to do the job they are trained to do and will undoubtedly place the lives of firefighters and the public in greater jeopardy.

The OBC makes several references to the ‘Cultural Inquiry’ and the ‘specific recommendations’ taken from it. It is disappointing, then, that the outcomes of this inquiry were not contained within the OBC appendices, nor was the FBU any part of this inquiry and at this time the FBU await report of these outcomes.

Clearly within any large organisation there are going to be instances of individuals at times feeling frustrated and disenfranchised, this would undoubtedly be the case for GMF&RS both before and after the transfer to the GMCA. The FBU notes paragraph 170 which states,

*‘Trust and empowerment was a key concern raised during the sessions, with 80% of leaders saying they felt empowered and trusted prior to joining the GMCA, dropping to 50% following the transition in 2017. Feedback indicated that, for those working within the GMCA structure, there was a feeling of being disenfranchised and disconnected, and, whilst it is accepted that the transition is still in a period of flux, they feel lost within it.’*

Given that questions have been raised over the leadership of GMF&RS prior to the transfer it is of interest that this feedback indicates that employees actually felt more trusted and empowered under the previous model of leadership than they do now under GMCA. This feedback would mirror the FBU’s as on the two main occasions when there has been an opportunity for the GMCA and ourselves to engage i.e. the TUPE Process and the Fire Cover Review, we as a Union have felt totally disengaged and disenfranchised and in an environment which could best be described as confusing and chaotic.

The ‘Leadership and Culture Summary’ opens with the following statement,

*‘Staff feedback from Mayoral visits, the Cultural Inquiry and the Staff Reference Group indicated the need for fundamental changes in our development of leadership skills and knowledge.’*

It is noted with disappointment and concern that the FBU were omitted from important area of work, the Fire Brigades Union are the recognised professional voice of firefighters.

### **Fire Cover Review**

HM Senior Coroner, Mr Meadows produced a Regulation 28 report into the death of GMF&RS firefighter, Stephen Hunt, at the Oldham Street fire in 2013.



Mr Meadows made 10 recommendations and importantly said that as a result of the evidence in relation to Stephens death which gave him cause for concern, that in his opinion there is a risk that further deaths will occur unless action is taken. (FBU emphasis). The 10 recommendations are:

**Recommendation 1 - Reduce risks associated with the physiological effects of working in a hot environment**

*It is suggested that all Fire and Rescue Services (FRS's) should consider the implementation of measures to reduce the risks associated with the physiological effects of working in a hot environment. In particular consideration should be given to:*

- *Duration of wears under breathing apparatus;*
- *Having regard to all relevant factors including, for example the weather, previous exertions of BA teams and individual circumstances;*
- *Training and guidance for all operational personnel to recognize the effects of heat, both on themselves and on their colleagues, and the appropriate steps to take upon such recognition, including withdrawal and self-withdrawal.*
- *Training and guidance for all operational personnel to have the ability and confidence to ensure the withdrawal of others who may be adversely affected by heat, whether by calling a BA emergency or otherwise, appropriately.*
- *Training and guidance for all operational personnel to have the ability and confidence to withdraw themselves by whatever means appropriate, including activating the ADSU.*

**Recommendation 2 - Measures to reduce the risks associated with the loss of communications at operational incidents**

*It is suggested that all FRSs should consider the implementation of measures to reduce the risks associated with the loss of communications at operational incidents. For example, to include safety control measures to ensure BA teams can be withdrawn from the risk area if needed.*

**Recommendation 3 - Review of procedures, training and guidance**

*It is suggested that all FRSs should undertake a review to ensure the adequacy of standard operating procedures, guidance and training of the handing over and taking over of roles at incidents to ensure all the key areas of information, including safety control measures, are captured and shared.*

**Recommendation 4 - Responsibility to record, share and make available information**

*It is suggested that all FRSs should ensure that significant hazards and any safety control measures are the responsibility of the incident commander and should be recorded within each sector, to ensure visibility to all on the fireground, and passed/copied for use by the incident commander/sector command team to assist the analytical risk assessment.*

**Recommendation 5 - Guidance, use and training associated with thermal image cameras**

*It is suggested that all FRSs should undertake a review to ensure the adequacy or standard operating procedures, guidance and training in the appropriate use of thermal imaging cameras to include the limited extent to which they can be relied upon to measure ambient temperature.*



### **Recommendation 6 - Standard operating procedures, guidance and training in the deployment of aerial monitors**

*It is suggested that all FRSs should undertake a review to ensure the adequacy of standard operating procedures, guidance and training in the deployment of aerial monitors to ensure the safety of any personnel within the risk area is not compromised.*

### **Recommendation 7: review circumstances of 7(2)(d) inspections**

*It is suggested that all FRSs should undertake a review to consider the circumstances in which inspections should be carried out under section 7(2)(d) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.*

### **Recommendation 8 – Undertaking this work**

*It is suggested the above mentioned steps be undertaken jointly by Fire and Rescue Services and the FBU or other Health and Safety Representatives on the Health and Safety Committees.*

### **Recommendation 9 - Qualification and training of Fire risk assessors**

*It is suggested that the Secretary of State for the Home Department considers measures to ensure that: Fire risk assessors are adequately trained and qualified so as to be competent in role, and the responsible person has the means to verify the competence of any person holding themselves out to be a fire risk assessor.*

### **Recommendation 10 - National and consistent approach to sharing any learning outcomes**

*It is understood that there are some 45 Fire and Rescue Services and the findings of the inquest need to be disseminated down to them all. The pressure is upon them to find their own solutions to problems against the background of financial pressures. The Home Office now leads on fire issues and there has been ever increasing decentralisation. Whilst this is not without merit there appears to be difficulties in ensuring that services meet expectations and a means of disseminating national learning.*

*It is suggested that consideration is given to be able to mobilise a national and consistent approach to sharing the learning and testing so it can be shown to be received, understood, actioned and embedded.*

This OBC and the associated FCR should have benchmarked every option against the ten recommendations which regrettably has not occurred. The FBU will attempt to address that deficiency.

### **Response Planning**

The OBC currently points to the fact that previously GMF&RS have published response times which only included turn out and travel times when the Government definition of a response time is ‘*defined as the duration from time of call to time of arrival of the first vehicle at the scene of the incident*’. The Fire Cover Review does not propose to correct that but to part correct it by limiting the proper and Government backed method of data recording and publishing to only life risk incidents.

To manipulate the response time data in such a manner is unacceptable, the public should be informed of the genuine picture and to simply strip an important element of the response time, that being the interaction of the firefighter (control) (North West Fire Control (NWFC)) can only be to attempt to present a better picture than is actually the case.



Members of the public are only ever concerned about how long it takes a fire appliance to arrive and assist them at whatever distress call they make via the 999 system, from the time that they telephone and ask for emergency assistance to the point they get it.

The OBC propose to lessen the current response standards varying from a 5 minute standard for households assessed as being very high risk to a response standard of responding to life risk incidents of 10 minutes to be achieved on 80% of occasions and the question must be asked why this is to be the case?

The reason is explained perfectly clearly in Appendix XIV of the OBC in that it considers the issue of response standards in the section entitled 8 minutes vs 10 minutes, the title itself is irresponsible and demeaning to firefighters whose professional opinion is that speed and weight of attack is paramount in the process of firefighting.

This section looks at the performance outcomes of 8 minutes, and 10 minutes, and concludes the patently obvious outcome in that at every single fire appliance disposition scenario GMF&RS fail to meet the 8 minutes response standard and concludes *'it is evident that there are a number of limitations relating to a response standard of 8 minutes on 80% of occasions'*. This is not management of risk but manipulation of figures and is utterly shameful. The people of Greater Manchester and the firefighters of GMF&RS deserve better.

This position of setting a non-challenging standard and then only using part of the data to measure performance and publishing this to the public and others is scandalous.

### **Fire Engine Ridership Levels**

This element of the OBC is probably the most concerning and makes a number of ill-informed statements. It states that reducing crewing levels on a fire appliance from 5 firefighters to 4 firefighters provides significant savings without affecting response times and provides enough resource in the initial stages of an incident to provide a safe system of work. This is simply wrong.

Two things are necessary to be able to resolve an emergency incident satisfactorily, either saving life or protecting property, speed and weight of attack.

1. Speed, how quickly can the fire appliance get to the incident, and;
2. Weight, that the correct amount of resources can attend the incident to be able to undertake the firefighting activities as safe as is possible.

You can send a fire appliance to an incident with two firefighters and it wouldn't affect the amount of time it takes to get there, but the crew of two couldn't resolve the incident due to the obvious lack of firefighters to provide a safe system of work.

The minimum amount of firefighters required to attend a fire is 9 firefighters, please note that the GMF&RS response standard is the **first** fire appliance to attend an incident within 10 minutes on 80% of occasions and is intended to be 4 firefighters, requiring the attendance of a minimum of 3 fire appliances for this type of incident before a safe system of work can be implemented and firefighting activities commenced. This delay is what is called as the LAG and the longer the delay between the first required appliance and the last required appliance the greater the likelihood of loss of life and/or property.

In 2009, the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) published a report, 'Review of Fire and Rescue Service Response Times: Fire Research Series 1/2009', written by Greenstreet Berman Ltd. The report expressed no remorse for 13 fire deaths caused by increased attendance times at that time. It showed no suggestion of



alarm that a deterioration of performance has left 13 people dead in 2006 (in England) who would not have died in 1996. Sadly response times have slowed even further by 2019.

To increase the LAG by either reducing crewing levels to 4 firefighters, closing stations or reducing appliance numbers will inevitably increase risk of loss of life and property from fire and other incidents.

The FBU CAST planning scenarios are based on a Home Office Research Report from the Fire Cover Review as follows:

***Central Fire Brigades Advisory Council; Response Options Planning Scenarios: Version 1.1 (covering Versions 2.0 and 2.01 CFBAC Planning Scenarios 20/01/2000) Produced by the Fire Experimental Unit of the Fire Research Development Group, Crown Copyright 2000***

Government reviews, including The Pathfinder review developed 'Worst Case Planning Scenarios' (WCPS). The WCPS built on the work that had already been undertaken in the formation of the Generic Risk Assessment (GRA) as detailed in the 'Guide to Operational Risk Assessment' referred to above.

By assessing the actual situation that Firefighters were faced with at emergency incidents, the WCPS methodology was then able to determine what was needed to deal with the emergency incident and what was needed to maintain risks to Firefighters (as far as reasonably practicable) at an acceptable level. The (WCPS) evolved into the 'Critical Attendance STandard' (CAST) used to determine the required emergency response. The required emergency response was determined by assessing the real situation faced by Firefighters at emergency incidents, and then planning risk-control measures which dealt with these 'real world' situations.

It sought to establish what actually happened at a range of common emergency incidents – what the fire & rescue service was actually faced with when they turned up – and the response and resource requirements (numbers of Firefighters and equipment) that would be required to implement effective Standard Operating Procedures. Experienced Fire & Rescue Service Incident Commanders were interviewed to determine both the emergency incidents that were routinely faced, and the number of Firefighters and the amount and type of equipment that would be needed at these different types of emergency incident.

This resulted in the compilation of a number of CAST scenarios.

Following the CAST methodology will ensure that the correct number of firefighters & equipment are mobilised as part of the initial attendance to emergency incidents. It should also ensure that the required firefighters and equipment arrive close enough together to limit the potential for Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) to be compromised by a lack of available resources, particularly during the early stages of emergency incidents.

Regulation 4a of the Safety Representatives & Safety Committee Regulations 1977 (SRSC Regs) requires the employer to consult with Safety Representatives; Regulation 9 of the SRSC Regs covers Safety Committees (the guidance notes suggest the functions of a Safety Committee might include consideration of reports which Safety Reps may wish to submit); and Regulation 3 of the Management of Health & Safety at Work Regulations 1999 covers the duty to undertake risk assessments, and the duty to review these risk assessments where there is a reason to suspect they are no longer valid or where there has been a significant change in the matters to which they relate.












































Detailed Risk & Task Analysis is the process of firstly assessing the risk from the incident as a whole, and from specific firefighting/rescue actions (or tasks), secondly matching the tasks to Standard Operating Procedures (which are designed to minimise risk), thirdly determining the length of time each task will take to complete, and fourthly determining which tasks can be carried out simultaneously and which tasks can only be carried out after an earlier task has been completed. A Task Key and Task Timeline can then be constructed from which the minimum number of personnel for the Planning Scenario is derived.
















An example of this is as follows:

#### CAST 4 Dwelling Fire: Multiple Occupancy Low Rise: 2 to 4 casualties involved rescue via internal staircase

*Fire confined to flat of origin. 2 to 4 casualties trapped on top floor and visible on arrival. Initial entry via ground floor, and rescue via stairs.*

1 Incident Command Role Firefighter & 8		9 TOTAL							
									
Task Sequence and Personnel Requirements		Personnel Deployed							
Initial information gathering									
Cause establishment									
General fireground liaison									
Incident command									
Provision of hose reel branch									
Provision of hose reel branch									
Provision of water from hydrant to pump/tank									
BA Entry Control									
Provision of water from pump/tank - high pressure pump									
Gaining entry to premises with breaking in gear									
Firefighting/Rescue 2 Firefighters BA - hose reel branch									
Firefighting/Rescue 2 Firefighters BA - hose reel branch									
Remove casualty to external opening - 2 x BA									
Remove casualty to external opening - 2 x BA									
Isolation of services									
Remove casualty to place of safety									
Remove casualty to place of safety									
Ventilation of other areas - 2 x BA									
Firefighting/Rescue 2 Firefighters BA - hose reel branch									
Casualty treatment									



Cutting away - 2 x BA									
Liaison with ambulance									
Ventilation of premises - fire compartment - 2 x BA									
Salvage									
Fireground servicing - 2 x BA									
Turning over - BA - thermal imager									
Damping down - 2 hose reel - 2 x BA									
Debris/water removal - with salvage equipment									

It is important to note that GMF&RS undertook a similar exercise in 2018 to test the FBU's analysis of the minimum number of firefighters required to successfully resolve a number of scenarios (4) as safely as is possible.

This Task Analysis (TA) was commented upon by Greenstreet Berman who incorrectly identify CAST as an FBU tool rather than one developed by the Pathfinder Trial commissioned by the Home Office.

### **Appliance Arrival Maximum LAG**

For illustrative purposes the FBU conducted a Task Analysis factoring in the lag times (times between the first and subsequent appliances arriving at the incident) in 2004. As aforementioned GMF&RS has replicated the lag times, see .....above for further information.

<b>Appliance Arrival</b>	<b>Maximum Lag</b>
Arrival of first appliance to the arrival of the second appliance	<b>3 minutes</b>
Arrival of second appliance to the arrival of the third appliance	<b>2 minutes</b>

Hence IRMP attendance times were normally 5mins, 8mins and 10mins for the appliances.

The FBU assumed maximum 3 minute LAG between the arrival of the first & second fire appliances at an incident assumes an attendance of 5 Firefighters on the first fire appliance to attend every incident covered by a CAST planning scenario. Without 5 Firefighters on the first fire appliance, the cornerstones of the Fire Authorities IRMP (Attendance Times) are seriously flawed.

The 3 minute LAG reflects:

- The time required for an initial assessment of the incident to be made by the first attending fire & rescue service Incident Commander;
- The time required for initial briefing and deployment of crews (including where necessary deployment in breathing apparatus) before the arrival of the second fire appliance.
- The maximum 2 minute LAG between the arrival of the second & third fire appliances at an incident covered by a CAST planning scenario reflects:



- The time required for the Incident Commander to brief the Crew Manager of the second fire appliance attending the incident and for the crew from the second fire appliance to be deployed, prior to the arrival of the third fire appliance.

Increasing LAG above these maximums potentially compromises the safety of Firefighters who will be left with insufficient resources to work within Standard

Operating Procedures and safe systems of work (SSoW) at emergency incidents. Any risk assessments which seek to introduce or justify excessive LAG times will have failed to risk assess the real situation faced by Firefighters at emergency incidents. In short, the risk assessment will not be suitable and sufficient. Where the required number of personnel and equipment for an emergency incident can be transported in one fire appliance the LAG times clearly do not apply

Procedures against which Firefighters are trained simply cannot be put into practice in the real world due to a lack of resources being available when they were most needed – in the early stages of the incident. The simple fact remains that on too many occasions Firefighters have no alternative other than to act when faced with the incident. They are, after all, the professionals who have been sent to deal with an emergency situation, and there is a public expectation that they will act when they arrive.

When someone is screaming at you to act, to rescue their parent, their partner or their child, and you are there as part of the Fire and Rescue Service response, it does not matter how *'self-disciplined to work within accepted systems of work'* you may be, a Firefighter will act. These are not individual decisions. Such is the frequency that they have become accepted group decisions amongst Firefighters throughout the service. In short – they are given no alternative.

The FBU believe that the policy of a supposed default 4 and 4 crewing level means firefighters will have been knowingly placed in a situation by their employer where it is reasonably foreseeable that they will be motivated or pressurised to act unsafely in the interests of saving life. The pressure to act unsafely will be as a result of a deliberate planning decision which delays the arrival of the necessary resources for an emergency incident which can be reasonably expected to occur.

***“... it is essential to avoid situations which could motivate or pressurise firefighters to act unsafely in the interests of saving life.”*** (Review of Standards of Emergency Cover - Technical Paper C – Response & Resource Requirements)

### **Greenstreet Berman Report**

An important statement by Greenstreet Berman (GSB) commissioned by GMCA, was that *‘The option of investing capital (or loans) to fund a future operational response framework is a possibility’*. This is a statement that the FBU wish to explore further with the Mayor.

A number of key issues were raised by GSB and referred to the imposition of a three minute time lag between the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> appliances and a 2 minute time lag between 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> appliance as per the Critical Attendance Standards (CAST) assumptions. GMF&RS identify that the lag data is based on the FBU’s own work undertaken in 2004, 15 years ago.

This report (FBU - OBCR) has already identified that the response time in GMF&RS was 6 minutes in 2004, and has increased to 7 minutes 14 seconds in 2018, a reduction of the fire response time in Greater Manchester of 20.6% over that period which in fire response terms is shameful.



That reduction has not been factored into the lag times rendering the exercise as unsafe.

What GMF&RS have also not factored into the data is that the lag times produced by the FBU was predicated on the fact that in 2004 there was 2,135 firefighters within GMF&RS, in 2018 there was 1,292 firefighters a shocking loss of 40% of the firefighting workforce in just 15 years. That loss of firefighting numbers, the loss of fire appliances and the slower response times have not, for whatever reason, been factored into this TA and nor has it been commented upon by GSB. The FBU believe the reason to be plainly obvious but do agree with GSB in that *'It was reported that....The time lag of the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> appliance is a critical factor'*.

GSB also referred to the TA also constraining firefighting activity to 'immediate risk critical actions'. The FBU do not understand what this is to mean because at the early stages of any incident all activities are risk critical and there either to assist the Incident Commander in managing the incident as safely as is possible or to provide a safe system of work (SSOW) for the crews. To consider stripping some activities out of the analysis seems to the FBU simply to manipulate the outcomes. It seems strange that GSB remained silent on this important issue.

Fire and Rescue Services for their entire history, including GMF&RS, distinguish between the first appliance and second appliance (and subsequent ones), on a 2 or more pump (appliance) station. Most Fire and Rescue Services use their own terminology but the first appliance is crewed by the most senior officer and the second appliance the second most senior officer, usually Watch Manager and Crew Manager. The appliance terminology can be *'first turn and pump'* (MF&RS), *'rescue ladder and water ladder'* (LF&RS), *'first away and second away'* (Cambridgeshire FRS) but in GMF&RS they are called *'first pump and second pump'*.

The first appliance historically had a crew of 5, the second a crew of 5 if staffing allowed but more usually a crew of 4. Under Home Office guidelines this had to be achieved on 75% of occasions and was termed the 'confidence levels', a one appliance station had a minimum crew of 5 on all occasions. This underpinned the obvious importance that such a crewing level has on safe operational procedures. The drive for a reduced crew of 4 has nothing to do with safe operating procedures, or risk management, it is all to do with reducing headcount and saving money at the expense of communities and firefighters alike.

GSB further identify that closing stations and the removal of second pumps are based on the number of appliances that can reach an area in 10 minutes. Currently the response standard is 5 minutes for high risk areas, to simply increase the response standard to suit the cuts agenda is shocking, worse still is that for these purposes the response standard is for life risk only and is, for statistical purposes, 10 minutes 59 seconds.

A further review of the Task Analysis was undertaken by Risktec, led by a retired Chief Fire Officer. The review reports that GMF&RS have not implemented the changes proposed by Risktec, questioning the validity of the TA and its own report. The FBU cannot comment further as we have never been provided the document referred to for consideration or consultation.

Risktec noted that GMF&RS assessed the scenarios on risk critical factors only and that they were not based on real life scenarios as issues such as access to property, security measures on the premises and fire loading were not factors considered.

The FBU do agree with Risktec observations and recommendations in which it states that

Health, safety and welfare framework for the operation environment states that:



“An integrated safety management system will support the safe person principles that describe how a Fire and Rescue Authority can secure firefighter safety in the operational environment”.

#### 4.1 Guiding principles

The guiding principles of health, safety and welfare on the Fire and Rescue Authority include:

- Well established management and incident command arrangements are in place for controlling the operational risks to firefighters.
- Appropriate resources are made available to ensure a high standard of safety management, incident command and the integration of good health, safety and welfare management within operational and business decisions.
- Provision of high quality training to ensure all personnel are competent to perform their roles and to make appropriate operational decisions.
- Ensuring internal standards and safe operational procedures aim to optimize the balance between risks and benefits - which does not mean avoiding risks but managing them responsibly on the basis of likelihood and severity.
- Detailed procedural guidance on how to establish a safe system of work.

The FBU also agree with Risktec in that GMF&RS need to align their Standard Operating Procedures with the national produced and circulated Generic Risk Assessments (GRA).

What the FBU strongly reject is Risktec agreeing that GMF&RS are correct in removing from TA's scenarios involving a fire situation which involves exceptional numbers of casualties, this is quite simply an unacceptable statement post Grenfell Tower tragedy and of course the Fire and Rescue Service must plan for, and provide for, a safe system of work for the foreseeable risk that is a Grenfell type incident in the Greater Manchester area. Indeed GMF&RS have proposed a High-Rise Residents Immediate Evacuation policy (HIRE) yet have not considered the TA for this, the number of firefighters to safely execute the policy or indeed how you practically make residents aware of the need for evacuation taking into account all the societal issues that impact evacuation. A suitable Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) would test those challenges and implement control measures to resolve or mitigate them, regrettably GMF&RS have not as yet provided the FBU with the requisite EIA.

Risktec do agree with the FBU with the use of the FBU lag times from 2004 and that real time data should be used. Additionally the response standard found in the 'Fire Cover Review Core Principles' document is stated as being *“we will aim to have a suitably equipped first appliance at all life risk incidents within up to 10 minutes (from receipt of call) on 80% of occasions”*. This target is set to fail on 20% of occasions and is no consolation to people who make the nightmare call for life saving assistance, only to have to wait longer.



However, through internal consultation GMF&RS have confirmed to the FBU that 33 fire appliances can attend the City Centre within 20 minutes. This would be 70% of all fire appliances within Greater Manchester and is outside of the GMF&RS planning assumptions that underpin the OBC (*appendix VIII p239*) which are supposed to account for 2 major incidents running concurrently.

In summary, the FBU make the following comments to the GMF&RS Task Analysis document.

Scenario 1: Domestic Dwelling Fire	
<p><b>GMF&amp;RS Findings:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Safe Systems of Work (SSoW) can be employed with differing crewing levels if procedural changes are implemented, which <u>may</u> also align with current national operational guidance. <i>(FBU emphasis)</i></li> </ul> <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Arriving with a crew of five gives the IC a dedicated Entry Control Officer (ECO) working under stage one BA Entry Control.</li> </ul> <p>Arriving with a crew of four leaves the initial IC without a dedicated ECO however rapid deployment can be utilised following a suitable risk assessment of risk versus benefit, as per Fire Service National Operational Guidance.</p>	<p><b>FBU Response:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The DCLG Guidance Document: ‘Operational Guidance Breathing Apparatus (OGBA), 2014’ states that communication is one of the key principles in this document Section 5.9 states: <p><i>“Good communications between the entry control point and BA teams, other entry control points and, where established, with Command Support are also essential to the effectiveness and safety of BA teams. Accordingly, suitable, sufficient and resilient means of communications should be established at all times.”</i></p> <p>This concurs with the coroner’s investigation into the death of FF Stephen Hunt (Recommendation 2).</p> </li> <li>It is accepted by GMF&amp;RS in this scenario that with a crew of 4 there will be no entry control operator in the initial stages. The FBU strongly assert this is unacceptable.</li> </ul> <p>A domestic dwelling fire is a foreseeable risk and the SSoW must provide with all foreseeable control measures, the ECO is a vital element of the SSoW and is a requirement of OGBA.</p> <p>BA entry without an ECO is for exceptional circumstances where crewing does not allow for the ECO.</p> <p>The TA for riding with a crew of 4 identifies a major risk which is that the</p>



	<p>Incident Commander (IC) could not undertake a suitable and sufficient risk assessment of risk versus benefit regarding the rapid deployment of the BA teams without an ECO. This is a serious flaw in the SSoW and must be remedied.</p> <p>Working assumptions with regard to the driver of a fire appliance place that individual under extreme initial pressure, they are responsible for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Water provision secured and maintained,</li> <li>○ Appropriate level of entry control,</li> <li>○ Safety jets.</li> <li>○ Administering trauma care to a casualty(s).</li> <li>○ Communications with BA teams, IC and NWFC</li> </ul> <p>Within those headings and the subsequent sub headings, the individual's capability in terms of span of control will be exhausted.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Crews with less than 5 firefighters on the first appliance to attend will still have to do the work of 5 firefighters and as such will be placed under avoidably strenuous conditions. (Recommendation 1)</li> </ul>
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**Recommendation 1 - Reduce risks associated with the physiological effects of working in a hot environment**

*It is suggested that all Fire and Rescue Services (FRS's) should consider the implementation of measures to reduce the risks associated with the physiological effects of working in a hot environment. In particular consideration should be given to:*

- *Duration of wears under breathing apparatus;*
- *Having regard to all relevant factors including, for example the weather, previous exertions of BA teams and individual circumstances;*
- *Training and guidance for all operational personnel to recognize the effects of heat, both on themselves and on their colleagues,*



and the appropriate steps to take upon such recognition, including withdrawal and self-withdrawal.

- Training and guidance for all operational personnel to have the ability and confidence to ensure the withdrawal of others who may be adversely affected by heat, whether by calling a BA emergency or otherwise, appropriately.

*Training and guidance for all operational personnel to have the ability and confidence to withdraw themselves by whatever means appropriate, including activating the ADSU.*

## **Recommendation 2 - Measures to reduce the risks associated with the loss of communications at operational incidents**

*It is suggested that all FRSs should consider the implementation of measures to reduce the risks associated with the loss of communications at operational incidents. For example, to include safety control measures to ensure BA teams can be withdrawn from the risk area if needed.*

*'All fire and rescue services should identify and assess all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks. They should also prevent and mitigate these risks'. (HMICFRS Report 2018/19)*

<b>Scenario 2: High Rise.</b>	
<p><b>Findings:</b></p> <p>When the first appliance attending has a ridership of four the following task deviations were observed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA) compromised as the IC undertook the task of laying hose and charging hose to branches to assist BA team at the bridgehead in an attempt to speed up deployment of a Breathing Apparatus (BA) crew into the fire compartment. (Recommendation 4)</li> </ul>	<p><b>FBU Response:</b></p> <p>This scenario, suffered from a lack of consistency, the casualty was not located in the same place and door to other compartments were left open accidentally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This is an unacceptable risk that has been identified by the TA. The IC could not conduct a DRA, therefore the IC could not undertake a suitable and sufficient risk assessment of risk versus benefit to commit BA crews under rapid deployment procedures.</li> </ul> <p>No dedicated ECO with a crew of four, the role of the ECO is to actively monitor and record the deployment of BA wearers through the ECB, making effective use of telemetry if available.</p> <p>The ECO should remain focused on their ECB and the health, safety and welfare of committed BA wearers, avoiding becoming involved in activities that distract from this task. This</p>



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Only a partial brief for BA teams was carried out at the bridgehead due to prioritising continued discussion with BA team while simultaneously setting up equipment over three floors.</li> <li>This impacted the ICs actions when undertaking command and control tasks in assessing the fire and briefing BA crews therefore leading to task deviation within the initial stages of Incident Command.</li> <li>Whilst arriving with a crew of four leaves the IC without a dedicated Entry Control Officer (ECO), rapid deployment of the team can be utilised, following a suitable risk assessment of risk versus benefit, as per Fire Service National Operational Guidance.</li> <li>Greater fatigue was experienced for the IC and BA team when arriving with a crew of four in the initial assessment and set up of equipment than with a crew of five. (Recommendation 1)</li> <li>Arriving with a crew of five allows the initial IC to use three personnel at the bridgehead area and may task dedicated ECO</li> </ul>	<p>information is taken from the learning management system within GMFRS. (Recommendation 4)</p> <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A partial brief was carried out to the BA teams, which breaches the SSoW. Greater fatigue is experienced with a crew of four.</li> <li>Following on from the Grenfell Tower incident, high rise incidents are unique, demanding challenging incidents, riding with a crew of four affects how quickly a high rise incident can be brought under control.</li> <li>We believe that GMFRS are basing their Pre-Determined Attendance (PDA) upon a situation where compartmentation works. Compartmentation is the principle whereby buildings are built divided into fire-resistant compartments. The failure of compartmentation at Grenfell caused the fire to spread so rapidly.</li> </ul> <p>A PDA of 5 fire engines does not account for the failure of compartmentation, putting both firefighters and the public at risk.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TA itself is in breach of H&amp;S legislation as a tower block residence has only one means of access and egress (entry and escape) and as such is considered a confined space for the purposes of the legislation. The Confined Space Regulations 1997 require BA emergency teams to be available prior to the commitment of BA crews, there were no BA emergency teams considered.</li> </ul>
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<p>duties, or may task the setting up of equipment to facilitate a greater speed of response of the BA team into the fire compartment.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Arriving with a crew of five gave the IC greater capacity to transport equipment, greater control over the set-up of equipment, a more controlled assessment of the overall situation, communications to ground level and a more structured brief for BA crews.</li> </ul>	<p>This is a major flaw in the TA that should have been identified at the initial risk assessment stage.</p>
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#### **Recommendation 1 - Reduce risks associated with the physiological effects of working in a hot environment**

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- *Having regard to all relevant factors including, for example the weather, previous exertions of BA teams and individual circumstances;*
- *Training and guidance for all operational personnel to recognize the effects of heat, both on themselves and on their colleagues, and the appropriate steps to take upon such recognition, including withdrawal and self-withdrawal.*
- *Training and guidance for all operational personnel to have the ability and confidence to ensure the withdrawal of others who may be adversely affected by heat, whether by calling a BA emergency or otherwise, appropriately.*
- *Training and guidance for all operational personnel to have the ability and confidence to withdraw themselves by whatever means appropriate, including activating the ADSU.*

#### **Recommendation 4 - Responsibility to record, share and make available information**

*It is suggested that all FRSs should ensure that significant hazards and any safety control measures are the responsibility of the incident commander and should be recorded within each sector, to ensure visibility to all on the fireground, and passed/copied for use by the incident commander/sector command team to assist the analytical risk assessment.*



**'Areas for Improvement.**

- *The service should assure itself that staff are competent in safety-critical areas such as incident command and breathing apparatus.*
- *The service should assure itself that changes to procedures are understood by all staff.*
- *The service should assure itself that risk assessments are accurately recorded and passed to oncoming crews.'* (HMICFRS Report 2018/19)

Scenario 3: RTC.	
<b>Findings:</b> Task deviations noted were:	<b>FBU Response:</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• IC and 2<sup>nd</sup> IC stepped out of command roles whilst getting hands on for short periods of time, mainly to assist with roof removals therefore resulting in task deviations within Incident Command.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The perceived criticism of IC and “IC stepping out of command roles to assist crews” will be exacerbated with a crew of four.</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• In both scenarios the command support role was compromised while additional assistance was given with multiple tasks e.g. trim removal, clearing of debris, panel removal.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• An identified lack of firefighting crews.</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The outcomes of these points did not detract from the overall task success of the incident and a greater adherence to procedure and fire ground discipline to ensure safe working areas and command and control is maintained would have mitigated these points.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The task was not completed successfully, crews and public were put at avoidable risk. To say otherwise is intentionally disingenuous</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• For casualty handling only one casualty handler was used per casualty. Good practice suggests two casualty handlers per casualty, one for C-Spine</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Relying on NWS personnel is not realistic or acceptable. GMF&amp;RS should be able to deal with multiple casualties at all times and that has to be reflected in the</li></ul>



<p>stabilisation and one for monitoring the casualty's status. This was raised as additional personnel required within the TA however it was noted NWS personnel may fulfil this role if in attendance.</p>	<p>risk assessments, the standard operating procedure and the SSoW. This is placing community members in a foreseeable, avoidable and unacceptable risk.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All operatives in both scenarios employed simultaneous actions with no latent capacity observed throughout the scenario.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There was a lack of communication with North West Fire Control (NWFC), there was no logging of important decision making operation assessments or any Analytical Risk Assessments (ARA) which is required by the national incident command guidance.</li> <li>No cordons were set up to manage high levels of traffic. The crews were unable to fulfil the SSoW and carry out all 6 phases of an Road Traffic Collision (RTC).</li> </ul>


<b>Scenario 4: Water Rescue</b>	
<p><b>Findings:</b></p> <p>Task deviations observed were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In the first scenario, the time taken to recover the casualty was not timely, due to 'perceived' procedures being followed by the Incident Commander preparing a safety team for a rescue swimmer prior to committing to rescue.</li> <li>When the initial attending appliance had a ridership level of four, the establishment of a hazard zone, maintaining cordon</li> </ul>	<p><b>FBU Response:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is imperative that we maintain the SSoW with regard to water incidents.</li> </ul> <p>In 1999 a GMF&amp;RS fire fighter lost his life attempting a water incident rescue. A crew of 4 has a negative impact in terms of health and safety with regard to the early stages of a water incident.</p>



<p>control or setting out additional rescue equipment was not achieved in the initial stages.</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The outcomes of the above points did not detract from the overall task success of the incident. A greater understanding and adherence along with a revised standard operating procedure would have mitigated these points.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A crew of five achieved safety objectives in a timelier manner, all tasks were achieved in a quicker time compared with a crew of four.</li> <li>The national standard of '15 Absolutes' was not achieved. (See below)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It took 2 mins 30 secs for an operative to get donned in a dry suit, with assistance from another operative, ready to be deployed as a rescue swimmer following a brief from the IC</li> <li>A crewing level of five gave the IC the option of improved cordon control and setting up of additional rescue equipment.</li> <li>In this scenario a swimming rescue by a firefighter wearing a dry suit could be carried out in under five minutes from the point of arrival at the incident to the casualty being recovered to the shore. This meant that if a swimmer was committed as soon as he/she was ready in a dry suit then a rescue could be affected and completed before the second appliance rescue swimmer was ready in his/her dry suit.</li> <li>An equipment dump was set up in the following timescales: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Crewing level of 4 - 3 mins 10 secs (with 2 personnel)</li> <li>Crewing level of 5 - 2 mins 30 secs (with 3 personnel)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Only trained personnel are employed to carry out a swim rescue. The TA does not account for the 'Lag Time' in getting the necessary resources to an incident to commit these personnel into the water.</li> <li>No upstream or downstream spotters were deployed resulting in a procedurally defective task that endangered the crews.</li> <li>This scenario did not account for the casualty to be in a hard to reach area and did not include the set-up of a boat.</li> </ul>



- Current Procedures and SOPs were found to be generic following discussion with operational crews and an element of confusion was apparent in regard to SSoW when committing non water specialist responders and appropriate PPE (dry suits). This has been communicated and a review of procedures will be undertaken.



The nationally circulated guide 'The Dynamic Management of Risk at Operational Incidents, A Fire Service Pamphlet' states:-

*"Legal - Fire Authorities, in common with other employers, have many legal duties in respect of safety. The most relevant to this document are those imposed by sections 2 and 3 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and regulations 3 and 4 of the Management of Health and Safety at work Regulations (MHSAW), 1992. These require employers to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare of employees and others affected by their work activities.*

*In order to achieve this, they must carry out and record suitable and sufficient risk assessments, then implement the control measures necessary to ensure an acceptable level of safety. Both the risk assessments and the control measures must be regularly monitored and reviewed to confirm their continuing validity."*

#### Risk Assessment – The Management of Health & Safety at Work Regulations



In the 1990's the manner in which consideration of employee health & safety was approached in the UK underwent a fundamental change. European legislation was enacted which shifted the emphasis from prescriptive requirements to requirements and procedures based on an assessment of risk. The Management of Health & Safety at Work (MHSAW) Regulations placed a requirement on employers to consider all work activities from the perspective of the risk they posed to their employees, and the risk posed to other persons who could be affected by the way their employees were undertaking tasks. It was ruled that fire & rescue authorities (as employers) were not exempt from the requirement to comply with this legislation. This had major implications for the Fire and Rescue Service, particularly in relation to procedures at emergency incidents, where the risks posed to Firefighters were potentially the greatest.

*"It is imperative that brigades use these assessments as part of their own risk assessment strategy not as an alternative or substitute to it. They are designed to help brigades assess their own risks, so they should be included in the brigade's normal planning process."*

(A Guide to Operational Risk Assessment – page 4)

Crucially 'A Guide to Operational Risk Assessment, Health and Safety, Fire Service Guide Volume 3' in its 'Fire Service Risk Assessment Summary Sheet, Generic Risk Assessment Summary Sheet (GRA 3.1) Section 3 page 15', lists operational activities in relation to 'Fighting Fires in Buildings' as being considered as high risk to Firefighters; these include heat and humidity, limited visibility, and uncontrolled ventilation. One of the key 'Control Measures' it lists in relation to these high risks is the Pre-Determined Attendance (PDA's), clearly the amount of Firefighters on the initial attending fire appliances is taken into account in GRA 3.1.

With regard to high rise dwelling fires, and some commercial fires, GMF&RS are in breach of the Confined Spaces Regulations 1997.

OGBA is very clear in that it states:

**Confined Spaces Regulations 1997:** *No firefighter must enter a confined space to carry out work for any purpose unless it is not reasonably practicable to achieve that purpose without such entry (regulation 4(1)). If entry to a confined space is unavoidable, firefighters must follow a safe system of work (including use of breathing apparatus) (regulation 4(2)) and put in place adequate emergency arrangements before the work starts (regulation 5).*

GMF&RS have not considered this critical element of its legislative obligations and not included these requirements in any risk assessments, SOPs or SSoW nor considered it in the TA.

Furthermore, the Fire Brigades Union ask which of the firefighters is not required if you reduce the crew from five to four, is it:

1. The Incident Commander - Is GMF&RS saying that we do not need an Incident Commander to make an initial assessment of the incident and to deploy crews according to this assessment? Is Incident Command a safety critical task and therefore a necessary measure to control the risk to which firefighters are likely to be exposed?
2. A Team of 2 BA Wearers - Is GMF&RS saying that we do not need to deploy a team of 2 BA Wearers internally in the dwelling for rescue or firefighting? Is a team of at least 2 BA Wearers a minimum requirement for BA Procedures, and is this minimum number of BA Wearers not safety critical, and hence a necessary measure to control the risk to which firefighters are likely to be exposed?



3. The Pump Operator - Is GMF&RS saying that we do not need a pump operator to control the supply of water for firefighting or firefighter protection to the BA team which has been committed to the fire in the dwelling? Is the requirement to have a dedicated pump operator not safety critical, and hence a necessary measure to control the risk to which firefighters are likely to be exposed?
4. The BA Entry Control Officer - Is GMF&RS saying that contrary to Standard (and nationally accepted) Operating Procedures that we do not need a designated, stand alone, BA Entry Control Officer to be responsible for BA control at any time Breathing Apparatus is required for firefighting and rescue purposes? Does GMF&RS intend to revise its local Standard Operating Procedures/Service Instructions in respect of BA to the extent that they deviate from nationally accepted Standard Operating Procedures in respect of the need to establish BA Entry Control before firefighters are committed in BA? Does GMF&RS believe that the requirement to have a dedicated BA Entry Control Officer is not safety critical, and is not a necessary measure to control the risk to which firefighters committed in BA are likely to be exposed?

FRS Circular 18/2009 - Firefighter Safety at Operational Incidents states-

*“2.4 The role of the Breathing Apparatus Entry Control Officer (BAECO) is essential to the safe control and support of BA operations. The skills and knowledge to carry out the BAECO role in terms of maintaining proper records on the Entry Control Board, communicating with BA teams, and the briefing and de-briefing of BA teams, is an integral part of both BA training and refresher training”*

If this crewing system is allowed to continue, then if difficult decisions are not taken i.e. telling a crew of four to stand outside a house fire and await the arrival of the 2nd appliance, and Incident Command Systems do fail to protect the health and safety of firefighters, GMF&RS will have to accept that the situation was reasonably foreseeable and was of their own making. They will have to accept that the root cause was a failure to incorporate adequate corporate health and safety management into the IRMP process.

### **Governance Arrangements**

The matter of ‘governance’ for Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service under the Greater Manchester Combined Authority is the cause of great concern for the Fire Brigades Union.

Since the TUPE transfer of GMF&RS staff to the GMCA in May 2017 which saw the abolition of the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Authority (GMF&RA), the FBU believe as a result there has been a democratic deficit. The dissolution of the Fire Committee immediately following its formation came with no explanation and was an early indication of the worrying trend which has followed. As was the shift of responsibility for ‘Fire’ to the Deputy Mayor/PFCC, an appointment that the FBU consider has been implemented without the necessary consultation.

Whilst the FBU were not always aligned to the views of the GMF&RA at least their democratic cross party, subcommittee structure allowed the FBU to engage, advise and lobby its membership. All Fire Authority meetings were open to Union Officials and all papers being considered were made available for scrutiny.



Two years on from this transfer the whole governance of GMF&RS is uncertain and confusing; questions relating to the current governance and constitutional arrangements were not able to be answered by service managers during this consultative process.

Para. 777 of the OBC states, *'The Programme for Change will be delivered through an agreed set of workstreams...'* it is extremely disappointing that following the FBU initially being invited to be engaged in the development of these workstreams, that this offer was then withdrawn without explanation.

The OBC in para. 787 does state that *'the Trade Union Forum and Staff Reference Group will continue throughout the implementation phase of the programme...'*, this appears to indicate that the GMCA wish to continue as per the 'Fire Cover Review' of excluding the FBU in the development of new concepts and only becoming transparent once clear plans are formed and implementation has begun. This is somewhat surprising as the FBU believe there to have been widespread acknowledgement throughout GMFRS that the decision to exclude the FBU from the 'Fire Cover Review' was regrettable. The FBU and other recognised representative bodies have made clear their opinion of the 'Staff Reference Group', this anonymous, unelected, unaccountable and unrepresentative group can only serve to be detrimental to the progress of GMF&RS and Service-Union relations.

Para 792. States,

*'The cashable and non-cashable objectives of the programme are identified below:'*

Bullet point 3 informs,

*'Develop an operating model that provides improved frontline services with a sustainable cost base;'*

Throughout the recent formal consultation period there has been no evidence whatsoever that the GMCA will provide a *'model that provides improved frontline services'*. This statement is considered inflammatory given the GMCA plans through Programme for Change to:

- Reduce the number of Fire Stations
- Remove 9 frontline firefighting appliances
- Cut 194 firefighter jobs
- Reduce crewing levels on fire appliances
- Increase attendance times, with a caveat to fail to achieve the new, worsened attendance times on 20% of occasions
- Dramatically cut non-operational post, thereby impacting on community safety and firefighter support

The FBU await explanation given these detrimental changes of how an improved service can be achieved.

Clearly the FBU consider its concerns around the democracy and accountability within the governance of GMF&RS as matters of great importance. It is fundamental to the future of the Fire and Rescue Service in Greater Manchester that any plans/decisions which impact upon our communities, firefighters and the shape of our service in the future are transparent and open to scrutiny and challenge.

### **Non SDS Duty System**

The proposed reduction of firefighter numbers at non SDS stations is unsustainable. Moving down from 14 to 9 firefighters (even if that move is a notional one) means that you cannot effectively operate the station without firefighters having to work additional shifts, this is what is referred to as a 'ridership factor' which is quite simply a staffing model that calculates the numbers of firefighting staff (firefighters and managers) taking into account all staffing abstractions due to leave, training etc. An example and explanation of which is below:



## The Components of a Ridership Factor

### 1. Leave.

Many elements of firefighters leave are entirely predictable such as annual leave made up of scale A, B, Long Service Leave (LSL) and public holiday leave. Some are statutory but less predictable such as maternity, paternity, adoption, Trade Union Leave (TUL), H&S leave etc and some are discretionary such as special leave etc.

Another element of the leave calculation is the allowance for other leave. This includes absence for trade union leave, Health and Safety leave as well as paternity, maternity, bereavement and other family friendly policies which are the subject of recent legislation. The demand for this type of leave can only increase as the number of women employed as firefighters increases as it must do.

### 2. Training.

The training element of the ridership factor is an allowance for off shift training of operational staff.

### 3. Absence due to illness.

The sick leave portion of the ridership factor includes long term and short term sick leave.

#### The Ridership Calculation

Total Shifts Per Annum (day and night shifts x 365)	<b>730</b>	<b>730</b>
Total Shifts per Rider	<b>182.5</b>	<b>182.50</b>
Scale A Leave (Annual Leave)	<b>15</b>	<b>15</b>
Scale B Leave (Annual Leave)	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>
Long Service Leave (Annual Leave)	<b>2.6</b>	<b>2.6</b>
Public Holiday Leave	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>
Shifts to Other Leave	<b>2.6</b>	<b>2.6</b>
Total Leave	<b>31.23</b>	<b>31.23</b>
Total	<b>147.27</b>	<b>147.27</b>
Shifts Lost to Training	<b>10</b>	<b>10</b>
Shifts Lost to Sickness	<b>5</b>	<b>10</b>
Total	<b>133.27</b>	<b>127.27</b>
Ridership Factor Per Rider Post Total Shifts Divided By Total 182.5 /133.27	<b>1.37</b>	<b>1.43</b>



Multiplied by Rider Positions (eg 250) x 4	<b>1370 firefighters</b>	<b>1430 firefighters</b>
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This is an indicative calculation as the figures will always move up and down e.g. annual leave, statutory leave and sickness leave can vary.

This is not a difficult formula that should inform staffing levels, particularly on non-SDS stations but with a proposed reduction of crewing to 9, less than 5 firefighters per shift, would result in a negative ridership factor before any staffing abstraction, contractual or statutory. A negative ridership factor would **require** firefighters to work extra shifts. This has been attempted without FBU agreement in other F&RS's and has failed.

The thinking is to re-invest the savings made by a reduced wage bill, to cover costs of additional shifts by the use of overtime at plain/flat rate, saving on recruitment, training and pension costs. This is a staffing model that could theoretically work in a factory or production line but cannot work in an emergency service without having a detrimental impact on service delivery and firefighter welfare.

### **Summary**

The OBCR sets out the concerns the FBU have in relation to the OBC. The required Fire Plan must be the vehicle to inform the staffing levels and appliance disposition and not the OBC which is essentially the business plan and not a risk management plan.

For too many years, the IRMP/Fire Plan has become the business plan at the expense of the required risk management plan, this is not acceptable and is in breach of the National Framework.

The OBC is the result of deeply flawed advice provided by GMF&RS managers. National Guidance has been at best misrepresented and in some cases disregarded. Risk assessments have not been undertaken and nor the requisite consultation concluded.

There is no suitable Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) provided with GMF&RS of the position that service delivery should not require an EIA.

There has been no consideration of the impact of the physiological effects of firefighting activities and no consideration whatsoever on the impact of the obvious increased workload if the proposed broadening of the firefighter role as laid out in the OBC and which is currently the subject of national dialogue within the NJC on firefighters and operational outputs.





# Appendix 3 – Demographics



## WHO ENGAGED WITH THE CONSULTATION?

People from across Greater Manchester responded to the consultation and this section shows who responded to the online consultation. There is no comparable public data for responses made via the inbox.

Below shows a table of responses from each District. The areas with the higher response rate are either areas with a station merger proposed or where the removal of a second pump is being proposed -

**Which local authority area do you live in (if you are responding on behalf of yourself) or work in (if you are responding on behalf of an organisation)?**

	Count	Percentage
Bolton	62	15.38%
Bury	29	7.20%
Manchester	50	12.41%
Oldham	12	2.98%
Rochdale	28	6.95%
Salford	71	17.62%
Stockport	53	13.15%
Tameside	29	7.20%
Trafford	14	3.47%
Wigan	23	5.71%
Greater Manchester organisation	4	0.99%
North West organisation	6	1.49%
National organisation	1	0.25%
Prefer not to say	15	3.72%
Not answered	6	1.49%

During the start of the consultation, there was limited diversity in our responses, so a more targeted approach was used to try and encourage a more representative sample of respondents.

### How old are you?

	Count	Percentage
Under 18	4	0.99%
18- 24	19	4.71%
25 – 34	65	16.13%
35 – 44	73	18.11%
45 – 54	92	22.83%
55 – 64	58	14.39%



65 – 74	33	8.19%
75+	3	0.74%
Prefer not to say	11	2.73%
Not answered	45	11.17%

#### What is your ethnic background?

	Count	Percentage
Asian or Asian British - Indian	3	0.74%
Asian or Asian British - Pakistani	1	0.25%
Asian or Asian British - Bangladeshi	1	0.25%
Asian or Asian British - Chinese	0	0.00%
Asian or Asian British - Any other Asian background	0	0.00%
Black or Black British - Caribbean	2	0.50%
Black or Black British - African	0	0.00%
Black or Black British - Any other Black background	1	0.25%
Mixed - White and Black Caribbean	5	1.24%
Mixed - White and Black African	1	0.25%
Mixed - White and Asian	3	0.74%
Mixed - Any other mixed background	1	0.25%
White - English / Welsh / Scottish / Northern Irish / British	282	69.98%
White - Irish	9	2.23%
White - Gypsy or Irish Traveller	1	0.25%
White - Eastern European	1	0.25%
White - Any other White background	9	2.23%
Other ethnic group - Arab	0	0.00%
Other ethnic group - other	0	0.00%
Prefer not to say	35	8.68%
Not answered	48	11.91%

#### What is your religion?

	Count	Percentage
Buddhist	4	0.99%
Christian	157	38.96%



Hindu	0	0.00%
Jewish	4	0.99%
Muslim	5	1.24%
Sikh	0	0.00%
Other religion	6	1.49%
No religion	139	34.49%
Prefer not to say	45	11.17%
Not answered	43	10.67%

**How would you describe your gender?**

	Count	Percentage
A man	190	47.15%
A woman	143	35.48%
Non-binary	0	0%
In another way	2	0.50%
Prefer not to say	25	6.20%
Not answered	43	10.67%

**Which of the following describes how you think of yourself?**

	Count	Percentage
Bisexual	5	1.24%
Gay or lesbian	13	3.23%
Heterosexual or straight	283	70.22%
Other sexual orientation	2	0.50%
Prefer not to say	53	13.15%
Not answered	47	11.66%

**Do you consider yourself to have a disability? (please tick all that apply)**

	Count	Percentage
No	281	69.73%
Yes - learning disability	4	0.99%
Yes - mental ill health	16	3.97%
Yes - mobility disability	16	3.97%



Yes - sensory disability	11	2.73%
Yes - other disability	14	3.47%
Prefer not to say	33	8.19%
Not answered	42	10.42%





## Appendix 4 – Volunteering service response



# Greater Manchester Fire & Rescue Service VOLUNTEER TEAM

## RESPONSE TO OUTLINE BUSINESS CASE



MAY 2019



## CONTENT

1. Executive Summary .....	112
2. Introduction .....	113
3. Economic value of GMFRS volunteers .....	116
4. Volunteer activities .....	117
5. Volunteer Team .....	121
6. Partnership working .....	126
7. Volunteering aligned to GMCA .....	127
8. Cost of the schemes .....	130
9. Volunteer feedback .....	131
10. Operational personnel feedback .....	135
11. Conclusion .....	138
12. Recommendations .....	139
Appendices .....	139



## 1. Executive Summary

This report has been produced in response to the Greater Manchester Combined Authority's Programme for Change Outline Business Case March 2019.

In light of the absence and therefore, the recognition of the GMFRS Volunteer Scheme within the OBC, this report seeks to inform and raise the awareness to GMCA of the invaluable and substantial contribution made by the GMFRS volunteers.

It also aims to highlight the extent to which the Volunteer Team coordinate and facilitate the 240 volunteers across cadets, youth projects, post incident clean up, post incident engagement, fire fighter training and major public events.

The report does not necessarily discuss or outline new structures however does explore new ways of working with GMCA, how the current establishment can be adapted to meet the GMCA strategic objectives and how this can be developed at a wider Partnership level across Greater Manchester.

Volunteering across the UK contributes massively to the community and voluntary sector, however, more recently this has evolved within public sector organisations in order to involve and engage communities into state led establishments but also to alleviate the financial constraints the services face.

The GMFRS volunteer scheme was established in 2008 as a pilot scheme in Trafford Borough with a group of 12 volunteers. Through controlled expansion, monitoring and evaluation, it has developed into a scheme that has delivered volunteering across Greater Manchester with over 1200 individuals volunteering resulting in over 500,000 hours donated, to support both operational and community based activities in the last 10 years.

The scheme has also helped individuals develop their employability skills and reach their personal goals.

The report provides a comprehensive breakdown of the work required to implement such a scheme and demonstrates the range of activities delivered by volunteers.

Although the OBC does not specifically mention the future of volunteering, following on from the publication, a number of discussions have alluded to firefighters taking on the role of coordinating and managing volunteers at a local level.

This report demonstrates that the extensive work involved in managing volunteers which requires a centralised and coordinated approach from a dedicated team of staff who can successfully work alongside operational crews to deliver this rather than adding this their already increasing workload and roles.



## 2. Introduction

### Nationally

Each year, more than one billion people are engaged in volunteering worldwide. Their actions have economic, private and social values

The scale of volunteering in today's Britain is outstanding. Almost 20 million people – have taken part in some form of volunteering within the past year, giving their time free of charge for their local communities with over 160,000 voluntary organisations contributing £12.2 billion to the UK economy.

These figures are taken from a survey of more than 10,000 people conducted by YouGov for NCVO, which provides the most detailed analysis of volunteering for a decade, depicting the rich diversity of civil society in action in villages, towns and cities throughout Britain.

### Greater Manchester

The Greater Manchester Strategy “Our People Our Place” sets out a vision for a truly inclusive city, where every resident can start well, live well and age well. It references the importance of people “getting a helping hand” when they need it, and highlights the value of volunteering in some specific contexts.

Volunteering within communities across Greater Manchester contributes to the positive wellbeing of individuals and strengthens community action, peer support and social capital, thereby increasing the resilience of communities and making it more likely that those who need that “helping hand” will be supported through the relevant structures and processes.

Volunteering allows individuals, including younger and older people and those who are disengaged, to find meaningful ways to contribute and be valued. This also supports them to gain confidence and skills, both vocational and non-vocational.

As demonstrated by the GMFRS scheme, volunteering can add value to public service delivery at a time when the public sector needs to maximise its limited resources.

The vision of this strategy is *“People who live, work and study in Greater Manchester will be encouraged and enabled to contribute to the life of Greater Manchester through volunteering and social action, and in return will gain a positive, meaningful and rewarding experience”*.

The GMFRS volunteering scheme fulfils a number of the 7 objectives outlined within the GM strategy:

**2. Volunteer Brokerage** - People accessing volunteering in different ways – we offer a wide range of entry level to highly skilled volunteer opportunities.

**4. Training for volunteers** - Volunteers benefitting from a range of training courses – training is provided at induction and throughout the whole-time a volunteer is with GMFRS.

**5. Transport** - Transport acts as a serious barrier to some people being able to volunteer – this is something we already provide both in terms of expenses and access to vehicles.



**6. 'Passporting'** - A system implemented which is mutually recognised by organisations and sectors for comparable volunteer roles - we have already successfully transferred volunteers across from GMCA.

**7. Recognition of Volunteers** - Ways of recognising the contribution of volunteers. This is something we do on an annual and regular basis with a recently celebrated 10-year anniversary.

The GM Volunteering Strategy, led by GMCVO, states GMFRS as a consultee and a contributor, highlighting the positive contribution the organisation already invests in the voluntary sector across Greater Manchester.

### Greater Manchester Fire & Rescue Service Volunteer Scheme

The original purpose of establishing the GMFRS volunteer scheme was to place volunteering at the heart of the service delivered to the communities of GMFRS, whilst adding to the quality of life of our volunteers.

The Purpose of GMFRS is to 'protect and improve the quality of life of the people in Greater Manchester'.

When initially established, the volunteer scheme met the following corporate aims:

**Prevention** - Volunteers will assist and support Prevention activities by engaging with communities to inform and educate people in how to reduce the risk of fires and other emergencies, and prevent crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour.

**Protection** - Volunteers will assist and support Protection activities to influence the safety of the built environment and to protect people, property and the environment from harm.

**Response** - As GMFRS has a lead role in the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum volunteers will assist and support at major incidents. They will also assist in post-incident emergency response activities in order to minimise the impact and improve quality of life.

**Public Value** - We will ensure flexible, efficient and effective use of volunteers to improve the use of public money in ways the public value.

**People** - We will equip volunteers with the right skills to deliver high quality, value for money services in a positive environment.

**Principles** - Volunteers will operate in accordance with the law, our values and the best practice of agencies such as Volunteering England.

Though directly linked to the Corporate Plan (2012-2015) through Delivery Goal 13, Volunteering was also established to support GMFRS in succeeding with many of the Delivery Goals, for example volunteers will help to:

- Reduce the number of emergency calls (DL1)
- Reduce deaths and injuries from fires and other emergencies (DL2)
- Reduce crime and disorder (DL3)
- Continually improve our service, providing value for money and a balanced budget (DL10)
- Place fire stations at the heart of communities, valued and used by local people, organisations and partners (DL11)



- Provide improved quality of life outcomes for communities (which includes our volunteers) (DL12)
- Develop and sustain a high quality, performing, effective, well informed and well trained workforce (DL14)
- Develop and maintain a committed, enthusiastic and healthy workforce including volunteers with high levels of satisfaction (DL15)
- Provide for better community outcomes through equitable service delivery by a workforce that is representative of our collective diversity (DL19)

Since 2008, over 1200 volunteers have taken part in the GMFRS volunteering scheme and have donated around 500,000 hours. The social value is truly immeasurable however; the economic contribution can be measured and is detailed later in this report.

The hours donated have allowed activities such as community reassurance, youth engagement and Prevention to take place across the whole of GM.

These include activities such as

- **Post Incident team (PIT)** including clean ups following a fire/flood
- **Targeted post incident support** awareness raising following a fatality or serious fire
- **Major incident support** including incidents such as Manchester Arena, Maple Mill and the Moorland fires
- **Attending community events** such as open days, fetes, high profile parades and career fairs
- **Crew support and training** from major emergency planning exercises to local Station RTC training
- **Chaplaincy support** to enhance the well-being function of the organisation
- Running **Cadet Units** across GM to provide opportunities for young people to be engaged in meaningful activities whilst developing their personal and social skills including self-confidence and in many cases creating a career progression path
- **CSA support** in delivery of S&W
- Taking part in **Major annual events** such as Pride and Manchester Day parades, Mega Mela and Caribbean Carnival
- **Targeted campaign work** to support activities such as Safe4 campaigns, road safety, dementia and mental health

This is only a snapshot of what volunteers have achieved on behalf of the organisation.

Volunteers have represented GMFRS in a professional and dignified manner throughout the past 10 years ensuring they uphold the values and behaviours of the Service.

Many have gone on to have a career with us, gained employment elsewhere, onto further education and many have stayed, either way their time with us has been invaluable to both staff and crews.

**Appendix A highlights the work carried out by volunteers on behalf of GMFRS**



### 3. Economic value of GMFRS Volunteers

In order to ensure that the contribution of volunteers is of the highest standard, it is essential that they be

- Appropriately recruited based on skills, knowledge and experience
- Suitably trained at induction stage and on-going
- Properly equipped with attire that is reflective of the organisation and relevant to the activity

Alongside this, volunteers need to be effectively managed in order that they are coordinated and utilised to meet their own expectations and to support the organisation's objectives.

Therefore, to run a volunteer scheme effectively, always involves a cost; the cost however, is far less than the value of the outcomes of their work.

Organisations involving volunteers incur costs in areas such as volunteer administration, advertising & recruitment, volunteer expenses, support and recognition, office expenses, communications, meetings, events and equipment; these are deemed as 'essential'.

Other costs are associated with areas of good practice, these include employing Volunteer Coordinators or Managers, within a public sector organisation, these roles are crucial to ensure the overall work carried out by the volunteers is aligned with the strategic objectives of the organisation.

Within GMFRS over the last ten years there has been an investment that has recognised the returns given by the volunteers to the Service.

Currently there is no proven scientific way to measure the real economic value of volunteering; all we have are estimates, calculated in terms of research designs.

These can vary in important ways, including the:

- Definition of volunteering
- Reliability of the data about volunteer hours
- Types of replacement wages used.

It is clear that the estimates of the value of the work done by even a single volunteer could vary significantly by using different types of replacement wages (minimum wage, specialist wage, median wage, mean wage increased by the level of fringe benefits, etc).

There are several reasons for calculating the value of volunteering based on replacement wages, mostly connected with consistency in using existing statistical systems and surveys.



Over the last 5 years, volunteers have contributed over £1.9 million worth of hours to GMFRS, including

- Over £561k hours in **community engagement** activities
- Over £850,000 in **youth engagement** activities in the form of fire cadet schemes (38,161 hours) and Moss Side Boxing Club (20,833 hours) and
- Approximately £270,000 contributing towards the **cultural richness** of GMFRS across GM via the Museum (20,051 hours) and Pipe band (17,682 hour)

A breakdown of some of the recorded activities are details in the table below, which also demonstrated the economic value of the volunteering

	COMPLETED HOURS 12 Months	COMPLETED HOURS 5 Years	Grade/Salary equivalent	Per hour	Total contribution (2018)	Total contribution (2014-2019)
Cadet Activity	1304	38,161.50	Grade E	£11.85	£15,452.00	£452,207
PIT Activity	108.3	15,834.50	£10,635.00	£7.75	£837.00	£122,713
Chaplains	1588.61	3,589.25	£26,787	£14.21	£22,565	£51,001
Community Engagement	3825.48	20,783.50	Minimum wage average over 5 years	£7.14	£27,310	£148,515
GMFRS Representation	433.14	8,713	Minimum wage average over 5 years	£7.14	£3,091	£62,210
RTC/Watch Support	2710.4	7,784.50	Minimum wage average over 5 years	£7.14	£19,349	£55,577
Community Well-Being/Safe and Well/ CSA Support	724	20,027.50	Grade D	£10.28	£7,442	£205,877
Cycle Patrol	56	1,735	Minimum wage average over 5 years	£7.14	£399	£12,387
Boxing Club	4224.45	20,833	£19,478	£20.23	£85,451	£421,451
Caged Football	11	741.36	£19,478	£20.23	£202.30	£14,990
Fire Safety Support		252	Minimum wage average over 5 years	£7.14		£1,799
Hazard Spotting	14	357.5	Minimum wage average over 5 years	£7.14	£100	£2,549
Training	703.35	4,954	Minimum wage average over 5 years	£7.14	£5,019	£35,371
Meetings	332.23	3,945	Minimum wage average over 5 years	£7.14	£2,370	£28,167
Museum	3518	20,051		£7.14	£25,118	£143,164
Pipe Band	5440.4	17,682	Minimum wage average over 5 years	£7.14	£38,841	£126,249
Station Guardian	326.21	1951	Minimum wage average over 5 years	£7.14	£2,327	£13,930
Induction Training	1090	1971	Minimum wage average over 5 years	£7.14	£7,782	£14,072
Heartstart	10.3	532	Minimum wage average over 5 years	£7.14	£71	£3,798
Wildfire and Water Safety	949.01	1033	Minimum wage average over 5 years	£7.14	£6,775	£7,375
Transport and Logistics	4	111	Minimum wage average over 5 years	£7.14	£28	£792
Climbing Wall		268	£19,478	£20.23		£2,245
Kitchen Fire Safety Unit	25	25	Minimum wage average over 5 years	£7.14	£178	£178
	<b>27397.88</b>	<b>191,335.61</b>			<b>£270,707.30</b>	<b>£1,926,617</b>

## 4. Volunteer activities

There are a number of considerations when coordinating requests for volunteering within GMFRS. The activity needs to be aligned to our strategic objectives and have an outcome based on the values of



Prevention. Community engagement and visibility is the primary purpose for most requests, followed by education and awareness raising and operational support.

Most requests are from GMFRS colleagues however due to our strong partnership working we do receive many requests from external community based organisations to attend events and activities as they recognise the benefits GMFRS attending can bring to the organisation and the wider community.

Volunteer Co-ordinators have to ensure logistical issues are carefully considered before agreeing to undertake the setting up of an activity. These include, relevant skills required to undertake the activity, additional training needs, equipment, resources, transport and health and safety.

We maintain on-going communication with our volunteers, colleagues and external partners at all times to ensure expectations are managed and achieved throughout the process. This is particularly important in allowing us to make sure volunteers feel valued and respected.

In addition to the local events, volunteers have played a huge part in the delivery of high profile partnership activities. Without their involvement, some of these may not have been possible and many would have then relied on paid staff, which demonstrates and reinforces the economic value of GMFRS volunteers.

#### **EXAMPLES OF HIGH PROFILE GMFRS VOLUNTEERING**

##### **Trafford Centre terrorist attack training exercise.**

GMFRS Volunteers played a major part in this exercise held at the Trafford centre in 2016.

The VDO attended planning meetings running up to the event and VCs advertised and recruited volunteers. Both liaised with organisers and volunteers, arranged transport and took part in the exercise.

Volunteers attended in unsociable hours (8pm – 3am) to play the roles of visitors to the shopping centre, which was part of a terrorist attack. Some volunteers were ‘made-up’ with real life injuries, even playing a fatality-wounded person.

Although only an exercise for those taking part it felt very real which was crucial for those running the event in order for them to get real life reactions, something they would not be able to do by using dummies and so the assistance of our volunteers was invaluable.

##### **Manchester Arena bombing**

In May 2017, Manchester was subject to a devastating terror attack. The day after the event, volunteers were requested to go into Manchester City Centre to provide visibility and community reassurance for members of the public.



GMFRS volunteers were very happy to assist and went out in small groups where they reassured people, gave directions and were in general a uniformed presence in a City still in shock.

These reassurance roles carried on over the weeks after the incident with volunteers working in partnership with MCC colleagues to assist in the laying of memorials in St Anne's Square whilst all the time offering support to those attending.

When it eventually came time for all the memorials to be removed volunteers also came forward to assist in this. During a time where they were affected themselves, GMFRS volunteers acted professionally, respectfully and were 'a credit to the brigade' as pointed out in many letters of appreciation received afterwards.

Last year on the anniversary of the attack, again our volunteers came together to help and took part over several weeks in the Trees of Hope, and other memorial events. In light of their invaluable help, a couple of volunteers were invited to attend a ceremony at Manchester Cathedral, along with families of those killed and injured in the bomb and other dignitaries.

### **Moorland Fires**

In 2018, we experienced a number of moorland fires across Greater Manchester, mainly in Stalybridge, Saddleworth and Bolton, which burned for several weeks placing a massive strain on Fire Service resources and Crews.

GMFRS volunteers assisted in a number of ways, including:-

*Helping at stations with the donations of food and water*

*Transporting refreshments to the various locations.*

*Assisting with the Salvation Army catering unit.*

*Transporting Firefighters to and from stations to the incident on the moors*

*Offering invaluable support as GMFRS chaplains.*





## VOLUNTEER ACTIVITY LIFE CYCLE




In order to highlight the amount of work involved in coordinating and planning volunteering activities, the following diagram highlights the extensive work undertaken by the Volunteer Team.



## 5. Volunteer Team





The Volunteer Team currently consists of 1 x Volunteer Development Officer and 5 x Volunteer Coordinators who cover all 10 Local Authority areas of GM.

The roles of the team are extremely varied and requires in depth knowledge of both the organisation and volunteering. Roles within the team can range from creating new volunteering modules and delivering appropriate training to carrying out audits on volunteer performance and supporting in the coordination of activities.

When recruiting new volunteers there are a number of considerations to ensure promotion of these roles is varied and wide-spread, including

- Liaising with external partners to promote opportunities within communities and online, e.g. Local CVS groups
- Undertake targeted recruitment talks, e.g. pre-employment courses, schools and college.
- Increasing social media presence targeting specific groups and communities

The online volunteer application process may be challenging so we also offer support sessions to assist individuals in applying.

The team, work on an extremely flexible basis in order to meet the need of both the volunteers and the organisation, this includes working evenings and weekends, both of which are necessary to ensure support is available to volunteers at all times.

Social media is a form of communication we are constantly looking to improve, the team currently have both a Facebook and Instagram page, where we promote the variety of activities volunteers are involved in and promote opportunities available in GMFRS.


Attendance at internal management meetings is key, to support in reviewing and monitoring incidents occurring in the area and respond with specific actions as agreed with Station Managers, to develop an understanding of the primary causes of accidental and deliberate fires in the area to inform on fire safety risk reduction activities. This is also important to support work within the agreed area action plan, making sure targeted volunteer activities help to support the need.

The Volunteer Team officers are an accessible support system for GMFRS volunteers offering guidance, advice and actively listening, not just regarding volunteering activities but also with home, work and personal life.

GMFRS volunteers are very diverse and come from different backgrounds and communities, our goal is to engage and ensure each of them meets the individual expectations they had when joining the Service.

We do not only coordinate volunteers, we build relationships with them so we are able to help and develop them however, also challenge them when appropriate.






In order to maintain the reputation of GMFRS the team also undertake investigations and grievances for and against volunteers to ensure any issues around safeguarding and values and behaviours are dealt with in an appropriate and timely manner.



The following diagrams highlight the extensive work of the team regarding the recruitment of volunteers (this is not exhaustive).



## VOLUNTEER TEAM ROLES - VOLUNTEER ADMIN




The following diagrams highlight the extensive work of the team regarding the administration function of managing volunteers (this is not exhaustive).



## VOLUNTEER TEAM ROLES - VOLUNTEER SUPPORT



The following diagrams highlight the extensive work of the team regarding the support given to volunteers (this is not exhaustive).





## 6. Partnership working

GMFRS Volunteering Service is fully committed to the ethos of partnership working and continuously works with a wide range of services across GM in pursuit of shared objectives and with the understanding that working together will increase 'public value' and utilise volunteers in the most effective way.

GMFRS Volunteering Service currently works in partnership with a wide range of services across Greater Manchester including,

- Schools, Colleges, Universities
- GMP, NWAS
- Youth Offending Teams
- Housing Providers, Social Services, Health Improvement Teams, Local Councils, Neighbourhood Teams
- Local Council for Voluntary Services (CVS), VCAT, GMCVO
- Age UK
- LGBT Groups
- British Red Cross
- Local Community Groups
- Job Centre Plus

Through partnership working, the volunteering management team have been able to ensure GMFRS visibility and education in relation to fire safety and other community safety campaigns.

**Example** - In January 2019 the Volunteer team held a GM partnership seminar with over 50 Health and social care partners to discuss the offer of community well-being volunteers to alleviate and support individuals experiencing social isolation.

The event also enabled partners to share with the Service the work they do and how we can work collaboratively in the future.



## 7. Volunteering aligned to GMCA work streams

As an existing and well-established volunteer service within GMFRS there is both the potential and appetite for the service to grow and contribute to the wider GMCA family.

By bringing together the skills, knowledge and experience within the team (staff and volunteers) we can deal effectively with demand in each geographic area within 'place based hubs', ensuring services and staff in that neighbourhood share a common purpose. Working in this holistic way with partners, people and communities will provide GMCA with a volunteering service adaptable to the changing landscape of GM.

### Supporting Communities

Volunteer Co-ordinators actively promote the volunteering service across GM, linking in with any targeted initiatives and local community needs.

Through our streamlined, efficient recruitment process, we ensure that our volunteers have a variety of skills, which enable them to be proactive in supporting a wide range of community safety events and campaigns alongside partners.

**FUTURE** - In the future we envisage that our volunteering service could work in partnership with place-based teams to provide volunteer support in line with area needs, including partnership working to respond to issues around raising awareness and promoting services

### Post Incident Team

Post Incident Team Volunteers currently attend people's homes to assist in the clean-up of their property following a fire. They clear the property, clean up and remove debris or water from their homes. The team are also trained to give basic fire safety advice, make appropriate referrals for Safe and Well visits.

**Future** - We have worked in partnership with housing providers and councils previously to attend properties where Hoarding is posing a potential fire risk.

This service has the potential to be developed further to provide a sensitive and discrete de-cluttering service to carry out the removal and disposal of accumulated possessions, rubbish and clutter from the home.



### Life Expectancy

GMFRS volunteering provides a multitude of benefits for individuals as keeping our volunteers stimulated and active is a priority. We provide an opportunity for increased social interaction and a support network for our volunteers based on their common interests. By working with them closely, volunteers are valued for their contribution and given a sense of purpose and fulfilment.

**FUTURE** - Community Wellbeing volunteers have been supporting those most vulnerable people at risk of or experiencing social isolation and loneliness by visiting them in their homes to discuss support needs, practical solutions and/or referring them to other agencies.

This area of work has potential for future development and could be utilised by partner agencies and community groups via place-based referrals.

This will reduce the impact on other main services (GP's, Hospitals, Social Services etc) by providing early help signposting/advice.

### Unemployment (including 16-19 year olds)

As a Volunteering Service, we believe that young people can make all the difference to our communities and their lives through the power of volunteering. Volunteer Co-ordinators promote volunteering opportunities across their local communities, such as schools, colleges, universities, recruitment fairs, community centres and local job centres. We have worked in conjunction with The University of Manchester, Hopwood Hall and Trafford College to support students in volunteering placements across Greater Manchester.

Volunteering provides individuals with many transferable skills including teamwork, public speaking, organisation and time management –these basic skills are a necessary requirement within any work place. At GMFRS, we also support the development of these skills by offering training, coaching and mentoring individuals.

**Future** – We have the potential to better support individuals who are unemployed by working closely with job centres and colleges through a referral process to deliver pre-employment programmes to support job seekers into employment, through volunteering.

We have supported this programme through secondment of staff to Volition at Manchester Cathedral. Individuals would join us over a set period where they would develop their employability skills through volunteering, appropriate training and attending recruitment related workshops.



## Calls to Police

Our Volunteers engage and educate young people and the wider community on a wide range of topics such as Fire Safety, Road Safety, Anti-Social Behaviour, Water Safety and Wildfires.

Through partnership working volunteers have attended targeted multi-agency activities alongside GMP, Youth Offending Teams, Housing and the Council. Providing volunteer support during out of hours where paid staff have not been available. Engaging with young people who are at risk of ASB and targeting hot spot areas.

**Future** - Volunteer Co-ordinators have the potential to link in with Neighbourhood teams to assist in the targeting of local hotspot areas and developing a volunteer role for Youth Engagement specific activity.

As Volunteers already engage with our younger community there is potential for them to be trained and carry out/support on FireSmart interventions.

Our volunteers are trained to set up and run the portable Caged Football Unit and can utilise this equipment in partnership with other agencies to engage with young people.

## Homelessness

Volunteers have previously worked alongside Homeless Charities to offer volunteering opportunities for our volunteers by providing contingency support for their services.

We have also worked alongside charities to provide opportunities for caged football activities to promote health and well-being for rough sleepers.

**Future** – GMFRS volunteers can be utilised to ‘hazard spot’ hot spot areas in order to assess both the risk and potential for void properties to be targeted by homeless individuals.

This information will be reported back to the relevant Station manager who can utilise the data within a place-based setting and take appropriate action alongside partner agencies.

Volunteers can also be utilised to support the Mayor’s ‘A Bed Every Night’ campaign and work with local councils to support rough sleepers across Greater Manchester.



## 8. Cost of GMFRS Volunteering Scheme

The current team structure of 1 x Volunteer Development Officer and 5 x Volunteer Coordinators is the majority of spend from the volunteer budget of £291,306 which includes the on-costs and recharges for services such as IT, office and support services.

The team have started to make savings in the last 18 months by recycling uniform rather than ordering new garments for each volunteer, which has saved over £13,000 and returning vehicles not being utilised back to Leigh Technical services.

Additional savings could, potentially be made by;

- Removing the Dutysheet system (an external software which we subscribe to), however this will need to be replaced with another form of data collection

The cost of this is currently £8,000 p.a.

- Reducing the team and amalgamating Boroughs. Only having 4 Volunteer Coordinators could reduce the budget potentially by a further £25,000, however this may have an impact on workloads as there will be geographically larger areas to cover for the officers

The current cost of the team is extremely cost effective when compared to the outcomes and the economic contribution donated by the volunteers.

### Cost centre 1312 - Volunteers

#### Direct costs

Staff (2019/20 ) at 2019/20 pay scales inc 0.5% vacancy factor)

Non staff (Devolved Budgets)

Managed centrally (Non Devolved budgets)

#### Income

#### **NET COSTS - exc recharges**

#### Recharges


2018/19	2019/20
Draft Outturn £	Proposed Budget £
212,432	212,432
28,668	28,668
1,148	1,148
242,248	242,248
0	0
242,248	242,248
49,058	49,058



9. Consultation Feedback from GMFRS Volunteers

To explore the views of our volunteers a questionnaire was sent out for them to share their experiences with us. With a current volunteer cohort of 237, we had 63 questionnaires completed, which is a response rate of 28%.

Volunteers were asked to explain their reasons for joining GMFRS and whether their expectations had been met, the choices included




The 3 main reasons volunteers joined was to ‘give back to the community’ (76%), To stay active and involved (58%) and ‘to gain new experiences’ (55%)

*‘To have a positive impact on young people and give them new life skills’*

*‘A lady I support was involved in a house fire and since then I wanted to make vulnerable people and others more aware of dangers and inform them of what they can do to reduce hazards that's have the potential to cause harm.’*



When asked if their expectations and reasons for joining had been met, over 79% said these had been met either 'a lot' or a 'great deal'




## Skills

As an organisation which encourages learning and development throughout, it was important for us to find out what our GMFRS volunteers had learnt.

Team work featured highly (80%), along with an 'Increased knowledge about Fire Safety' (85%) and the top answer chosen was 'Increased knowledge about GMFRS' (86%)





#### Additional skills identified

*'Leadership'*

*'A feeling of being useful even though retired'*

*'Confidence in speaking to a wide range of people'*


*'How to work safely with young people, assessment skills.... how to work with other agencies and departments in the organisation'*

*'My confidence has grown tremendously since I started volunteering with the GMFRS'*

#### Volunteer Team support

We wanted to know what volunteers thought about the level of support received from the Volunteer Team – Over 78% felt that the support was 'very valuable' or 'extremely valuable'.





### Added Value


As well as providing an opportunity to give back to the communities of Greater Manchester and to develop new skills, we asked volunteers to tell us in what other ways volunteering has helped them.

Over 85% stated it had helped them **‘to contribute to the work of GMFRS’** and 79% felt that it helped them **‘feel part of a respected organisation’**.

47% stated that it had given them **‘employability skills’**, **‘given them a purpose’** (56%) and helped with their **‘health and well-being’** (44%)



- ✚ Helped with my health and well-being
- ✚ Given me employability skills
- ✚ Increased my confidence
- ✚ Given me a purpose
- ✚ Helped me feel part of a respected organisation
- ✚ Helped me make new friends
- ✚ Allowed me to contribute to the work of GMFRS
- ✚ Gave me the opportunity to give something back



*'Not only had it helped me to make lifelong friends, but it has helped driven my ambition to join the fire service as a career. My health and fitness is far superior to what it was originally'*

*'Give me the confidence to work with numerous different young people...and a purpose knowing I'm doing something so valued and so important to many young people'*

*'Volunteering kept me active and involved in the local community. This gave me a sense of worth'*

*'As a community wellbeing volunteer I feel I have helped those that are vulnerable in our local communities..... encouraging them to be part of something again, giving them a purpose to live life to the full'*

*'I feel so proud to be a part of the organisation. It provides so many life skills and life lessons. It allows you to be a part of the community and belong to a family'*

## 10. Consultation Feedback from Operational personnel

Proposals within the Outline Business Case refers to (albeit vaguely) that following the implementation of the review, volunteers will be utilised and managed by SM and crews.


To ensure Operational Crews have a full understanding of this task and are able to take on the delivery of the schemes, Borough and Station Managers were contacted and requested to complete an online questionnaire regarding volunteering within GMFRS.

The survey was sent out to 63 Officers, 29 completed with a response rate of 46%




### Value of Volunteers

Over 55% of respondents felt that GMFRS volunteers were 'very important' or 'extremely important'



When asked whether **volunteers had supported the work of Crews**, over 96% said that they had with only 1 respondent stating that they had not.




### Management of Volunteers


Although **90% of respondents were aware** that under the PfC proposals, management of volunteers may be given to crews, **over 56% did not feel that the crews had skills** and knowledge to coordinate the volunteer provision locally and **97% felt they would not have the capacity** to coordinate volunteering at a local level.

***Q. Are you aware that under the Programme for Change proposals, management of volunteers may be given to crews?***






*Q. Do you think you have the skills and knowledge to coordinate volunteer provision locally?*




*Q. Do you think you would have the capacity to coordinate volunteer provision locally?*



**80% of respondents** thought that the changes proposed for Volunteering would have an impact on them and their crews.

*Q: Do you think the proposed changes to the volunteering scheme will impact on you?*





Comments on the impact included:

*'More personnel to manage. It is unlikely that I will have capacity to do this and so the volunteers will not be supported and further volunteers would not be recruited resulting in low to zero number of volunteers'*

*'More demands on time that I currently do not have'*

*'Managing volunteers as well will impact on carrying out the day to day running of the watch increasing watch officers workloads and being responsible for volunteers'*

*'Time required for operational training and prevention work will be spent on volunteers'*

*'The impact would be massive. I already have approximately 260 staff in my 2 areas and there is a lot of management time allocated to supporting the existing staff and to increase this with the recruitment and management of volunteers I feel would be unmanageable.'*

*'Recruiting, training and organising volunteers would undoubtedly impact on my time and that of my crews'*

*'To put the managerial onus of volunteers onto Station Managers is appalling due to already being well over capacity'*

*'As SM, I'm guessing the management / recruitment would fall to this role and there is not the capacity to undertake this. The crews cannot be relied upon to undertake this due to call out, difficulty in booking appointments then not being able to attend to vehicle issues, incidents, training etc.'*

## 11. Conclusion



This report has demonstrated the value and worth of GMFRS volunteers and the contribution that the scheme has made over the past 10 years to the Service.

Also evidenced is the importance of the team structure and level of coordination and management required to deliver such a scheme.

The GMFRS volunteer scheme could easily be developed into a model, which will seek to support the wider GMCA family by providing a response to opportunities from within place-based structures in addition to continuing the excellent preventative work.

The opportunity to work in a more cohesive way with partners across GM is one we would welcome, more importantly is the need for staff and volunteers to be involved in these discussions and in shaping proposals for the way forward.

## 12. Recommendations

1. The Mayor, Deputy Mayor and CFO to note the content of this report and commit to meeting to discuss current programme with this team
2. Workshops on the future of volunteering, with a cross section of the workforce are organised to explore more effective ways of working.
3. Research undertaken by the VDO and the CA to look at volunteering models across GMCA and the emergency services family, to identify opportunities for collaborative working.
4. Seminar organised with GMCA partners and stakeholders to identify and explore where we can provide support and create opportunities.
5. GMFRS/GMCA develop a remit/scope for volunteering and design a structure with the Volunteer Team Officers who are currently manage the service and GMFRS Volunteers who deliver the work.



### Volunteer Checklist

Volunteer Name	
Coordinator	
Borough	
Start Date	
End Date (probation)	
ID badge given (date)	

#### Activities completed (Minimum 3 activities attended)

Activity	Date completed	Location	Notes/feedback
Community Event			
Safe and Well visit			
Crew support			
Other (please specify)			
Online driving assessment *			
Online Safeguarding*			
Online GDPR training*			

\*compulsory via LMS

#### Competencies

	Observed (date)	Notes
Punctuality		
Appearance		
Professionalism		
Active involvement		
Teamwork		

#### Issues raised/feedback received

--

#### Outcome

Uniform and Black lanyard given	
Probation extended (state reason)	

Signed \_\_\_\_\_ (Volunteer Coordinator)

Signed \_\_\_\_\_ (Volunteer)

Date \_\_\_\_\_



## Requesting Volunteer Support

### CONTACTS

Details of Person requesting volunteers	Name	Role/Rank/Position
	Location	Contact number
Details of Single Point of Contact (SPoC) on the day or Event Organiser if an EXTERNAL event	Name	Role/Rank/Position
	Location	Contact number

### DETAILS

Description of request  (In most cases, we require 14 days' notice)	Name of event	
	Date	
	Start Time	
	Finish Time	
	Location (including postcode)	
	Number of volunteers required	Min _____ Max _____



	Meeting point: (if different from above)	
	Role of volunteer and reason for the request  (please provide as much detail as possible)	

<b>Type of Activity</b>	Car wash                      ___                      Community reassurance                      ___ Open day                      ___                      Letter drop                      ___ Ops training support                      ___                      Caged Football                      ___ Community event                      ___                      Recruitment event                      ___ Other (please state)                      ___
<b>Any additional skills requested</b>	Community fitness                      ___                      Heartstart                      ___ DBS Check                      ___                      Driving Sim                      ___ Kitchen Fire Safety Unit                      ___                      Bike trained                      ___ Safe & Well Trained                      ___ Additional Languages                      _____ Other (please state)



Resources required- All volunteers will come with a standard kit bag including leaflets, stickers and flumps

If the event requires the following please indicate and advise if you are providing these

	Yes we need the following items (please tick)	Yes we need a volunteer to bring this (please tick)	We will provide this (please tick)	Unsure, will confirm
Table				
GMFRS Tablecloth				
Gazebo				
Other				
List any particular GMFRS campaign leaflets needed				

Resources you have booked which require volunteer assistance		TICK	
	Event Vehicle		Date booked __/__/__
	Parade Pump		Date booked __/__/__
	Childrens Fire Engine		Date booked __/__/__
	Driving Simulator		Date booked __/__/__
	Cracker Costume		Date booked __/__/__
	Kitchen Fire Safety Unit		Date booked __/__/__



	Other – please state		
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Please advise what you will be providing for the volunteers		
	Lunch	
	Refreshments	
	PPE	
	Other – please detail	

Any other information	Please detail here any other information that you feel may be useful for the volunteer to know
-----------------------	--

### Weekend events

If you are requesting volunteer support for a GMFRS weekend event you may be required to address any queries/concerns volunteers may have on the day and of any last minute alterations (during the week, volunteer coordinators can assist with this).

If requesting volunteers for an EXTERNAL weekend event please include all known contact details on the front page. Unless otherwise advised, there will be no Volunteer Coordinator attending on the day.



Work-stream	1. Caged Football		
Description	Caged Football is a portable community facility, housed and transported in self-contained box vans.		
Rationale	Designed to be used as a diversionary activity for children and young people, to reduce instances of anti-social behaviour and reduce fire related crimes. Additional aims include, Increased community cohesion, Increased numbers of disengaged young people in fire service activities, increase in health and well-being activities for all ages.		
Team Members	Currently 4 staff (Volunteer Development Officer and 3 Volunteer Coordinators) and 7 volunteers trained. Non-trained volunteers can support this in a supervised capacity.		
Outputs		Lead	Quarter (s)
Policy and Guidance	1.1. Operating procedure, guidance document, checklist and risk assessment in place.	VDO	Q. 1,2
Resources	1.2. 3 x complete caged football kits 2 x Iveco box vans Protective footwear	VDO/VCs	Q. 1,2
Training	1.3. Two day Volunteer Induction training followed by half day CF training provided		
Partnerships	1.4. Manchester FA	VDO	Q. 1,2
Events	1.5. Used during open days, national volunteer week roadshows, sporting events/tournaments	VDO/VCs Volunteers	Q. 1,2
Systems & Recording	1.6. Hours and activities recorded on Dutysheet. 1.7. Accidents/Near misses recorded on online reporting system	VDO/VCs	Q. 1,2
Evaluation & QA	1.8. Spot checks carried out and all reports of damaged equipment reported to Leigh Technical Services.	VDO/VCs Volunteers	Q. 1,2



	1.9. Environmental risk assessment completed prior to each activity.		
<b>Reporting</b>	1.10. Via Dutysheet	VDO/VCs	Q. 1,2
<b>Cultural Change</b>	1.11. Attitudes towards ASB, sports and fitness and involvement with GMFRS.	VDO/VCs Volunteers	Q. 1,2
<b>Considerations</b>	1.12. Seasonal – only used during Spring/Summer months due to weather conditions.	VDO/VCs	Q. 1,2
<b>Work-stream</b>	<b>2. Preventing Wildfires</b>		
<b>Description</b>	Develop a programme of work to raise awareness of the damage caused by wildfires and how they can be prevented. Support work to prevent non-accidental wildfires.		
<b>Rationale</b>	GMFRS have recently seen a spike in wildfires, and the cost to the service and the environment is significant and damaging. We can contribute a useful prevention strategy to support the work of the FOG groups linked to our area.		
<b>Team Members</b>	LA / UB / HJ / DS / AT		
<b>Outputs</b>	<b>Actions</b>	<b>Lead</b>	<b>Quarter(s)</b>
<b>Policy and Guidance</b>	2.1 Implement the prevention element of the GMFRS Wildfire Plan	LA/UB	Q1 and Q2
<b>Training</b>	2.2 Provide a training package to new Wildfire Volunteers	LA/UB/PW	As required
<b>Resources</b>	2.3 Develop our resources to raise awareness in the community and prevent wildfires through accidental and non-accidental actions 2.4 Develop and update our education packages for schools in relation to wildfires 2.5 Equipment and PPE provided to all WFAW volunteers	LA  LA/PW/ZH	As required  Q1
<b>Partnerships</b>	2.5 Represent GMFRS Prevention at the PDNP FOG group	LA	Quarterly
<b>Campaigns</b>	2.6 Support timely campaigns to raise awareness about wildfires in key areas	LA / boroughs	Q1 / Q2



<b>Events &amp; Projects</b>	2.7 Support the deployment of the WAWS volunteers to attend risk areas at high risk times	LA/HJ	Q1 / Q2
<b>Systems &amp; Recording</b>	2.8 Utilise the Environment Agency warnings to prompt action as laid out in the GMFRS Wildfire Plan Prevention Action Card 2.9. Activities and hours recorded via Dutysheet	LA/HJ/DS/AT	Q1 / Q2
<b>Cultural Change</b>	2.10 Support work to help communities understand the international importance of the peat areas surrounding GM to the global environment	LA/FOG Group	ongoing
<b>Considerations</b>	2.11 Seasonal – only used during Spring/Summer months due to weather conditions.	VDO/VCs	Q1 / Q2

## Appendix A

Work-stream	3. Chaplains		
<b>Description</b>	The role of a Chaplain is to provide practical and emotional support to firefighters/dependents, other staff members/volunteers and anyone else with a connection to the Fire and Rescue Service.		
<b>Rationale</b>	Previously the role of the Chaplaincy was ad hoc and reliant on a limited number of volunteers from the Salvation Army. The role was formalised and expanded over the last 4 years with attendance at a number of emergency responses to support crew and staff.		
<b>Team Members</b>	11 Chaplains, Volunteer Development Officer and 5 Volunteer Coordinators		
Outputs		Lead	Quarter(s)
<b>Policy and Guidance</b>	3.1. Chaplaincy Handbook and Guidance document in place 3.2. Standard monitoring forms	VDO	
<b>Training</b>	3.3. Two day Volunteer Induction training followed by two day Chaplains training provided	VDO/VCs	
<b>Resources</b>	3.4. GMFRS mobile phones for all Chaplains, expenses and training/conference costs.	VDO/VCs	Q 1,2,3,4



<b>Partnerships</b>	3.5. Salvation Army/ Health and Well Being Team (People Directorate)	VDO	Q 1,2,3,4
<b>Activities/ Campaigns/Events</b>	3.6. Minimum monthly visits to Fire Stations and other GMFRS premises 3.7. Support at large-scale emergency incidents 3.8. On-going engagement for individuals requesting 1-1 support.	Chaplains VDO/VCs	Q 1,2,3,4
<b>Systems &amp; Recording</b>	3.9. Monthly returns submitted outlining hours and issues raised 3.10. Hours recorded on Dutysheet	VDO/VCs	Q 1,2,3,4
<b>Evaluation &amp; QA</b>	3.11. Review of Chaplaincy scheme carried out in 2017 – appropriate changes adopted 3.12. Regular feedback received from Crews both formally and informally	VDO/VCs	Q 1,2,3,4
<b>Reporting</b>	3.13. Quarterly meetings held to discuss trends and issues raised – representation from Prevention and People Directorates	VDO	Q 1,2,3,4
<b>Cultural Change</b>	3.14. Chaplains have contributed to the Health and Well-Being culture within GMFRS by providing on-going, consistent and visible support to crews and staff especially during challenging periods.	Chaplains	Q 1,2,3,4
<b>Work-stream</b>	<b>4. Driving Simulators</b>		
<b>Description</b>	Provide road safety education to target groups through the interactive use of driving simulators		
<b>Rationale</b>	Many groups (including young people) learn best through active participation and demonstrating risk and consequence for themselves in a controlled environment		
<b>Team Members</b>	LA / CSA's / Volunteers / VC's / LTS		
<b>Outputs</b>	<b>Actions</b>	<b>Lead</b>	<b>Quarter(s)</b>
<b>Policy and Guidance</b>	4.1 Update Driving simulator guidance and risk assessment regularly and provide to all users by email and intranet	LA	ongoing
<b>Training</b>	4.2 Two day Volunteer Induction training followed by one day Driving Sim training provided to new users on the booking and use of the driving simulators	LA	ongoing
<b>Resources</b>	4.3 Oversee maintenance of the vehicles and equipment to ensure they are fit for purpose	LA/LTS	ongoing
<b>Partnerships</b>	4.4 Continue to develop partnership agreements with other agencies to make use of the simulators	LA	ongoing
<b>Campaigns</b>	4.5 Support thematic partnership campaigns by providing the driving simulator (GMP Drink and drug drive etc.)	LA/CSAs/ VCs/Volunteers	ongoing
<b>Events &amp; Projects</b>	4.6 Provide the driving simulators at road safety and general events	LA/CSAs/VCs	ongoing



		/Volunteers	
<b>Systems &amp; Recording</b>	4.7 Ensure all users are aware of systems for fault recording and oversee process for repairs and putting vehicles back on the run	LA/LTS	Ongoing
<b>Evaluation &amp; QA</b>	4.8 Promote the use of the public feedback cards to help evaluate the effect of the inputs.	LA/Volunteers	Ongoing
<b>Reporting</b>	4.9 Report to TfGM on the use and success of the driving simulators	LA	ongoing

## Appendix A

Work-stream	5. Community Well-Being Service		
<b>Description</b>	Volunteers support the most vulnerable people at risk of or experiencing social isolation and loneliness, by visiting them in their home to discuss their support needs, practical solutions and/or referring them to other agencies.		
<b>Rationale</b>	<p>This service supports social prescribing needs within our communities.</p> <p>GMFRS staff are often exposed to those most vulnerable to a risk of fire, one of these contributing factors being social isolation and loneliness. By utilising skilled volunteers to carry out person-centred visits to address issues and make necessary referrals, this reduces the financial impact on services such as GP's, Hospitals and Social Services.</p> <p>This service currently runs 7 days a week, weekends and evenings.</p>		
<b>Team Members</b>	Volunteer Co-ordinators, Volunteers, Operational Crews, CSA's, Partner Agencies, People (HR)		
<b>Outputs</b>		<b>Lead</b>	<b>Quarter(s)</b>
<b>Policy and Guidance</b>	5.1 Community Wellbeing Instruction and Guidance, regular updates to risk assessment, GDPR Information Sharing	VDO	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Training</b>	5.2 Induction Training, GDPR, quarterly refresher training and any relative social isolation/loneliness updates/changes	VDO,VCs	Q1/2/3/4



<b>Resources</b>	5.3 Community Wellbeing Information Pack and Documentation, Uniform and ID Badge	VDO	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Partnerships</b>	5.4 Continual partnership working with local councils, housing, social services, community connectors	VCs, VOLS	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Campaigns</b>	5.5 Safe4Winter, Partner Campaigns around Social Isolation/Loneliness	VOLS	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Events &amp; Projects</b>	5.6 Promotion of service at GMFRS and partner community events	VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Systems &amp; Recording</b>	5.6 Visit records held on Vulnerable Persons Register/Safe and Well Reporting System. Dutysheet, Accident Management System	VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Evaluation &amp; QA</b>	5.7 Telephone audits and joint visits with Volunteers to individual referrals. Monitor handovers to partner agency by 4 <sup>th</sup> Visit	VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Reporting</b>	5.8 Report to local councils and GMFRS Senior Management Teams on performance outcomes	VC,VOLS	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Cultural Change</b>	5.9 Community Well-Being Volunteers have assisted in raising the awareness and actions taken to address issue of Social Isolation and Loneliness within GMFRS personnel and communities.	VOLS	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Other</b>			Appendix A
<b>Work-stream</b>	<b>6. Community Engagement and Campaigns</b>		
<b>Description</b>	Volunteer engagement with local communities to provide visibility in order to carry out PREVENTION related work such as fire safety education/advice, campaigns and Safe and Well visits. Provides a consistent service and contingency support to Operational Crews when unable to attend.		
<b>Rationale</b>	Volunteers deliver essential fire safety messages and education, which support a wide range of internal, partner and multi-agency activities.  Where requests are made by Partner Agencies (ie..Schools, Councils, GMP, Housing, Community Groups etc.) to provide attendance and visibility within the community, volunteers are able to provide essential Prevention fire safety advice and literature, support Community Event Vehicles (Parade Pump, Children's Fire Engine, Community Event Vehicle, Driving Sim, KFSU, Caged Football). Volunteers ensure contingency support and visibility is provided where Crews are not available.  Volunteers also provide regular support to Operational Crews for any internal events/campaigns, such as Open Days, Car Washes, Road Safety, Water Safety, Heartstart etc.		
<b>Team Members</b>	Volunteer Co-ordinators, Volunteers, Partner Agencies, Operational Crew, Borough Management Teams, Leigh Technical Services, Prevention Campaigns Co-ordinator, Corporate Communications, People (HR), Health and Safety		
<b>Outputs</b>	<b>Actions</b>	<b>Lead</b>	<b>Quarter(s)</b>



<b>Policy and Guidance</b>	6.1 All Volunteer Policies (Appearance Policy, Code of Conduct, Lone Working etc.) Risk assessments undertaken for new activities and regular review of existing ones.	VDO, VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Training</b>	6.2 Induction Training, GDPR, Safeguarding, WRAP, Fire Safety/Safe and Well	VDO, VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Resources</b>	6.3 Leaflets, Freebies, Table, Pop Ups, Gazebo, Community Event Vehicles, Uniform, ID Badge	VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Partnerships</b>	6.4 Continual partnership working with local councils, housing, social services, community groups,	VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Campaigns</b>	6.5 Safe4 Campaigns, Local Initiatives, Multi-Agency/Partnership Events, Jobs/volunteering events	VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Events &amp; Projects</b>	6.6 Promotion of Fire Safety at GMFRS and partner community events (Such as Emergency Services Days, Operation Stay Safe, Pride and Manchester Day Parade)	VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Systems/ Recording</b>	6.7 Dutysheet, Accident Management System, Quarterly Management Reports.	VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Evaluation &amp; QA</b>	6.8 Dutysheet hours and engagement recorded, Volunteer Audits, feedback		Q1/2/3/4
<b>Work-stream</b>	<b>6. Community Engagement and Campaigns Cont.</b>		
<b>Reporting</b>	6.9 GMFRS Senior Management Teams on performance outcomes and engagement	VDO	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Cultural Change</b>	6.10 Volunteers have access to and are able to engage with all communities. Through the skills, training and tools provided by their Volunteer Co-ordinators, they are able to educate a wide range of audiences around Prevention work such as Fire Safety and other relevant safety messages/campaigns.	VOLS	Q1/2/3/4



Work-stream	7. Survival Academy		
Description	Volunteers delivering basic life support, CPR and Defib training to members of the public, independently at Community groups or supporting crews with visits to schools		
Rationale	Educating as many members of the public as possible on how to treat an individual in the event of a cardiac arrest. As increasing amounts of businesses and organisations now have public defibrillators, both GMFRS and the Mayor want to ensure everyone knows what to do in the event of an emergency as safely and correctly as possible.		
Team Members	Volunteer Co-ordinators, Volunteers, Ops Crews, NWS, PSR Colleagues		
Outputs	Actions	Lead	Quarter(s)
Policy and Guidance	7.1 BHF guidance documents and videos, Survival academy documentation, regular updates to risk assessment, GDPR Information Sharing	VDO, PSR	Q1/2/3/4
Training	7.2 Heartstart Training, Train the trainer NWS sessions, regular refresher training,	VDO, PSR	Q1/2/3/4
Resources	7.3 Guidance DVD, Practice manikins, Defib, information pack, wet wipes, leaflets	VDO	Q1/2/3/4
Partnerships	7.4 NWS	VDO, VC	Q1/2/3/4
Campaigns	7.5 All year round activity	VC	Q1/2/3/4
Events & Projects	7.6 Contact local community centres to book in sessions on days they meet, liaising with crews to support their school visits	VC	Q1/2/3/4



<b>Systems &amp; Recording</b>	7.7 Dutysheet system Campaign and engagement calendar	VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Evaluation &amp; QA</b>	7.8 Practical sessions during training, assessment at the end of training, regular observation sessions during delivery	VC, VOLS	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Reporting</b>	7.9 Dutysheet	VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Cultural Change</b>	7.10 Volunteers have access to and are able to engage with all communities. Through the skills, training and tools provided by their Volunteer Co-ordinators, they are able to educate a wide range of audiences around BLS.	VOLS	Q1/2/3/4

#### Appendix A

Work-stream	8. Cadets		
<b>Description</b>	Volunteers attend a unit on a weekly basis and are trained as Instructors to support and guide young people through a two year programme. There are also junior instructors who have been through the cadet programme and wish to remain as volunteers but taking on extra responsibility to guide future groups.		
<b>Rationale</b>	The programme offers young people an opportunity to learn basic firefighting skills while working towards both accredited and non-accredited qualifications.		
<b>Team Members</b>	VDO, VC's, Youth Engagement, CSTD, trained volunteers and sessional YE staff.		
<b>Outputs</b>	<b>Actions</b>	<b>Lead</b>	<b>Quarter(s)</b>
<b>Policy and Guidance</b>	8.1. Organisational policies and procedures, Per 19's Input and guidance from YE Team	VDO,YE	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Training</b>	8.2. Two day induction, 1 day cadet Unit induction, local induction with VC & YEC. Health and Safety, cadet instructor training, Drill yard training, Safeguarding, GDPR, ASDAN, WRAP, Dealing with challenging behaviour and any other related training organised by YE.	VDO,VCs, YE	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Resources</b>	8.3. Per19's, medical forms, cadet details, permission forms, ASDAN book, uniform & ID badge	YE	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Partnerships</b>	8.4. Local schools for cadet referrals, Supermarkets for fund-raising, Youth Engagement.	YE, VOLS	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Campaigns</b>	8.5. This runs on a weekly basis for 2 years.	VOLS	Q1/2/3/4



	Cadets are involved in supporting station open days and car washes and they also organise independent fundraising events for their residential and trips through bag packing at local supermarkets.		
Events & Projects	8.6. Activities vary on a weekly basis...ultimately all designed to complete the criteria with the ASDAN Qualification	VOLS	Q1/2/3/4
Systems & Recording	8.7. PER19's, dutysheet	YE, VOLS, VCs	Q1/2/3/4
Evaluation & QA	8.8. Dutysheet hours, PER19 monitoring and volunteer audits on a monthly basis	VCs	Q1/2/3/4
Reporting	8.9. Dutysheet	VCs	Q1/2/3/4
Cultural Change	8.10. Reduction in ASB, YE activities promoting life skills and ASDAN qualification leading to DofE award	VOLS	Q1/2/3/4
Work-stream	<b>9. Ops Training Support</b>		
Description	Supporting crews in Greater Manchester and beyond (ie. Lancs, Merseyside) and also partner agencies with their training and development		
Rationale	Using volunteers as live casualties provides more reality to the scenarios than using dummy as the volunteers are able to role play and simulate injuries and feelings. As the volunteers are very diverse we can offer a wide variety of individuals so FF's are able to tailor their support / rescue methods to suit the requirements of the volunteer they are supporting.		
Team Members	VC, Leadership Team, Volunteers, Ops crews, external partner organisations, GMFRS support staff		
Outputs	Actions	Lead	Quarter(s)
Policy and Guidance	9.1. Volunteer two day induction, risk assessments, dutysheet & confirmation information, briefing prior to the activity taking place	VDO,VC	Q1/2/3/4
Training	9.2. Volunteer two day induction,	VDO,VC	Q1/2/3/4
Resources	9.3. Resources are dependent upon the activity and are provided by exercise organiser or arranged by the volunteer coordinators. Occasionally transport is offered	VC	Q1/2/3/4
Partnerships	9.4. GMP, Local councils, Mountain rescue, NWAS, Army, local businesses and other external organisations county wide	VDO,VC	Q1/2/3/4
Campaigns	9.5. Volunteers are crucial in supporting the training needs of FF's	VC	Q1/2/3/4
Systems & Recording	9.6. Dutysheet	VC	Q1/2/3/4
Evaluation & QA	9.7. Debrief sessions, VC in attendance, feedback emails	VC,OPS	Q1/2/3/4
Reporting	9.8. Ops briefs, Inside GMCA.	VC	Q1/2/3/4



<b>Cultural Change</b>	9.9. By assisting with these training exercises, FF are able to plan for certain situations and support the community of Greater Manchester as safely as possible.	VC,VOLS	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Other</b>			

<b>Work-stream</b>	<b>10. POST INCIDENT TEAM</b>		
<b>Description</b>	To provide practical support to families and individuals who have been involved in a domestic fire, where the fire service have been called out. Flooding and cases of hoarding have also been undertaken.		
<b>Rationale</b>	Provide support for those who have no insurance whilst enabling the victims of fire to move back into the property as quickly as possible. Carry out grill pan cleans to those at risk of fire.		
<b>Team Members</b>	Volunteers, VCs, team leaders		
<b>Outputs</b>	<b>Actions</b>	<b>Lead</b>	<b>Quarter(s)</b>
<b>Policy and Guidance</b>	10.1. Module 23 Post Incident Team Handbook, Risk assessments, referral forms.	VDO	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Training</b>	10.2. Two day Volunteer Induction training followed by half day PIT training given by volunteer team leaders provided.	VDO,VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Resources</b>	10.3. PIT van, PPE, cleaning equipment, cleaning products	VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Partnerships</b>	10.4. Ops crews, Local Authorities, CST, Housing	VDO,VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Campaigns</b>	10.5. On call all year round dependant on team availability	VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Systems &amp; Recording</b>	10.6. Duty sheet, PIT folder (secure)	VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Evaluation &amp; QA</b>	10.7. Dutysheet hours, and volunteer audits on a monthly basis	VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Reporting</b>	10.8. Dutysheet, VC, requesting officer	VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Cultural Change</b>	10.9. To enable victims of fire who have no insurance to move back into the property asap and resume some normality. To help person at risk of fire with grill pan cleans reducing fires.	VC,VOLS	Q1/2/3/4



Other			

Work-stream	11. Fire Bikes/Hazard spotting		
Description	A chance for volunteers to cycle around areas highlighted as having fires out in the open and spotting hazards. To provide a visible uniformed presence around footpaths/canal banks and other hotspot areas (highlighted by SM) where vehicles may struggle to access.		
Rationale	To pass on valuable information to crews where rubbish/furniture may be dumped or houses boarded up. To deliver seasonal literature to walkers etc. For example, 'Don't drink and drown' water campaign in surrounding areas or waterways in Manchester city centre.		
Team Members	Volunteers, VC, SM		
Outputs	Actions	Lead	Quarter(s)
Policy and Guidance	11.1. Volunteer two day induction, risk assessment, Dutysheet & confirmation information, briefing prior to the activity taking place	VDO,VC	Q1 & Q2
Training	11.2. Two day induction followed by half day cycle proficiency training	T4GM	Q1 & Q2
Resources	11.3. Seasonal literature, other resources provided by partners	VC	Q1 & Q2
Partnerships	11.4. TRANSPORT FOR GM, BM/SM, Cityco, GMP, waterways	VC	Q1 & Q2
Campaigns	11.5. Safe4 campaigns more active in spring/summer months when more people are drinking around the canals/locks areas.	VC	Q1 & Q2
Events & Projects	11.6. As and when requested.	VC	Q1 & Q2
Systems & Recording	11.7. Dutysheet/straight to station manager at central and Cityco/local council Photos obtained sent through to Station Managers to action.	VC	Q1 & Q2



<b>Evaluation &amp; QA</b>	11.8. Dutysheet hours, and volunteer audits on a monthly basis	VC	Q1 & Q2
<b>Reporting</b>	11.8. VC/Station/watch/crew manager	VC	Q1 & Q2
<b>Cultural Change</b>	11.9. Volunteers are able to engage with those out drinking near water. Are able to report hazards/hotspots are report to local council for removal.	VC	Q1 & Q2
<b>Considerations</b>	11.10. This activity is weather dependant.	VC	Q1 & Q2 Appendix A

Work-stream	12. STATION GUARDIAN		
<b>Description</b>	To staff Fire Stations and keep secure if the crews become mobilised. Many stations have community rooms where regular supervised activities take place. Basic duties of answering the phone and ensuring access to the station by groups using these facilities.		
<b>Rationale</b>	Providing support for crews so that normal duty can commence.		
<b>Team Members</b>	Volunteers, VC		
Outputs	Actions	Lead	Quarter(s)
<b>Policy and Guidance</b>	12.1. Volunteer 2 day induction	VDO	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Training</b>	12.2. Volunteer 2 day induction, local induction and Station familiarisation	VDO/VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Resources</b>	12.3. Security codes and access to Stations via ID badge	VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Partnerships</b>	12.4. Groups using the facilities, SM, Watches.	VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Events &amp; Projects</b>	12.5. Weekly basis	VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Systems &amp; Recording</b>	12.6. Dutysheet/crews at station	VC/VOL	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Evaluation &amp; QA</b>	12.7. Dutysheet hours and audits	VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Reporting</b>	12.8. VC/Station manager/watch manager/crews	VC	Q1/2/3/4
<b>Cultural Change</b>	12.9. By providing this service, the Stations can remain accessible to local communities	VOLS	Q1/2/3/4



# Appendix 5 – Youth engagement response



## **Youth Engagement Department Targeted Youth Engagement Team Response to Outline Business Case Proposals May 2019**





# Contents

Executive Summary .....	160
Introduction .....	161
Corporate Programmes/Activities .....	163
Targeted Youth Engagement Teams: Finance Overview .....	169
Performance .....	170
Indirect Benefits of Delivery .....	172
Programme for Change and the Outline Business Case. ....	174
Risks Associated with Proposals .....	176
Summary .....	177
Recommendations .....	177



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Acknowledging the financial pressures that have influenced the proposals within the Outline Business Case, we, the Targeted Youth Engagement Team, are aware that the status quo must change. Delivery costs must be reduced in order to deliver a more sustainable model and work needs to be undertaken to motivate and upskill operational staff to increase their engagement, not with just young people engaged in mainstream provision but those young people who present with additional needs and challenging behavior. Many of these young people are at risk of being victim to, or actively involved in anti-social behaviour all of which affect communities and blue light services across Greater Manchester.

It is a concern that GMFRS's current Corporate Leadership are unfamiliar with the remit and workload of our team. To address this perceived gap, the report provides a detailed background and rationale as to why GMFRS is best placed to deliver specific programmes to young people who are; actively engaged in fire setting activity and at risk of or have been excluded from mainstream education. In addition, the purpose and current status of Community Fire Cadets is also explored. A detailed section of this report provides full and accurate costings of this team.


Our team are using this report as an opportunity to highlight opportunities and areas of risk associated with the proposal to transfer full responsibility and ownership of delivering and managing youth engagement activities from dedicated Youth Work and educational professionals to our operational colleagues, Fire Fighters and senior officers. We hope this document is the start of a piece of structured work to fully consider the intention to, impact and transition of scaling down current delivery and engaging operational Fire Fighters. The report is summarised with a list of recommendations.



## INTRODUCTION

The Youth Engagement Targeted Delivery Team consists of seven members of staff; a structure chart is included below. Each of the five grade E Youth Engagement Co-ordinators (YEC) are responsible for a geographical area. The grade F YEC currently manages; sessional staff, invoicing and accounting, and is responsible for ensuring quality assurance activity across all areas and monitoring/evaluation of all the programmes. The Youth Engagement Manager manages all six YECs, is the Designated Safeguarding Officer for the team and provides specialist advice and guidance on all matters relating to children and young people. The post-holders within this team have over fifty years' experience of working with children and young people.

### Targeted Youth Engagement Structure May 2019



This team's remit covers all GMFRS's contact with children and young people. The team act as a point of contact and support for GMFRS staff, volunteers and external partners regarding youth issues, concerns, referrals etc.

In addition to this responsibility, the team manage co-ordinate and deliver four strands of corporate youth programmes, which include;



- Interventions for fire setters
- Alternative curriculum programmes: This work generates income to offset delivery costs and there is significant potential for this to increase.
- Seasonal and Area-driven Safety Campaigns eg arson and Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB) reduction – interventions and educational programmes targeted to the most vulnerable e.g. children not in mainstream education or close to exclusion, lookedafter children (LAC), children in the criminal justice system.
- Community Fire Cadets – currently operating from 7 stations (not 14 as stated in the OBC)

All of the above require inter-agency working – the YECs achieve this by working peripatetically across their geographical areas and align to the varied place-based working models/structures across Greater Manchester.

The tables below detail the purpose of each of the programmes and rationale for GMFRS delivering these programmes.



## CORPORATE PROGRAMMES/ACTIVITIES

### Fire Smart

This programme is targeted at children and young people who are actively engaged in fire setting. This is obviously a concern to most public sector organisations as well as individuals, families and communities.

#### Impact:

- Reduction and prevention of physical harm (including death) and psychological trauma.
- Reduction and prevention of loss of property.
- Reduction in criminalisation of young people (often used as a diversionary tool).

Why GMFRS are best placed to deliver:



- Positive engagement levels (referral take up), as interventions are delivered by trained youth work professionals who have additional credibility from association with GMFRS.
- Fire and Rescue Services, rather than other organisations, are best placed to deliver such interventions, given their expert subject knowledge.
- Research supports assertion that fire safety education, rather than 'treatment' (psychological intervention), should be the first and predominant intervention when working with children who have set fires.
- No other partners are delivering this bespoke service in GM and there is a significant need for this programme to be extended to adult fire setters.

## Alternative Curriculum

Fire Team and Firefly are bespoke programmes commissioned by partners, developed and delivered by GMFRS utilising specially trained Youth Workers, education professionals and retired firefighters who are employed on a sessional basis, as and when a programme is commissioned. Programmes engage with young people aged 14-16 who are at risk of or have been excluded from mainstream education.

Impact



- Developing young people's skill base and experience of the work place.
- Educating at risk young people in fire, water and road safety as well as the impact ASB has on communities.
- Facilitating re-engagement to education and reducing young people's involvement in ASB.

Why GMFRS are best placed to deliver:

- GMFRS YE staff are highly experienced in delivering the course and have extensive experience working with young people demonstrating challenging behaviour.
- GMFRS staff have a wealth of knowledge around the subject matter delivered and are therefore best placed to deliver these programmes.
- Both programmes are well respected and established; they have been running for around 14 years. □ Currently the only public/emergency service that deliver anything similar to Fire Team or Firefly.
- GMFRS can offer young people a pathway into different opportunities e.g. Cadets, Prince's Trust Team Programme, apprenticeships and volunteering opportunities.

## Community Fire Cadets

This programme is targeted at young people aged from 14-17. It is a long-term youth engagement programme whereby local young people attend a Fire Station one evening per week, for two hours an evening to take part in Fire & Rescue Service led activities with a developmental /educational outcome.



### **Impact:**

- It is designed to provide young people from a mix of gender, ethnicity, backgrounds, and abilities with positive opportunities to improve community cohesion and reduce undesirable behaviour by enhancing key citizenship skills in young people through a structured and varied range of Fire & Rescue Service-led activities.
- Cadets learn about their local communities, fire safety messages, life skills, and operational practice. All the practical activities help build upon their own strengths and helps embrace their team work skills as well as becoming more resilient and confident. Being a cadet also gives young people the knowledge and experience to assist in the reduction of preventable fires, fire injuries, hoax calls and attacks on fire fighters.

### **Why GMFRS are best placed to deliver:**

- Another service would not be able to deliver such a programme, as it would not have the same reputation/draw, which is a brand young people respect and want to be part of.
- Cadets is an integral part of the organisation, representing the youth of Greater Manchester in a positive light.
- Many young people do not respond well to authority, particularly uniformed organisations, however, the Fire Service is unique in that young people do respond well to and want to actively engage with, therefore it is an ideal platform for those young people who want to be part of something different, and who want to be positive role models to their peers.



### Targeted Education

Through identification and engagement of key target groups of young people involved in ASB, fire setting, offending and those not in education, training and or employment. This team provides bespoke education input.

### Impact


- Reduction in incidence of fires
- Reduction in ASB
- All the practical activities help build upon their own strengths and helps embrace their team work skills as well as becoming more resilient and confident.

Gain an understanding of how their behaviour impacts on individuals and communities.

### Why GMFRS are best placed to deliver:

- PRU delivery - in addition to individual referrals, sessions are also delivered around safety/seasonal/ASB. YECs deliver this work due to their knowledge and understanding of how to deal with the most hard to reach and challenging young people
- Knowledge and understanding of fire setting behaviors.
- Specialist training in Teaching and Learning, Behaviour Management, Fire-steer Interventions.
- Availability to deliver throughout the working day.
- Experience of working with children and young people and strong desire to do so.







## TARGETED YOUTH ENGAGEMENT TEAM: FINANCE OVERVIEW

The team are responsible for generating income to cover the costs of bespoke programme delivery, which often involves sessional employment of retired Fire Fighters. There is a constant demand for the team to deliver alternative curriculum programmes, which are commissioned by Local Authorities, Greater Manchester Police, schools, Pupil Referral Units, Youth Offending Teams etc. In the last five years, this team has generated £213,948.

The table below shows the cost for the structure detailed above.

Targeted Youth Engagement	2018/19	2019/20
	Draft Outturn	Proposed Budget
	£	£
Staff (2019/20 ) at 2019/20 payscales inc 0.5% vacancy factor)	236,807	236,807
Non staff (Devolved Budgets)	14,987	14,987
Managed centrally (Non Devolved budgets)	0	0
<u>Direct costs</u>	251,794	251,794
Income	-2,979	0

It is the view of this team and other partners that the above represents good value for money in consideration of the remit and geographical responsibility of this team. A simple calculation shows that GMFRS commits £25,179 to each of the ten boroughs of Greater Manchester for delivery of the programmes outlined at the beginning of the document. The Team however, have considered where efficiencies could be made. A summary of these



areas are listed below and should be explored further before a decision is made to remove the team;

- **Staffing Costs:** There is scope to restructure the team to make efficiencies, but before this is approached, it is important that the function/remit of the team is clear so it can be resourced appropriately. Unfortunately, the narrative within the Outline Business Case does not provide this information so the team see little benefit in providing numerous structure options based without a clear direction from GMFRS/GMCA
- **Income Generation:** The Youth Engagement Department have been successful in raising significant levels of income in previous years. The Targeted Youth Engagement Team are aware of a demand, particularly from schools and other education providers for alternative curriculum programmes and interventions with adult fire setters. Partners are willing to commission these services from GMFRS; therefore, this could be seen as a way of reducing cost of this team to GMFRS/GMCA
- **Non-Staffing Expenditure:** Mileage, uniform and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) are the areas of biggest expenditure for this team. Updating the historic mileage guidance/policy and providing the team with flexibility to review suppliers of uniform and equipment could make some efficiencies.

## **PERFORMANCE**

Over a twelve month period from April 2018 to March 2019, the Targeted Youth Engagement Team;

- Engaged with 2925 children across Greater Manchester;
- Carried out educational prevention/harm reduction interventions with just over 2,000 of them;
- Delivered alternative curriculum programmes with four Pupil Referral Units/Behaviour Schools. Sixty-six vulnerable and at risk young people spent 300 hours based on a Fire Station as part of these programmes;
- Managed seven cadet units with the support of GMFRS volunteers to provide this programme to 112 Community Fire Cadets attending on a weekly basis;
- Carried out educational behaviour change interventions with children and young people who set fires (FireSmart)
- Delivered a number of the above sessions jointly with operational firefighters
- Provided consultancy and support to operational and Prevention colleagues on all youth engagement-related issues (including carrying out risk assessments)
- Acted as local first point of contact for safeguarding concerns regarding children and young people



- Assisted young people to engage in GMFRS activities e.g. Pride, Manchester Parade, operational training exercises, GM Youth Combined Authority, Fire Station Open Days and Charity Car Washes

The majority of these interventions were targeted to some of the most vulnerable children and young people across Greater Manchester; that is those in care, those outside mainstream education, and those working with Youth Offending Services. They were identified through our existing partnership and multi-agency networks.

## **Impact of Delivery**

We are in no doubt that the work carried out by the Youth Engagement Targeted Delivery Team has both reduced the risk of harm to children and young people, their families, friends, the public and Operational Firefighters, and improved the lives and future outcomes of the children and young people with whom we have engaged.

For example, we have enabled 38 young people to achieve accredited qualifications on their alternative curriculum programmes, and 100 of the Community Fire Cadets are working towards nationally accredited qualifications. In addition, we facilitate and support Community Fire Cadets to take part in various excursions, locally, regionally and nationally. Three current Cadet Units are due to travel to an international Fire Service Youth Competition in Switzerland in July 2019. The Targeted Youth Engagement Team will oversee the planning and management of this excursion.

In addition to the above, it is important to capture the ‘human impact’ of the Team’s work, and how this reflects positively on the reputation of GMFRS and GMCA. Please see below a collection of testimonies provided by various partners on their experience of our delivery;

**GMFRS have worked closely with Brownhill Learning Community in Rochdale for 3 years (currently on the fifth consecutive FireTeam cohort). Stella Oldham (Learning Support Manager) said this:**

*“The professionalism and patience shown by the team at GMFS has given all the students who have completed this course an insight into the work of the Service, whilst helping them to develop skills they struggle, at times, to display in school. Seeing students working as a team and showing their obvious pride in their commitment to the course gives them a sense of achievement that they sometimes struggle to gain in an academic setting. The accreditation they gain also helps on their Careers Pathways as it shows they can commit, work as a team and follow instruction.*

*Brownhill Learning Community hope that the partnership we have with GMFS and Fire Team will go from strength to strength over the coming years. It is admirable that in these times of cutbacks that GMFS recognise their role in the shaping of young people’s lives.”*

**Gary Howard, Deputy Head-teacher of Highfields Inclusion Partnership (Pupil Referral Unit in Stockport) said of FireTeam:**



*“A really worthwhile experience for our students, which gave them the opportunity to build upon life skills.... Nothing negative to say – I only wish we could put more students through the project... The students learnt team-building, respect, social ‘norms’, as well as the obvious fire safety skills... An extremely well run project that we would love to be involved in again in the future”.*

**Helen Hammersley, Deputy Head teacher of Oakgrove Primary School in Stockport (a special school) gave the following feedback after a Safe4Autumn session:**

*“We are a provision for children with social, mental health and emotional difficulties and consequently anything new (or in this case anyone), can cause such an increase in their anxiety, they are unable to listen and engage. Every child in the hall sat and listened, interacted, asked & answered questions and engaged perfectly. This is not easy to achieve in our setting but the tone, content, even the volume of how the presentation was delivered was just perfect and accessed by 100% of the children... [name of YEC] and I had the opportunity to discuss exactly how to pitch the presentation and this worked really well... I think ongoing updates with different themes of fire safety would be beneficial. For example, hoax calls, setting off fire alarms, People Who Help us... The more positive role models are children come into contact with, the better.”*

**Jill Howarth, Humanities teacher at Elmbridge School (Pupil Referral Unit in Tameside):**

*“Thank you for the sessions you have done with the key stage 3 students at Elmbridge School (Tameside Pupil Referral Unit). Your subject knowledge is immense and your delivery is calm and sensitive. You answer the student's questions with full explanations that are none judge-mental. The information is easy for the students to understand and is totally engaging. You intersperse the information with interesting examples from your work and videos that reinforce your points so concentration is maintained. All the information is put into context and the student's contributions are valued and developed. I have no doubt that our students are better informed and are now in a position to consider their safety more effectively.*

*This is particularly important for our students, the majority of whom are vulnerable young people who can be susceptible to poor influences. The students were clearly comfortable with you and many of them opened up to you. You were able to add information about the Fire Service and what a Fire Fighter's role involves, fostering respect for the Service. The benefits to the students can't be underestimated. Ongoing sessions for our students would be beneficial as we have a high turnover.”*

## **INDIRECT BENEFITS OF DELIVERY**

### **Safeguarding**

Safeguarding is at the forefront of all our targeted youth engagement interventions. The Team have all completed advanced complex safeguarding training and are all accomplished at ensuring all potential safeguarding concerns are dealt with in a timely and appropriate manner, in line with GMFRS and local authority practice and procedures.



The wealth of experience among team members has also been put to excellent use by advising non-specialist colleagues on child and young person-related Safeguarding issues, which we have no doubt improved practices thereby preventing potential safeguarding issues arising.

In a field where responses to contextual safeguarding (implementing safeguarding measures in an environment rather than around an individual) are being developed, in response to community issues and safeguarding concerns. It would be regressive to remove one of the most experienced and qualified team members from the frontline.

### **Partnerships/Contribution to Place Based Working**

YEC's work with various partner organisations to ensure that our delivery is not only fire related but ensures that information shared enables holistic programmes to be planned and delivered for the benefit of young people. Examples include;

- Working alongside and contribute to 'Community Risk Referral Teams' (CRRT'S) across GM, YEC's keep up to date with partners and discuss current concerns involving children and young people who are presenting as vulnerable to partner organisations. YEC's liaise closely with the Police, Social Workers, Teachers, Local Authorities, Probation Officers and other agencies offering advice and assistance. Types of referrals to the YEC include concerns about; young people involved in deliberate fire setting, risk taking around water and road safety including car crime.
- YEC's attend specialist meetings such as Emotional Health and Well Being (EHWB) for young people. This is chaired by Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS) and involves Local Authorities, Practitioners, Health Professionals and Youth Services. Here, we can keep up to date and have an active input on changes to policies and services that are on offer to young people. In these multi agency meetings professionals apply a child centred approach, where each service offers their expert advice. This is then used to create tailor made support packages for that young person. The meeting will include highlighting objectives and agreeing actions for completion by partners involved. If we did not attend these meetings, partners and young people would not get the level of expertise and experience or professional standard that they do now. Young people could fall through the gaps resulting in a rise in fire setting activities in the community and increase overall incidents of anti-social behavior. Working closely with vulnerable young people on a daily basis, YEC's are able to participate in sign posting, supporting, advising and sharing best practice. GMFRS Youth Engagement Team have always been good at being the first in contact with the most vulnerable in the community and continuing with place based working enables us to give a better service to the young people we come across in our role.

The Team work collaboratively, sharing resources expertise and knowledge across Greater Manchester, the Team support the work of various groups, which include but are not limited to;



- Youth Disorder Partnership – multi-agency practitioner meetings led by GMP and Youth Offending Service - supporting individuals under 18 involved in crime/ASB.
- Youth Offending Service – joint working with young people involved in fire setting and car crime.
- ASB Team -regular contact around youth ASB issues, two-way information sharing, programmes are designed and delivered to address the issues in the boroughs.

### **Profile of GMFRS in the Community**

This team spend a significant amount of their time ‘front facing’ the public which therefore enhances and highlights GMFRS’s profile in the community. Our staff are involved in evening work and outreach sessions so the GMFRS is visible at times when other staff are not. This all contributes to the largely positive public perception that exists.


### **PROGRAMME FOR CHANGE AND THE OUTLINE BUSINESS CASE**

As referenced earlier in this report, the team have a number of concerns surrounding the development and content of the Outline Business Case, which are summarised below;

- The document is inaccurate in a number of references to youth engagement e.g. there are 24 staff members in Youth Engagement Department and not 22 as stated on page 113 (point 680). This indicates that the authors have limited understanding of the nature, structure etc. of this work.
- Dedicated, youth engagement staff were not involved in the development of the OBC, which has obviously resulted in significant omissions and flaws in proposals – see table below.
- The Activity Based Costing exercise did not detail income achieved from youth engagement teams therefore projected savings are not accurate. Accepting that this has since been retracted and not replaced, it is unclear what the OBC is now based on.
- There is no specific detail in relation to youth engagement programmes; the term is used frequently throughout the document, which is unhelpful as youth engagement is a vast field. The suggestion that FFs can deliver youth engagement ‘activities’ is difficult to explore as there is no clarity as to whether this refers to Fire Fighters facilitating a tour around a the fire station to a Guides/Scout group or delivering bespoke programmes to the most vulnerable/at risk groups. Ultimately, our team remain confused as to what GMFRS’s direction is.
- New roles introduced in the Outline Business Case are presented with no detail relating to remit.
- The consultation appears to purposefully exclude the individuals and communities who access our services and programmes. Particularly those with basic literacy skills and no access to ICT.

The team have carefully considered the proposals within the OBC and would like to offer constructive feedback on the risks that are likely to materialise if the proposals are to be





implemented within the proposed timescales. The table below summarises this feedback. Admittedly, there are mitigations which could be introduced to control the risks mentioned and the team are eager to develop these further once there is a clearer picture of what the direction is.



YE Activity	Proposal from OBC	Existing Safeguards/Minimum standards	Risk of FFs taking on this role
<b>Cadets</b> <b>Fire Smart</b> <b>Alternative Curriculum</b> <b>Targeted Education Sessions</b> <b>Partnerships</b> <b>Place Based Working</b>	Operational Crews to lead	<p>Availability to deliver throughout the working day and evenings without interruption</p> <p>Specialist training in Teaching and Learning, Behaviour Management, Fire-setter Interventions</p> <p>Experience of working with children and young people and a strong desire to do so</p> <p>Comprehensive knowledge of;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- policies and procedures for working with children and young people</li> <li>- current issues experienced by children and young people Complex Safeguarding issues</li> <li>- A designated person, with the above experience and knowledge, to manage and co-ordinate delivery all this work</li> <li>- Support from at least 2 volunteers or sessional staff for every unit, each week to deliver</li> </ul>	<p>If existing safeguards are not in place, this work cannot be delivered in a safe and defensible manner. Delivery staff and their managers must make and record defensible decisions (safeguarding) at all times and in all cases. Failure to do so could result in reputational, legal and financial harm to the service, in addition to potential harm to individuals living and working in Greater Manchester.</p> <p>Increased cost: operational firefighters would need to be off-the-run or be paid overtime to deliver on their days off</p> <p>Fire fighters could be at risk of being in a compromising position with YP if they do not have the correct training and /or experience to support appropriately.</p> <p>Potential for young people to have negative experiences of working with GMFRS if FFs are not prepared and trained adequately to support in a pastoral capacity.</p> <p>Lack of consistency in delivery due to Fire Fighter rotas, shift patterns etc. This is likely to impact on retention, achievement and capability to deliver accredited outcomes.</p>



## **SUMMARY**

The Targeted Youth Engagement Team have found Programme for Change challenging, not because change is imminent but because there is little clarity on what the future delivery ambitions are for youth engagement. Therefore, the team cannot provide a structured response or alternative proposal to the information provided within the Outline Business Case. As an example, the team have still been given no clarity as to the remit of many of the new roles that are shown on the structure charts on page 101. In addition, other than references to a re-focusing on fire related programmes, the team are unclear on what programmes/interventions GMFRS would like the Fire Fighters to deliver.

Despite the above, the team have developed a number of structures, some of which include financial efficiencies. Each structure is based on a refined remit for the team. We believe that our current role and experience is of great value to GMFRS and communities we serve and are committed to using our expertise to develop and deliver a safe and effective service for vulnerable children and young people across Greater Manchester. We would welcome the opportunity to explore these structures further, following clarification of the points raised above.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Following analysis of input into consultation process;

1. Commission a project to consider the aims/objectives of GMFRS/GMCA in relation to youth engagement, identify budget available and design bespoke service to deliver against aims/objective.
2. Commit resource to scoping/developing funding opportunities through a commissioning model i.e. Local Authorities 'purchasing/commissioning' local services or for example, a fire setting intervention service at a GM level.
3. Seeking external funding opportunities via private sector, including corporate sponsorship, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).
4. Review remit of this team in line with new 'business model'.
5. Develop alternative delivery models i.e. staffing structure based on all of the above/
6. Change business model i.e. set up charity, Community Interest Company etc.
7. School education/engagement: Currently emergency services across GM approach education in schools in different ways. Each service has a specific safety message to communicate in this forum. With training and closer working between services, we could provide a range of safety messages on behalf of GMP and health, in local schools.





## Appendix 6 – Prevention response





## Table of Contents

<b>1. Introduction.....</b>	<b>179</b>
<b>2. OBC Proposal.....</b>	<b>180</b>
<b>3. The Target Operating Model (TOM) .....</b>	<b>182</b>
<b>4. A Prevention Development Function – what is its purpose and how does it support effective delivery?.</b>	<b>184</b>
<b>5. Prevention Central Support – Skills, experience and qualifications .....</b>	<b>190</b>
<b>6. Prevention Themed Submissions to the OBC proposals .....</b>	<b>194</b>
<b>7. Prevention Function – proposed roles/structure.....</b>	<b>210</b>



## 1. Introduction

This document is the response to the proposals in the Outline Business Case (OBC)/Programme for Change (PfC) March 2019 document, on behalf of the Prevention Central Support team based at Fire Service Headquarters, as part of the formal consultation process.

The Prevention Central Support function comprises a manager and eight Co-Ordinator roles as follows:

- Prevention Service Support Manager
- Bridging Cultures Co-Ordinator
- Campaigns Co-Ordinator
- Fire Crime & Disorder Co-Ordinator
- Health & Social Care Co-Ordinator
- Home Safety Co-Ordinator
- Other Emergencies Co-Ordinator
- Partnerships Co-Ordinator
- Substance Use Co-Ordinator

The central function was created around eight years ago as part of a fundamental review of Prevention and Protection, and in recognition of the following:

1. Grey Book conditioned staff are relatively expensive when employed in support or service delivery roles other than roles providing operational incident cover, therefore this was an opportunity to reduce the salary budget
2. The overall breadth and depth of skills and experiences in those areas which increase vulnerability to fire and other risk, which could be used to develop our prevention approaches, did not exist in our operational workforce.
3. Boroughs expressed a lack of support from the centre in developing and supporting community safety activities, and that specialist Co-Ordinator roles were required to support delivery staff to improve our understanding of vulnerable people, those factors that increase fire and other risk, and develop approaches that will reduce the risk of fires and other emergencies, deaths and injuries.

This document acknowledges the need for change and the underlying drive for efficiencies, however the OBC and Target Operating Model (TOM) has presented multiple conflicting proposals/unanswered questions. The purpose of this document is to highlight those errors and propose sensible, working alternatives to support effective prevention delivery that will reduce fire and other risk for the communities of Greater Manchester. It includes 'biographies' of the current role holders, to demonstrate the breadth of skills, knowledge, experience and qualifications needed to develop high quality approaches and to support high performing teams.

It also provides a suite of themed responses to various elements of the OBC proposal, for example, Safe and Well, road safety, fire crime etc.



Unfortunately, due to the time constraints of the consultation period it has been difficult to obtain and analyse the breadth of data required to underpin our feedback, however some data relating to Safe and Well has been provided by our data analyst and is included at Appendix A.

Finally, based on the above as well as the structures and roles proposed in the OBC, we have included a revised proposal for the management of a Prevention function. These indicative roles would require further exploration, job descriptions etc.

## 2. OBC Proposal

### Source:

**Prevention – page 45 – 48, bullet points 300 – 321 Place Based Delivery – page 45, bullet points 289 – 291**

The OBC suggests the following approach to prevention delivery:

- We will target people with increased fire risk through place based teams.
- We will have a three tiered approach:
  - (i) Universal messaging
  - (ii) All age community engagement
  - (iii) Person centred fire risk assessments
- Prevention will be devolved to local operational staff, including the management of activities and messaging
- The specialist central support function will be disestablished, with the responsibility for effective delivery and assurance returning to operational staff.

In order to do this, the OBC proposes:

1. *Operational staff will hold 'portfolios' for fire prevention, road safety and water safety, with responsibility for knowledge, skills, messaging and guidance at local levels.*
  - \* **Our question/challenge is** - who will provide operational staff with the requisite knowledge, skills, messaging and resources and how will its currency be maintained?
2. *An enhanced 'digital solution'*
  - \* **Our question/challenge is** - who will develop and support this and provide the subject matter input?
3. *Central strategic support and subject matter expertise in relation to fire safety, road safety and water safety (but proposes to disestablish this at the same time – see bullet points 305 & 309)*
4. *The 'frontline' will be provided with necessary training and tools to support effective schools engagement*



- \* **Our question/challenge is** – who will develop the resources and provide the subject matter expertise for the training materials and tools, for example, road and water safety messaging, deliberate fire setting? (*Bullet point 310*)
- 5. *Developing national safety campaigns and strategies and working with partners and experts on seasonal campaigns*
  - \* **Our question/challenge is** – who will develop these and work with partners and experts, both locally and nationally? (*Bullet point 311*)
- 6. *Develop and deliver Safe Drive Stay Alive*
  - \* **Our question/challenge is** - who will develop and deliver this, given that the proposal is to disestablish the team that this responsibility currently sits within?
- 7. *Bespoke water safety campaigns*
  - \* **Our question/challenge is** - who will develop and deliver this, both locally and nationally, given that the proposal is to disestablish the team that this responsibility currently sits within?
- 8. *Engage and upskill 'frontline' staff and Borough Managers across a range of topics that contribute to fire and other risk*
  - \* **Our question/challenge is** – what approaches will be developed to upskill 'frontline' staff and who will provide the subject matter expertise on these topics?
- 9. *A strategic Corporate Support function (which does not exist on any of the proposed structures) which will include roles with subject matter expertise in relation to fire, road and water safety led by a 'strategic prevention lead role'.*
  - \* **Our question/challenge is** that neither this functional area nor any of these roles exist in the proposed structures or Target Operating Model (*Bullet point 319*). Are these additional roles?
- 10. *The introduction of a 'team' to reduce fire risk and support effective collaboration (Bullet point 289)*
  - \* **Our question/challenge is** that the OBC does not describe which roles in the proposed structures are part of this 'team' or indeed, whether this is an additional team
- 11. *That we will 'refresh our relationships with GM strategic leaders ..... to shape future activities' in a variety of organisations, many of whom will not be part of place based delivery (Bullet point 290)*
  - \* **Our question/challenge is** - who will develop these relationships, given that the OBC expects all local delivery to be driven through place based teams; it is not clear who will do this or its purpose?
- 12. *That we develop service level agreements and partnership arrangements that will be 'kept under review' (Bullet point 291)*



\* **Our question/challenge is** - GMFRS has focussed on partnership arrangements and targeting service users with increased fire and other risk for many years, this is NOT something new. However, the OBC does not make clear who will have responsibility for developing and monitoring partnership arrangements or with whom (particularly pan-GM and national arrangements), given that it suggests all our delivery should be through place based teams. The OBC proposes that we disestablish the Central Prevention function which develops many partnership arrangements, and specifically includes a Partnerships Co-Ordinator.

### 3. The Target Operating Model (TOM)

#### Source:

**Developing the Target Operating Model - page 94, bullet points 568 - 574 Service Delivery – page 95-96 Service Improvement, Performance and Partnerships – page 97-98 New GMFRS Structures – page 101 – 106**

The OBC suggests a realignment from current directorates into functional areas, according to the table on page 94 these are:

- Strategic Delivery
- Core Local Service Delivery
- Central Fire Safety & Investigation
- Service Improvement, Performance and Partnerships
- Delivery Support (operations & Business)

Additionally, the suggestion is that 'key services' should be aligned within each of the functional areas, and whilst *borough fire prevention* features as key service, developing our prevention function strangely does not; however bullet point 580 suggests '*prevention strategy and direction should be aligned with corporate goals, and this should be the focus of the Service Improvement function*'.

We have therefore assumed that the responsibility for the development of the Prevention function lies in the Service Improvement, Performance and Partnerships function.

Bullet points 575 – 588 make several references to 'fire prevention' and/or 'prevention', but only focus on the fire safety element of prevention (service) delivery – it fails to recognise or acknowledge the breadth of prevention activities, including (but not exclusively), road safety, water safety, wildfire safety, fire crime and disorder, campaigns and events.

It is therefore not entirely clear what the proposed Prevention function is in the new Target Operating Model; further development of the organisation's proposal will need to be clear on what prevention approaches and activities will be delivered, in order for there to be the right skills and knowledge in the organisation to develop these.

Bullet points 593 – 607 make many references to partnership development, strategy, planning and delivery, however nowhere in this section does it describe who will have responsibility for the



development of our prevention approaches. In other words, who will develop the prevention 'products' that we expect Operational Staff to deliver, as well as the infrastructure required to support effective delivery, such as policy, guidance, assurance, resources and training?

## Structures

The proposed structures pose a number of questions/observations:

The Level 1 TOM (*bullet point 643, pg. 101*) and Service Improvement, Performance and Partnerships proposed structure (*bullet point 660, pg. 104*) show structures down to operational Station Manager level (PO – AM – GM – SM) and other non-operational roles assumed to be non-uniformed (green book) roles, shown by the number of FTEs.

Both of these structures show three 'Senior Partnerships Officers' roles (three x FTE) and are not aligned to either a PO, AM, GM or SM role. However, bullet point 603 suggests that these roles should be a 'balance of uniform and support staff'. This contradicts the information in the two tables referenced above, nor is there any explanation or rationale to support this proposal.

It is not clear what the job purpose is for the Senior Partnership Officer roles, other than 'ownership and accountability for all developments in partnership working' (*bullet point 603*). The TOM also introduces five Community Partnership Officers to 'support place based and core service delivery', but with no clear job purpose, rationale or accountabilities.

Bullet point 635 references a 'fire prevention function' however as already described above, the tables do not show this function, nor does 'fire prevention' describe the breadth of the current prevention activities developed and delivered.

Bullet point 654 proposes the introduction of 'area-based prevention managers' to support local stations to take ownership in progressing prevention, community safety and partnership direction – it is not clear what this means and whether local stations will be expected to develop their own approach to prevention. It is our view that this would be a backward step and one which would mean prevention activities would be impossible to quality assure, measure or benchmark. It also indicates that these are temporary roles depending on the progress of place based working and fails to articulate the role of the local Station Managers in progressing this work.

Bullet point 662 references a 'partnership function being essential' – is this the same as the Corporate Support function referenced in bullet point 319 (having subject matter expertise), the 'team' referenced in bullet point 289 (public sector reform) or the 'fire prevention function' referenced in bullet point 635?

In summary, the structures do not clearly articulate how the organisation envisages providing an effective development function for any future prevention activities that it plans to deliver, regardless of the mechanism by which we deliver them, i.e. through place based working, through targeting, working with other partners or post incident reassurance, for example.

Setting aside the confusion raised by bullet point 319, the OBC structures introduce the following roles, which, in the absence of clear job purposes or descriptions, we have assumed will have responsibility in relation to prevention development and delivery:



- GM Prevention x 1
- Prevention Managers x 5
- Senior Partnerships Officers x 3
- Community Partnerships Officers x 5

This is not a typical central support function found within a FRS that would support effective Prevention delivery, such as policy, guidance, assurance, resources and training as already mentioned above. Our proposals regarding the above roles and an effective management structure for Prevention is expanded in Section 7, which has been developed based on our experiences and successes to date and underpinned by the information in sections four and five below.

## 4. A Prevention Development Function – what is its purpose and how does it support effective delivery?

The rationale for the introduction of specialists into the Prevention function is already described in the Introduction above.

The purpose of the Central Support function is to support Greater Manchester Fire & Rescue Service to develop and maintain an effective organisational approach to preventing fires and other emergencies, by maintaining services and processes that aim to prevent incidents, injuries and deaths and improve wellbeing, amongst people at increased risk.

The OBC promotes the continued delivery of prevention work, namely fire risk reduction and road and water safety advice and interventions, across Greater Manchester. The OBC does not explicitly acknowledge that in order to deliver any of this, it has to first be developed. It also has to be coordinated, quality assured and reviewed if our prevention approach is to remain relevant, effective and efficient.

Development, coordination, quality assurance and review of our risk reduction messages, policies, guidance, resources, campaigns, initiatives, programmes, partnerships and prevention training content and prevention systems content is currently the work of the Central Prevention Support function. The OBC proposes the dis-establishment of this team, posing a significant organisational risk to the following outputs, all of which this central function is solely or partly responsible for and all of which aim to reduce fire risk and improve road and water safety:

**Policy** (developing, writing, reviewing, updating, overseeing implementation), for example:

- Safeguarding Policy and Procedure
- Safe and Well Policy and Procedure
- Inclusivity Strategy
- Partnership Working

**Guidance** (developing, writing, reviewing, updating and overseeing implementation), for example:

- Smoking Related fires and Tobacco Control
- Electronic Cigarettes (Fire safety guidance)



- Fire Retardant Equipment
- Record Keeping (for prevention interventions)
- Pressure relieving devices and fire safety guidance
- Smoke alarm guidance
- Partnership models for working with organisations that support our target groups
- Guidance for the use of the Driving Simulators
- Safeguarding (Complex) guidance on preventing extremism, Child Sexual Exploitation, Modern Slavery
- Guidance for Managers for staff during Ramadan
- Emergency Accommodation Provision for the Homeless
- NHSBT Blood Donation Station
- Target Hardening (fire safety guidance)
- Various home safety technical documents relating to risk reduction equipment

**Safety Campaigns** (developing, supporting, co-ordinating, implementing, reviewing), for example:

- Safe4Spring
- Safe4Summer
- Treacle
- Safe4Winter / Help Us Help You Stay Well This Winter
- Keep SAMMIE safe (campaign to increase Safe and Well referrals from partners)
- Alcohol Awareness week (highlighting the link with fire risk)
- Stoptober/GM Making Smoking History campaigns (highlighting the link with fire risk)
- Support of the summer and winter drink / drug driving campaigns
- NFCC Drowning Prevention Week
- Safer Roads GM themed campaigns
- Mental Health Awareness Week (highlighting the link with fire risk)
- Dementia Action Week (highlighting the link with fire risk)
- Child Safety Week (highlighting the link with fire risk)
- Student fire safety and water safety
- Chimney Fire Safety Week
- Electrical Fire Safety Week
- Hate Crime Awareness Week
- Modern Slavery weeks of action

**Safety Literature** (developing, writing, commissioning design/print, ordering, distributing), for example:

- Fire safety leaflets:
  - Alcohol and fire safety
  - Smoking and fire safety



- A Short Guide To Making Your Premises Safe From Fire
- Barbecue Safety
- Candle Safety
- Do You Know What Your Children Are Doing? (preventing deliberate fire setting)
- Hoax calls
- Kitchen Fires
- Moorland Fires
- Pressure Relieving Devices and Fire Safety
- Wheelie Bin Safety (preventing deliberate fire setting)
- ASB
- Deliberate fires
- Safe and Well core documents:
  - Advice to households folder
  - Partner referral form
  - Public referral form
- Road safety leaflets and Glovebox Guide
- Water Safety leaflets
- Ice safety leaflets
- Safeguarding z-card
- Give a blessing Leaflets (Ramadan)
- Posters and banners
  - Community Resource Brochure
  - Parking and Street Safety leaflet
  - Target Hardening

**Risk Reduction Equipment** (supporting procurement and contract negotiation), for example:

- Smoke detection
- Fire retardant equipment
- Target hardening equipment
- Driving Simulators
- Throwline boards
- Pocket ashtrays
- Safety equipment to support funded projects (e.g. target hardening, under 5's accident reduction etc.)

**Multi-Agency Partnerships** (the team represents GMFRS within multi-agency partnerships aimed at reducing fire risk, improving road and water safety), for example:

- Making Smoking History in Greater Manchester
- Safer Roads Greater Manchester (Executive and Practitioners Groups)
- Peak District National Park Fire Operations Group
- Greater Manchester Faith and Community Leaders Forum
- Challenging Hate Crime Group
- GM Multi-agency Community Recovery Group



- GM Hate Crime Working Group
- GM ASB Theme Group
- North Together
- Challenger
- GM Crime and Disorder Partnership
- GM ASB Partnership
- Prison Working Group
- National Arson Reduction Group
- Domestic Abuse Partnership
- Probation
- Victim Services
- Restorative Justice

**GMFRS Partnerships** (the team develops and oversees or supports GMFRS partnerships aimed at reducing fire risk, improving road and water safety, with...)

- Greater Manchester Mental Health Trust
- Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust
- Drug and Alcohol Treatment Services
- Delphi Medical
- Stop Smoking services
- Community Wellbeing services
- Falls Prevention services
- Greater Manchester Police
- North West Ambulance Service
- Salford Royal Foundation Trust
- HMP Forest Bank and all Prisons
- Hatzola Emergency Service (Jewish)
- Community Security Trust (Jewish)
- Safe Haven
- NHSBT
- Registered Providers
- Victim Services Agencies
- Other FRS
- Restorative Justice
- Probation

**Programmes** (the team develops and coordinates the following programmes/initiatives)

- Safe Drive Stay Alive ☐
- Safe and Well

**Training** (the team informs the content of, commissions and sometimes delivers training), for example:



- Prevention Training for Firefighter Recruits
- Safeguarding Training for staff and volunteers
- WRAP training for staff and volunteers
- Lunchtime Learning (complex Safeguarding) for staff and volunteers
- Safe and Well training for staff and volunteers
- Training for partner organisations on how to identify/refer people at increased risk of fire
- Dementia Friends Training
- Smoking Related fires and Tobacco Control for staff
- Domestic Abuse Training
- Wildfire and Water Safety Volunteers
- Driving Simulator Familiarisation
- Safe Drive Stay Alive speaker workshops
- Modern Slavery
- Restorative Justice
- Victim Services

**Systems** (the team informs the design and content of systems for capturing prevention activity)

- Safe and Well Application
- Community Engagement Application
- Safe and Well Directory Application (for mobile phones)
- Partnership Portal – used to capture meetings / initiatives /partnerships / co-location across the organisation (GMFRS but with potential to be used across GMCA)

**Community Engagement** (the team develops and oversees implementation of prevention work to engage our diverse communities)

- Informal partnership working with Bolton Council of Mosques, Manchester Council of Mosques, Oldham and Rochdale Council of Mosques.

GMFRS attend annually Greater Manchester Mega Mela, and Collbra8 event.

SHED 17

Station Open Days

- We love (places in Manchester)- Environment / Health Events
- GMFRS entry in Manchester Pride Parade and Manchester Day Parade
- Supporting people in recovery (from substance misuse) to access fire safety information, Safe and Well visits and volunteering opportunities

**North West Region /National Work**

- GMFRS Substance Use Coordinator – National Lead for Smoking Related Fires and Tobacco Control (National Fire Chief’s Council)
- GMFRS Other Emergencies Co-ordinator – Vice Chair of National Road Safety Performance Forum and represents GMFRS at NFCC Forums for Road Safety and Water Safety



- Bridging Cultures Co-ordinator leads on NFCC Protection Group to develop and implement the work on Engaging with Diverse Businesses
- National Fire Safety Campaign Practitioners' Group (recently set up)
- Crime and Disorder Coordinator - Arson Reduction Group The benefits of a dedicated Central Prevention team include:
  - ***Dedicated resource*** with the ***time*** to develop, coordinate, quality assure and review prevention work on an ongoing basis
  - ***Attracting external funding*** in order to deliver road safety and water safety initiatives in collaboration with external partners.
  - *Evaluation*: large scale projects such as Safe Drive Stay Alive require extensive ongoing evaluation to continue to attract external funding.
  - Staff with relevant *skills, experience, knowledge and qualifications*
  - Staff who are *invested in a preventative approach* and have an *intrinsic drive and passion for prevention and community engagement*
  - Staff with the ***time, motivation and 'headspace'*** to develop and maintain prevention skills and knowledge by immersing themselves in local, regional and national conversations, partnerships, research and data, so that the prevention of fires and other emergencies is underpinned by ***evidence, understanding and best practice***.
  - Staff with the ***time and knowledge*** to ensure that GMFRS's prevention approach forms part of an integrated partnership approach
  - From an ***efficiency perspective***, employing grey book staff is cost-effective in comparison to green book staff.
  - From an ***efficiency perspective***, developing single central approaches to prevention workstreams, based on evidence and good practice, and informed by local needs and demands, is more cost effective than developing five different approaches in five different areas (or ten in ten boroughs, or thirtysomething across thirtysomething stations).

This Central Support approach is replicated in both Protection and Operations – whilst we would no more advocate 41 fire stations developing their own mobilising procedures or procuring their own technical equipment, for example, nor should we support 41 versions of Prevention approaches that are not informed by specialists, data or outcomes. Protection and Operational approaches are developed at the centre to support effective delivery, so it should be with Prevention approaches.

The above list is not exhaustive, but demonstrates the range of activities, skills and knowledge needed to provide a professional and effective prevention development function. Whilst the OBC requires some clarity around a future Prevention TOM, it does indicate a desire for a more targeted approach to those people with increased risk and vulnerability, and a focus on quality over quantity. The requirement for dedicated specialists to develop the Prevention function in order to do this, therefore seems paramount if we are to improve the quality of our delivery to the communities of Greater Manchester and support wider GM strategies



## 5. Prevention Central Support – Skills, experience and qualifications.

This section highlights the roles that currently make up the Central Prevention function. The intention is not to make a case for maintaining these people in these roles, but rather to demonstrate the skills, knowledge and experience that the current staff bring to the organisation that have resulted in a professional and high performing function. Indeed, we believe that there is a better way to provide development of our prevention approaches with improved support for our delivery function, which is expanded further in Section 7.

### **Sarah Hardman (GMFRS Substance Use Coordinator)**

Previously Centre Manager for 'Big Issue in the North', which supports homeless people. Delivering person-centred risk assessments and person-centred advice and interventions - principles which were directly transferable to fire risk assessment and advice.

Employed by GMFRS since 2008, initially as the Trafford Drug and Alcohol Advocate, and then in 2011 as the GMFRS Substance Use Coordinator. Extensive experience of delivering home fire risk assessments (now Safe and Well) and developing partnership models and agreements to improve fire safety for people at increased risk of fire. Knowledge and understanding of the impact of smoking, substance misuse, medication, and other key factors on fire risk and the tactics available to reduce risk. Key work - development of policy, guidance, resources, training, Safe and Well, Safeguarding, partnerships and campaigns.

Degree in English. Trained in Fire Safety Awareness, Substance Misuse, Brief Interventions, Making Every

Contact Count, Motivational Interviewing, Equality and Diversity, Mental Health Awareness, Leadership, Health and Safety, Dementia Friends, Identification and Brief Advice (and more). GMFRS lead - Making Smoking History in GM. National lead for Smoking and Tobacco Control for the NFCC.

### **Lesley Allen (Other Emergencies Co-ordinator)**

Worked in the mental health field for many years before taking a role with Greater Manchester Police Authority. Experience in developing partnership approaches across the ten local authorities in collaboration with the 999 services, health services and voluntary sector including a GM wide approach to older people's safety and preventing distraction burglary, doorstep and rogue trader crime.

Knowledge and understanding of the main contributory factors around road and water risk, and the principles of reducing these risks for specific road user groups. Developed effective working relationships with all key partners regionally and nationally. Successful experience in fundraising and managing partnership projects and budgets. Currently Vice Chair of a National Road Safety Performance Forum.

Degree in Psychology. Completed Road Safety Practitioners Course, Managing Behaviour Change and Road Safety in the Workplace (all accredited by RSGB). Completed Greater Manchester Police's Trainer



Skills Course with accreditation. Also trained in Counselling Skills, Equality and Diversity, Project Management, Safeguarding, Leadership and Health and Safety.

**Yasmin Bukhari (Bridging Cultures Coordinator)**

With over 20 years' experience in the public sector and careers in Greater Manchester Police, Bury Council and Manchester Training & Enterprise Council working predominately in the areas of Community Safety and Equality Diversity and Inclusion.

Worked in this role in GMFRS for eight years, supporting the organisation to ensure communities are accessible and easy to reach, including working extensively with third sector organisations and the faith sector to reduce the number of fire related incidents to those individuals who are deemed most at risk from within and across minority communities.

Leading on 'engaging diverse businesses' through the NFCC as well as carrying out the role of National Chair for the Asian Fire Service Association (previously held the position of General Secretary for six years). Significant contributor to the internal Inclusivity Strategy Group and lead on some of the complex safeguarding issues (Prevent, CSE, and Hate Crime), developing guidance and training materials to support the workforce. Following the Manchester Area attacks, on behalf of GMFRS I contributed to the work of the Community Recovery Group and support the Mayor's Commission on Community Cohesion & resilience.

**Zoe Henderson (Campaigns Co-ordinator)**

Campaigns and communications background, most recently working for the Vegetarian Society as a Project Worker in their Campaigns and Engagement team, which including leading national campaigns. Bringing transferable campaigning skills around the planning, delivery and evaluation of campaigns, which are vital for my current role. Also, having previously worked in communication roles (The Vegetarian Society and Audiences Yorkshire), brought valuable skills for the creation, editing and refreshing of resources.

I have worked for GMFRS since February 2018 and have grown my knowledge around fire safety and other emergencies. I develop and manage service wide community safety publicity campaigns and events to enhance community safety across Greater Manchester. I also develop a range of campaign plans and resources aimed at reducing death and injuries associated with fire and other emergencies, including leading on the seasonal educational campaigns and resources on behalf of GMFRS for delivery as part of the schools curriculum across Greater Manchester.

Degree in Media and Popular Culture. Mental Health First-Aider. Dementia Friend. Trained in project management, behaviour change and campaigning.

**Donna Gyles (Partnership Liaison Officer)**

Varied background across a number of sectors public and private. Came to GMFRS from Youth Justice in

2006 as an Equality and Diversity Trainer and went on to become an Equality and Diversity Advisor, developed an attraction strategy to target under-represented groups and led on programmes such as



Fire Fighter Taster Days, Retained Fire Fighter Recruitment sessions, Fire Fighter 'support sessions' with Colleges and Training providers.

I was part of the team, which set up the Community Safety Advisor Apprenticeship Programme and qualification with Skills for Justice and the Traineeship Programme, which ran for approximately three years.

Within my Partnership role, I set up a number of pilot initiatives, working closely with Borough Managers, Salford and Trafford Ex-offender Programme (STEP), New Horizons (Ex-offender Programme) in Oldham. I also developed a three-year business plan for the Moss Side Fire Station Boxing Club and have set up SHED 17, which is a 'community' (independently funded) project aimed at working with 'older people' or people who may be socially isolated and may be at increased risk of fire.

I am responsible for the coordination and implementation of the internal Ideas and Innovation funding stream, working with internal clients to help them write funding bids and develop ideas they may have to improve service or working conditions. I developed the Partnership Portal and the Safe and Well Directory mobile application. I also work with Station Managers to help them develop partnerships, as well as writing policy and guidance.

Degree in Business and Finance. Mental Health First-Aider. Dementia Friend, Equality and Diversity, Safeguarding, Leadership and Health and Safety. Connect 5 (Mental Health)

### **Paula Breeze**

Qualified Occupational Therapist with a history of supporting people with mental health problems. Employed by GMFRS since 2010, initially as the Manchester Mental Health Liaison Officer, and then in 2011 as the GMFRS Health and Social Care Coordinator. Extensive experience of delivering home fire risk assessments (now Safe and Well) and developing partnership models and agreements to improve fire safety for people at increased risk of fire. Knowledge and understanding of the impact of mental and physical health, falls and frailty, dementia, older age and other key factors on fire risk and the tactics available to reduce risk. Key work - development of policy, guidance, resources, training, Safe and Well, Safeguarding, partnerships and campaigns.

GMFRS representative for NFCC work-streams on mental health, hoarding and assistive technology. GMFRS representative at GM multi-agency meetings linked to remit. Extensive role based training.

### **Andy Williams (Fire Crime and Disorder Co-Ordinator)**

Background in community safety management with Local Authority and Police working at national, regional and local levels. Management experience includes, ASB, designing out crime, acquisitive crime, heritage crime, community engagement, SOC, domestic abuse, hate crime, prevent, schools liaison, restorative justice, missing from home and project management. Consultant in community safety management and practice.

Work strategically within the organisation and across Greater Manchester to formulate crime reduction strategies for situational and sociological crime prevention, and where appropriate introduce



good practice advice and guidance to Greater Manchester Fire & Rescue Service. I pursue partnership opportunities with agencies, charities and organisations aimed at reducing crime & disorder and arson, which may include working with offenders and ex-offenders in prisons, probation and other rehabilitation settings. Co-ordinating work centrally to support area based teams in the effective implementation and delivery of all crime & disorder and arson reduction projects and initiatives, with the view to providing direction, co-ordination, support and training for other. Liaising and working in partnership with the Challenger team, GMP, Probation, Prisons, Domestic Abuse services, Restorative Justice, Victim Services, Registered Providers, other FRS and all other agencies to support and develop the priorities of GMFRS. Coordinating joint agency working to tackle modern slavery, exploitation, arson, deliberate fires, prison fires, ASB and car fires. Supporting Fire Investigation, Fire Prevention and Fire Safety with all partnership working.

MBA, PGCE, B.A. Hons Business, Diploma HRM, Crime Reduction Trainer, Prevent, WRAP and Collaborative Leadership.

**Alison McDonald – Prevention Service Support Manager**

Employed by GMFRS since 1997 initially in Fire Control for ten years as a Fire Control Watch Manager, leading and supporting all aspects of Control incident management and also responsible for the development and training of Watch members.

I have worked at borough level as an Administration Manager, gaining extensive experience in all aspects of line management, performance management, planning, project management and budgetary planning, monitoring and reporting. Have worked in Prevention and Protection since 2009, as the Administration Manager for the function and for the past five years as the Prevention Service Support Manager.

I have extensive experience and knowledge across prevention and protection activities and my role as the Prevention Service Support Manager is to support the development and implementation of prevention strategies, policy, guidance and approaches that reduce risk, injuries and death from fire and other emergencies, improve health and wellbeing, and to add public value to our work. I manage the Central Support team of Co-Ordinators and represent the organisation strategically within GM as well as with Prevention leads in other fire and rescue services. I support the development of our Safe and Well approach and lead the Safeguarding Policy Review Group on behalf of GMFRS.

Degree in French and German. ILM Level 5 Leadership Qualification. Trained in Fire Safety Awareness, Equality and Diversity, Mental Health Awareness, Health and Safety, Dementia Friend, Project Management and developing Funding Bids. Represent GMFRS at the North West Home Safety Committee Working Group.



## 6. Prevention Themed Submissions to the OBC proposals

This section provides a suite of themed submissions to the OBC proposals in the following areas:

- Bridging Cultures and working with our communities
- Campaigns
- Crime and Disorder
- Partnerships and Engagement
- Road Safety, Water Safety and other emergencies
- Safe and Well (our fire risk assessment tool)

They pose questions and challenges to the statements and proposals made in the OBC, providing further information, evidence and experience that should be considered when developing any future proposals.

### 1. Outline Business Case - Programme for Change Themed Submission

#### **Bridging Cultures and working with our communities**

The OBC makes little, if any reference, to the hard-to-reach communities of Greater Manchester and therefore demonstrates no knowledge or recognition of diversity, cultural and religious issues which may impact on fire risk, and what our approaches should and could be to engage people in those communities, the third sector, faith leaders etc.

Understanding the cultural and religious practices which put people at increased risk of fires is vital, therefore delivering educational campaigns targeted specially at those communities in a manner they understand.

The Bridging Cultures Co-Ordinator role leads this prevention approach, also supporting the Protection function and business communities, as well as other areas across the organisation. The work with the third sector and faith communities and community leaders is vast and extensive and excellent relationships with partnerships have been developed over the years.

*As the OBC proposes to disestablish the Central Support function that this role sits within, how does it envisage that this work will be taken forward and who will lead on it?*

#### **Supporting the Equality, Diversity & Inclusivity agenda both internally and nationally**

This role influences the national agenda through work with the Asian Fire Service Association (AFSA) and is the current national Chair for AFSA.

It co-chairs the BAME staff network and has supported staff with workplace issues, providing a consultative role to the organisation including providing input to firefighter apprentices on cultural and religious practices.

The role develops relevant guidance, for example, and guidance on Ramadhan and provides team and one-to-one support and advice.



Following the Manchester Arena Attack, this role continues to support the work of the Community Recovery Group to improve community cohesion and to prevent extremism.

*As the OBC proposes to disestablish the Central Support function that this role sits within, how does it envisage that this work will be taken forward and who will lead on it?*

### **Supporting Protection and Businesses**

It has been recognised nationally that we dis-proportionately prosecute a large number of ethnic minority businesses and through the NFCC Protection Group the Bridging Cultures Co-Ordinator role leads on the development of work to engage with diverse businesses. This included developing an on-line toolkit to support fire and rescue services nationally and the commissioning of research.

*As the OBC proposes to disestablish the Central Support function that this role sits within, how does it envisage that this work will be taken forward and who will lead on it?*

### **Complex Safeguarding**

The OBC makes little reference to Safeguarding (and a separate submission to PfC on Safeguarding has been provided), however the Bridging Cultures Co-Ordinator leads on some of the complex safeguarding related areas of work, including the Prevent Agenda, Honour Abuse, Child Sexual Exploitation and Hate Crime. This is supported by other members of the Central Prevention Support function, who develop our policy and approaches to safeguarding.

## **2. Outline Business Case - Programme for Change Themed Submission Campaigns**

***Point 301 – ‘our prevention activities will have a three tiered approach .....’ Point 304 – ‘all-age fire risk reduction, water safety and road safety activities...’ Point 311 – ‘develop and deliver national safety campaigns... work with partners on local seasonal campaigns’ Point 315 – ‘bespoke water safety campaigns’***

The OBC does not make clear what the format will be for universal messaging, although a digital solution has been referenced elsewhere in the document. Resource will be required to develop, monitor, maintain, evaluate and assess the subject matter input – who will be responsible for this if the Central Support function is disestablished? Part of the Campaigns Co-ordinator role is to lead on the development of resources, literature and media to support our educational messaging and many campaigns across all parts of our communities.

This role also leads and develops resources to support multi-agency campaigns such as the seasonal Safe4 campaigns, and provides operational staff with a suite of age-appropriate resources to support effective primary school engagement. This role works with a wide range of internal and external partners, in particular leading on the annual Treacle campaign leading up to Bonfire Night. The OBC does not explain how this important development work will continue in the future.



A new 'digital solution' sounds exciting and is something we would welcome, although the OBC does not make clear how long this might take to develop, the cost or who would lead on the co-ordination of the significant prevention input.

The OBC suggests supporting water safety campaigns, something we have been doing for years and already target dependant on the area. The Campaigns Co-Ordinator's role (as with other topics) is to work with the subject matter expert to develop the messaging, branding, collateral and resources to support effective delivery, and without this role it is not clear who will co-ordinate our many prevention campaigns to ensure consistency.

### **School visits**

#### **Point 310 – *'our frontline will work with schools and colleges'***

The OBC does not mention who will develop and co-ordinate the safety and seasonal messaging and resources for operational staff to deliver in schools. This will likely take us back years to a time when fire stations developed their own local input, which was often age-inappropriate, uninspiring, impossible to quality assure or evaluate and not informed by staff with expertise in how to positively engage young people or children.

Each seasonal campaign has primary and secondary school resources which are used during the relevant campaign period and without central co-ordination, there will be no input or updates into the school presentations. Our Training and Development staff can create the presentations and trainer notes, but need relevant content, updates and messaging from the subject matter experts to feed into this.

Secondary school visits are currently delivered by community safety teams, is the intention that firefighters will also deliver these? Secondary school visits are usually requested by the school during morning assemblies due to the demands of the curriculum, which conflicts with change of shift – how will this be managed and do firefighters have the skills and experience to positively engage with young people across all age ranges?

### **Other areas of feedback**

#### **Leaflets and other resources**

There are around 50 prevention and protection leaflets / posters which are currently part of the organisation's leaflet catalogue. There are additional seasonal resources, and resources from partner organisations, which we also distribute. Without a Central Prevention function, who will create new resources, update existing resources, keep a tally of stock levels and arrange printing? Disestablishing the Central Prevention function also removes the expertise to develop consistent, up-to-date information and branding for the resources. How will you ensure the quality of prevention and protection information distributed across Greater Manchester in the future?

The Safe and Well branding has been developed at significant time and cost over several years, and is also known to many partners both locally and nationally. Losing the brand awareness which has built



up over the years with our partners may result in a decrease in referrals to the service for those who are at increased risk of fire.

### **Events**

The Campaigns Co-ordinator currently co-ordinates our entry to two of the large events which GMFRS take part in each year – Manchester Day Parade and Manchester Pride Parade. They are important community events and FRS across the country travel to attend the parades. The parades are an opportunity for us to engage with our communities, share safety messaging and demonstrate that we are an inclusive organisation. A lot of time goes into the planning of these events – who will do this in the future?

### **Meetings and Groups**

There are internal and external groups for Safe4Summer and Treacle campaigns, supported and led by the Campaigns Co-Ordinator. In the absence of this role, who will co-ordinate on behalf of GMFRS? Where will the specialist knowledge come from? We also attend the Greater Manchester ASB theme group and input into national Fire Kills / Home Office campaigns. It is vital what we consider GM wide and national campaigns to understand the trends and priorities wider than what is going on at a station or borough level alone. It is important to have a view of, and feed into, regional and national research and information.

## **3. Outline Business Case - Programme for Change Themed Submission**

### **Fire Crime and Disorder**

#### **Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB)**

**Point 61** - links ASB with deliberate fires and point 162 mentions that Youth Engagement work will be driven by place based working to address ASB and deliberate fires. However the OBC fails to articulate which role/roles will develop and coordinate national guidance, data, campaigns, best practice, trends and correlation in relation to deliberate fires and ASB. This work is currently undertaken by the Fire Crime and Disorder Coordinator role in the Central Prevention Support function.

**Point 320** - explains that campaigns and educational packages will be reviewed including those which address ASB. As has been described by the Campaigns Co-Ordinator, this work is currently undertaken jointly by both of these roles, every year for each of the seasonal Safe4 campaigns. Which role/roles will be developing this work in line with the national ASB legislation and GMFRS statutory duty under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 to ensure sure that our messaging is meaningful?

**Point 351** - highlights our 'successes' in ASB areas as the caged soccer unit, the climbing wall and Moss Side Boxing Club. Whilst these are good examples of diversionary activities away from ASB, they are not an effective tool in addressing ASB. This should be done through analysing data, trends and patterns to identify hot spot areas and sharing this information with other agencies to implement diversionary activities and take enforcement action where needed. Those data sharing processes, multi-agency discussions and representation at the GM ASB meetings are undertaken by the Fire Crime



and Disorder Coordinator and Campaigns Coordinator? Which role/roles will be undertaking this work in the future?

**Point 353** - promises to develop ways to prevent deliberate fires. This requires a good understanding of the behaviour of a fire setter and understanding the research which has been undertaken in the field by academics in the UK. The Crime and Disorder Coordinator role ensures this national best practice and knowledge is brought into the GMFRS. Which role/roles will be undertaking this work in the future?

This same point also states that we will be changing our preventing fires approach, going from leading to supporting outreach schemes. Which roles will be responsible for undertaking this development work to 'support' others to prevent fires?

### **Modern Slavery**

The links between modern slavery and unsafe commercial premises have become more apparent through the partnership work in Challenger. The Fire Crime and Disorder Co-Ordinator role sits within this team one day per week, and also undertakes various other activities throughout the week related to this topic.

In the past year, the Challenger partnership has rescued 30 victims of slavery, safeguarded 364 children and 519 adults, arrested 500 men and 86 women, confiscated £312,649 in cash, taken 46 weapons and £231,456 worth of drugs off the streets. GMFRS is an integral part in several ongoing cases.

GMFRS estates includes a place of safety ('the flat') for victims of modern slavery. GMFRS and GMP have a partnership agreement in place which encompasses all of the detail about this partnership project. £20,000 funding was obtained from the Police and Crime Commissioner and is due to end in 2020. Currently the Fire Crime and Disorder Coordinator develops and coordinates all work streams in relation to the flat. Which role has been identified to lead this work in the future, given the OBC's intention to disestablish the team that this role sits within?

The place based working agreement between Challenger and GMFRS (one day per week) is developed and delivered by the GMFRS Fire Crime and Disorder Coordinator, below is a list of work streams, completed and currently being developed:

- Deliver training to GMP officers in relation to fire safety
- Deliver training to GMP officers in relation to the GMFRS Flat which accommodates victims of Modern Slavery
- Share information and intelligence with all Challenger partners regarding people and premises in order to identify and safeguard vulnerable victims and offenders
- Raise awareness to GMFRS staff to encourage reporting of modern slavery which they may come across during incidents
- Coordinate modern slavery training to GMFRS staff (Fire Safety teams, NILO's, Community Safety teams, Youth Engagement teams, Princes Trust, Safeguarding reps...)



- Coordinate joint visits between GMFRS and other organisations within Challenger to businesses where a risk of modern slavery and fire safety concerns have been reported (carwashes, nail bars, brothels, factories, cannabis farms...)
- Work with the Challenger team to develop all work streams in relation to the flat (partnership agreements, risk assessments, funding, evaluation)

Whilst **point 359** states that we will continue to support and help develop Programme Challenger, it does not provide any information on how we will do this, or give any indication on how all the above work streams, for example, will continue to be supported and if so, by whom? Will it have a central point of contact within GMFRS? Will Challenger still access GMFRS estates (i.e. the place of safety accommodation for victims of modern slavery)?

GMFRS, through the Fire Crime and Disorder Coordinator role, has provided valuable liaison and coordination between partners to support operations which have seen offenders prosecuted by legal powers from all partner agencies. This has resulted in people being rescued from exploitation, abuse and potential life threatening risks relating to fire.

### **Strategic Offender Management/Probation/Prisons**

The Fire Crime and Disorder Coordinator role maintains strategic links relating to offenders with fire setting behaviours and manages and coordinates all engagement and prevention work with the prison estate.

The Fire Crime and Disorder Coordinator role works locally, regionally and nationally coordinating and working in partnership with all partner agencies on a range of fire risk factors that are increased, due to crime and disorder or because of crime and disorder activity.

### **Domestic Abuse**

The OBC does not specifically mention this subject within the document; however it is an important contributory factor when considering people who are most at risk of deliberate fires.

The OBC only refers to 'deliberate fires' in relation to ASB. However, we know through the very regular 'arson threat' calls we attend and the deliberate dwelling fires we investigate, a large proportion of deliberate dwelling fires are linked to domestic abuse.

Deliberate fires continue to rise (79% increase April 2019) and in order to prevent deliberate fires potential victims need to be identified. This can only happen through effective partnerships, an extensive knowledge of domestic abuse and the national best practice and legislation that surrounds this, effective training for GMFRS staff and effective policies and procedures when coming across victims. All of these activities are currently developed by the Fire Crime and Disorder Coordinator role.

It would be unfeasible (and not cost effective) to expect all Station Managers to have this level of understanding at this time, or the capacity to develop the partnerships, training and policies and procedures needed in relation to domestic abuse, and as has been suggested elsewhere, would likely result in 41 different approaches and outcomes across 41 fire stations.



Which role within GMFRS does the OBC suggest will develop our domestic abuse work across Greater Manchester, so that there is a standardised approach to the level of service we are offering victims?

**Should the outcome of the consultation process still result in a role which delivers the breadth of fire crime and disorder activities detailed above, it will need to:**

- Develop closer links with Fire Protection/Investigation
- Be more performance focused from the root cause of the fire to how we will prevent
- Become embedded within the Police, Fire and Crime team to address higher-level policy and partnership work
- Develop closer links to youth engagement – addressing fire setting and ASB
- Develop closer links to training to develop prevention training

#### **4. Outline Business Case - Programme for Change Themed Submission**

##### **Partnership and Engagement Work**

##### **Point 8 – GMFRS to be ‘truly’ embedded in the place based teams (PBT).**

There is a lack of clarity in the OBC regarding the fire service offer to Place Based working, the expectations of a Station Manager and other roles, what they will be asked to do and what resources they will have. The OBC does not make clear what the GMFRS ‘offer’ is to place based working other than being a conduit for managing our referrals for people with increased fire risk when clearly it should be more than that.

There is potential for operational staff to have reduced capacity to undertake ‘Person Centred Risk Assessments’ to the same extent as they do now, with the additional proposed demands on their roles and the training they will be required to undertake, such as Youth Engagement, Partnership Working and Protection work.

##### **Point 48 - Station Mergers / potential for co-location**

Is there an opportunity for income generation? There is a lot of discussion within the OBC regarding savings but little suggestion of generating income, for example, by renting out spaces within the GMFRS / GMCA estate.

##### **Point 56 - Information Sharing between agencies.**

From previous experience, working with different agencies (particularly the Police and Social Services), has always presented an issue regarding access rights (information sharing) and compatibility of systems. In order for this to work there would need to be a ‘universal’ information sharing agreement



and investment in an IT system that would work across organisations. What does the size of this project look like, how long will it take to develop and what are the cost implications? Coupled with the many other IT systems that the OBC suggests developing and improving, this would seem like a lengthy process.

#### **Point 119 – Fire Fighter Feedback & Point 316: FF Attraction**

The OBC claims that firefighters have expressed a desire to take on more responsibility though it provides no evidence to support this, and feedback from Mayoral visits to stations is quite the opposite.

Whilst we do not dispute that we have a significant operational workforce to deliver a range of prevention activities who have a valuable role to play in prevention it is important that, as well as improving our promotion processes, the attraction, selection and training of new Firefighters is also redesigned to reflect this. Recruitment and promotion of staff to undertake more community safety activities will need to be embedded into the attraction, development and promotion stages. Trying to catch up by delivering training once staff have joined us doesn't work. The HROD and Operational Training Teams currently rely on guidance, advice and training delivery from the Central Coordination Team for prevention advice. If the central team is 'disestablished' it is not clear who will be the subject matter advisors going forward.

### **5. Outline Business Case - Programme for Change Themed Submission**

#### **Road Safety, Water Safety and Wildfire Prevention**

##### ***Point 293 – 'prevention activities ...may be better addressed by other agencies'***

In the case of road safety, local authority cuts have left Greater Manchester with much depleted road safety teams, and in some cases none at all. GMFRS has worked closely with Safer Roads Greater Manchester to help fill some of these gaps through risk profiling, and looking at where gaps were. We now lead on all activities around young drivers and passengers, as do most other fire and rescue services, and attract significant funding from the partnership to deliver against this.

We report our activity regularly into the Safer Roads Greater Manchester Partnership, and ensure that we are aligned with their priorities in terms of casualty statistics across Greater Manchester. Road traffic collisions continue to be the biggest risk to causing death or serious injury to young people aged 17 – 25, and there is a need to continue to reduce this risk at a strategic level with our partners. I am concerned that without central co-ordination of this work, and development and delivery of road safety being decided at station level, this GM partnership approach would no longer be effective. It is unclear whether any partners have been consulted on this suggestion, and whether they agree with it.

##### ***Point 294: 'Operational crews .... are insufficiently trained to undertake the role ...'***

Within both road safety and water safety, the experiences of operational crews are drawn upon both in the development of resources and in the delivery of them. For example, we have created educational films for both topics using the stories told by our firefighters, drawing on the specialist teams from



Water Incident Unit and Technical Response Unit stations. Firefighters are able to deliver effective messages that are remembered, especially by young people.

However, the extensive development and background detailed work that has to go into ensuring that we have funding, partnership agreements, effective age appropriate and consistent up to date presentations and resources to deliver, requires specialist knowledge and skills. This skill set and expert subject knowledge enables each borough to deliver consistent and effective education and support to the local communities and does not exist in our operational workforce.

**Point 298: *'Stop working in silos'***

How does removing a Central Prevention Support function stop silo working? A return to working in silos is exactly what will happen if decisions on what prevention activity to undertake is devolved to Station Managers with our strong brand and reputation under threat. For example, our reputation with partners at Safer Roads Greater Manchester has developed over the past eight years as we have taken the lead on strategic pieces of work identified as a priority by Greater Manchester partners. The resources we develop centrally to deliver road and water safety are co-designed with partners to ensure our messages are consistent with theirs, and that they are age appropriate.

**Point 301.1 *'Universal messaging'***

We are concerned that this seems to be a "tick box" quick win approach. Road fatalities are the single biggest killer of young people aged 17-25, coming at a huge emotional and financial cost. It seems that there is no appreciation of the level of research and development that has contributed to our current approaches to road safety, or to the best practice forums we represent the service at nationally, to ensure the approaches continue to improve. Both road and water safety affects young adults the most, and there is a wealth of national research around helping young people change their attitudes, beliefs and behaviours. It is vital that "universal messaging" is informed, and cognisant of the reasons behind increased risk in certain groups, and that simple social media, leaflets, and quick win opportunities do not generally work to reduce specific risk taking behaviours.

**Point 302 – *'Devolve the management and delivery of all prevention activity and messages'***

When resources (GMFRS, Local Authorities, GMP etc.) are limited and depleted, prioritisation of work to prevent road traffic collisions needs to be intelligence led at a Greater Manchester level. To be most effective, it must be directed by partners at the Safer Roads Greater Manchester Partnership. This is the current approach and has resulted in some fantastic work streams, for example:

- Safe Drive Stay Alive
- the issuing of 25,000 Glovebox Guides to young drivers as they pass their driving tests each year
- the provision of our driving simulators

All of these work streams are informed by best practice and national research to develop interventions that have lasting positive effects on young people's attitudes and behaviours when out in cars. Prior to this approach through central co-ordination, stations had pretty much been left to develop their own approaches to road safety and some of which was shocking, not evaluated and not age appropriate.



To suggest a return this is an 'improvement' to what we have since developed is an insult to the Central Prevention function and the communities of Greater Manchester. Is this what we will be returning to?

How would the nationally respected work outlined above continue without central co-ordination and a Greater Manchester wide outlook?

**Point 304: *'Operational crews will provide the majority of prevention and education delivery'***

Fire fighters should and do have a role in delivering prevention and education, and sometimes they are the best people to do this. Certainly, within water safety and road safety fire fighters are already utilised to deliver messages effectively within the programmes developed and co-ordinated as described above. The unanswered questions in the OBC, however, are:

- What will they deliver?
- How will they decide who to deliver it to?
- How will it be evaluated?
- How will they measure success?
- Where will their funding come from to develop new approaches and resources?
- How will they ensure messages are consistent and age appropriate?
- Where is the resilience should there be an incident or local emergency such as a wildfire?
- Who will quality control their content?
- How will they share best practice locally and nationally?

Schools often require the inputs to be during morning assemblies, which would mean that the watch change over times would need to be changed to allow for this. Is this a proposal?

Young people will miss out on vital safety messages because operational staff are unable to keep to appointments because of operational demand. This will also affect our relationships with schools and colleges who will be let down with no community safety staff available to provide resilience.

**Point 312; *Road Safety Interventions***

Whilst we welcome the support expressed with regard to Safe Drive Stay Alive (SDSA), this point is inaccurate and misinformed, most likely due to the fact that the view of the Other Emergencies CoOrdinator (who is the GM Project Co-Ordinator for SDSA ) was not sought.

The OBC refers to the GM Casualty Reduction Partnership – this has not existed for two years, it is now Safer Roads GM.

The OBC refers to 5,000 students seeing SDSA each year - the figure has risen every year since its inception as more colleges and groups want to take part, and is currently circa 12,000 students for 2018/19. This inaccuracy is concerning as extra funding of £25,000 from the Mayor's Office was provided this March to ensure that we were able to increase the number of students coming through the project. The OBC makes it appear that we have failed in this, and gone back to the numbers we reached right back in 2014, and could threaten any further such funding for 2020.

The OBC demonstrates a lack of appreciation in exactly how much work is involved in co-ordinating this project. Since we attracted further funding this year from the Mayors' Office, delivery takes place



in March as well as November, meaning that the core team, chaired by the Other Emergencies Co-Ordinator role is almost 100% dedicated to ensuring it is delivered smoothly, safely and effectively. While fire fighters remain central to the actual delivery on stage, the significant amount of development work involved throughout the year is not reflected in the document.

SDSA is entering its sixth year, and to date has delivered 95 performances to 40,456 young people and has attracted £335,000 of partnership funding from TfGM. The co-ordination of our emergency service partners, continual liaison and follow up work with all Greater Manchester colleges and youth groups (including Manchester City And Manchester United Academies), organisation of coach transport, reporting to TfGM and continued work to refresh and renew the content of the actual performance, makes the role of co-ordinating Safe Drive Stay Alive almost a full time job. Planning for the November dates is already taking place but with no ability to provide assurance to partners and colleges that we can make these commitments as the OBC proposes a disestablishment of the role which co-ordinates the work.

To date 7,500 places have been booked for November and 3,000 for March 2020, which will require someone to identify a further £25,000 external funding – who will that be?

The cost of one road traffic fatality alone is estimated at £1.9 million (source – Department for Transport) on top of the huge emotional cost experienced by families. Put into context, if one life is saved via Safe Drive Stay Alive the total project costs would be covered for 20 years.

As this project is externally funded, and has always been a 999 partnership rather than a GMFRS project, I feel that the decision on how it should continue to be co-ordinated should be put to the funding bodies and the partners involved in it. Safer Roads Greater Manchester should be central to any decisions made about the future of Safe Drive Stay Alive, and not an arbitrary and uninformed view in the OBC.

The OBC refers to continuing to deliver simulated car crashes in colleges using actors. What have you based this suggestion on? There is **no** evidence that this approach has any positive impact on the attitudes and behaviours of young people towards road safety, or that it teaches them how to actually keep themselves safe. Road Safety GB promotes approaches that are known to help behaviour change in young people, and it is these that we have been working to promote across the organisation for several years.

Whilst fire fighters may feel comfortable demonstrating how they rescue people from vehicles, and that it is good for their training, to encourage this activity under the banner of delivering road safety education is a backwards step and an insult.

You also refer to continued use of the driving simulators. Again this is welcomed, however, much investment has been made into training our local community safety teams to deliver this activity. Some operational watches have received this training, but find it difficult to deliver community sessions with the simulators as they are usually on call and cannot simply abandon the expensive equipment. Our experience over the six years that we have had the driving simulators proves that operational fire fighters, no matter how keen they may have been to be trained on the equipment, do not find the time to actually use it. The simulators themselves are also reaching an age where wear and tear means they need further investment to keep them maintained and repaired. If community safety teams are no



longer going to be in post, significant training time and financial investment will need to be made to deliver on this intention.

Our partnership with the DVLA, whereby every single under 25 year old who passes their driving test in Greater Manchester receives our Glovebox Guide that offers timely road safety advice, is not reflected or mentioned in the document. This intervention attracts partnership funding as it is valued by Safer Roads GM, and has been running for several years without any need for GMFRS funding or resource implications other than the Other Emergencies Co-Ordinator's time. Currently, 25,000 young people benefit from this resource every year on the day they pass their driving test and we consistently receive positive feedback via our website. Who will continue to foster this partnership relationship at a GM level with TfGM (who fund the Glovebox Guides), the Safer Roads Greater Manchester Partnership who advise on the content, and the DVLA in the future? Without this, the resource would be discontinued.

#### **Point 315: '*Bespoke Water Safety Campaigns*'**

This bullet point describes approaches and activities that we have been doing for years. Through the Manchester Water Safety Partnership chaired by one of our Station Managers, the Other Emergencies Co-Ordinator is working closely with city centre partners to develop several pieces of work to address these specific problems.

We also have several interventions to address the wider problems of young people taking risks around outside water on hot days. These include our Safe4 educational materials for schools, and the installation of physical safety measures at our most high risk areas in partnership with United Utilities and the Canal and Rivers Trust (again bringing in significant external funding to deliver this campaign).

We also train small teams of volunteers to become specialist water safety advisors, so that we have a presence in these areas at risk times. The Other Emergencies Co-Ordinator represents GMFRS at the NFCC Water Safety Practitioners Forum, enabling our organisation to take full part in planning and delivering national campaigns and share best practice with all other regions. With the removal of the Central Prevention Support function, what is your proposal for ensuring this valuable work continues.

#### **Other Feedback:**

##### **Wildfire prevention**

There is no mention at all of this role as part of our prevention approaches within the document, yet last year the cost to the organisation of attending wildfires, and the environmental cost of those fires was huge. The Combined Authority has been very quick to promote wild fire safety messaging in recent weeks, including the value of volunteers to do this important work (especially when it was endorsed by David Attenborough) whilst at the same time proposing to disestablish the function that develops the approaches themselves.

This is an issue which requires more investment at a Greater Manchester level not less. We have project work planned for this summer to help prevent wildfires, including the recruitment of a new team of volunteers to help cover the hotspot areas at weekends. This will require Central Prevention Support to train, motivate, mobilise, support and monitor the volunteers, the activities and outputs, and to ensure that they are at the right locations at the right times. Devolvement of prevention activity to station level would not facilitate this, or ensure that it is an intelligence led, risk profiled project.



## 6. Outline Business Case - Programme for Change Themed Submission

### Safe and Well – our primary fire risk assessment tool

Safe and Well has been led by members of the Central Prevention function since it launched in November 2015. We feel that Safe and Well is misrepresented in the OBC and this gives us cause for concern about the future of this important fire risk reduction intervention.

**Bullet points 82, 144, 300, 565 and 582** - state that Safe and Well visits will be person-centred fire risk assessments, focus on quality rather than quantity and be targeted at people at increased risk of fire. The wording implies that this would be an altered approach – an outcome of the Programme for Change. This is misleading because this is the approach that is taken currently.

This misrepresentation could be a result of the way in which the review was conducted; our team was not meaningfully consulted, or listened to. The result is a business case which shows little recognition of:

- the fire data which informs the content of Safe and Well
- how GMFRS identifies and targets at-risk groups in the community
- what a person-centred fire risk assessment is and why it is important
- the focus on quality visits as opposed to quantity of visits
- the value of subject matter experts to develop an evidence based fire risk assessment tool, evidence based fire safety messages and evidence based fire safety interventions – all informed by local and national best practice
- the problems experienced by the organisation in developing, implementing and evaluating Safe and Well, which provide lessons for future development.

**We want to see a proposal that shows understanding of Safe and Well visits, what the problems are and identifies workable measures for improvement. Going forward, the organisation will need to retain staff with knowledge and expertise in order to progress Safe and Well successfully. This knowledge exists within our team.**

Safe and Well is an evidence based intervention. GMFRS fire data tells us that, in GM, smoking causes 46% of accidental fire deaths. Mental health is a profile factor in 20% of fire deaths, physical disability in 37%, alcohol use in 44%, drug use in 11%, living alone in 53%, social care needs in 36% and medication use in 45%. Of those who die in fires, 50% are aged over 60 which is disproportionately high in comparison to the number of people over 60 in the GM population. This and other data, such as where fires occur, shapes our approach to targeting our visits and to modelling our visits.

### **Targeting our visits**

We use data-led risk-modelling to identify and target **addresses** across GM where fire risk is likely to be increased. To compliment this, the fatal fire data above creates a profile of **people** who are at increased risk of fire, enabling us to target Safe and Well visits (whilst still maintaining a universal offer).



To do this we work with organisations that are most likely to support our target groups – older people’s services, mental health trusts, drug and alcohol services, stop smoking services, housing associations, falls prevention services, social care, etc. These partnerships, documented in written agreements, generate targeted Safe and Well referrals. Last year partnerships generated 17,133 referrals for Safe and Well visits from at least 414 partners.

**Point 82** - the OBC suggests that in the future , visits will be generated through place-based working. There are numerous other references (**points 58, 143, 144, 300**) which suggest that for Safe and Well visits to be person-centred, targeted and of good quality, they must be driven through ‘place’. This is untrue. Although place based working is one method of increasing targeted referrals for Safe and Well visits, you can see from the figures above that it is not the only way.

**Our recommendation is that we do not rely solely on place-based working as the only method of engaging partners and generating Safe and Well referrals.**

### **Modelling Safe and Well visits**

Fatal fire data shapes our current approach to fire risk assessment. Statistically, the main ignition sources of fires and fire deaths in the home are cooking, smoking, electrics, fires/heaters and candles. We know that working smoke alarms, safe night time routines, escape plans and clear escape routes are vital for home fire safety and we have always discussed these elements in our home visits. However over the years evidence has emerged highlighting the fire risk linked to mental health, mobility and falls, substance misuse, smoking, medication, living alone, older age, keeping warm, and social care needs, therefore we have re-modelled our fire risk assessment so that it also considers the impact of these ‘person’ and ‘occupational factors’ on the individual’s fire risk. This person-centred model IS Safe and Well.

### **Safe and Well - Person Centred Fire Risk Assessment**

The OBC suggests that a Safe and Well visit is something other than a person-centred fire risk assessment and that its focus is not fire safety. This is untrue. The document shows a lack of understanding of what is meant (locally and nationally) by person-centred fire risk assessment, suggesting at one point that simply targeting the right people makes the visit person-centred! Examples of this lack of understanding are:

*‘We will redesign Safe and Well to ensure a clear focus on fire safety’* **Page 24 – Key recommendations**

*‘Visits undertaken will deliver focused and effective person-centred fire risk assessments.’* **Point 300**

*‘Firefighters have raised concerns that the Safe and Well checks have strayed too far into the health arena, as opposed to focussing on fire safety.’* **Point 142**

*‘Firefighters told us that they were expected to engage with communities on complex health issues as part of Safe and Well visits....’* **Point 82**



There is no need to re-design Safe and Well. The product is sound, evidence based and focused on fire safety. In fact, ***in developing Safe and Well, GMFRS has actually improved its focus on fire safety,*** unlike the old approach to fire risk assessment, which only assessed fire risk relating to the home environment and the main ignition sources of fire in the home. Safe and Well focusses on the other key fire risks underpinned by data – those relating to the person and their occupations/behaviours.

This is what we mean by person-centred fire risk assessment – **a fire risk assessment which takes into account the person, their environment and their occupations/behaviours and provides fire risk reduction advice and interventions that meet the needs of the individual.**

- Environmental factors are those integral to the fabric of the property (layout, presence of smoke detection, clutter, repair, egress, heating etc.)
- Person factors are those integral to the person (mobility, physical and mental health, sensory impairment, abilities, beliefs, wishes, motivations etc.)
- Occupational factors are behaviours (drinking alcohol, smoking, taking medication, testing or not testing smoke alarms, overloading sockets, leaving doors open at night before bed etc.)

Safe and Well visits are not part of the health arena.

Safe and Well questions on topics such as smoking, alcohol, mental health, falls prevention are designed to assess how ‘person’ and ‘occupational’ factors impact on the individual’s risk of having a fire and their ability to escape in the event of a fire.

The questions also seek to establish whether the individual has, or needs, support from another organisation to address an underlying cause of fire (e.g. help with an alcohol problem). Delivery staff have adequate fire safety knowledge to agree person-centred fire risk reduction tactics once they have assessed the risk. Signposts and referrals to other organisations are fire risk reduction tactics; referring Mrs Smith to a Stop Smoking Service is the most effective fire risk reduction tactic a firefighter could undertake for her. Signposting Mr Jones to a strength and balance class will improve his chances of escape if a fire starts.

Firefighters are not expected to ‘engage with communities on complex health issues’. They will of course visit these people because we pro-actively **target** people with complex needs; it is those very needs which increase the risk of fire. It is not the role of the firefighter to address the complex needs per se. The firefighter’s role is to:

- assess fire risk taking into account the person, their occupations and their environment
- deliver fire safety advice, interventions and equipment, taking into account the person, their occupations and their environment
- record the visit

This model of person-centred fire risk assessment, originally led by GMFRS, is being taken on board nationally by National Fire Chiefs Council as we speak. Fire Chiefs have accepted the recommendations in a paper that went to the Fire Chiefs Council in May and it is widely accepted that this model is best practice.



If GMFRS does not support this model, then people with increased fire risk will remain at risk and continue to die in preventable fires.

**We strongly recommend that Safe and Well should remain a person-centred fire risk assessment, should be aligned to the national approach and that any development of the intervention should be refinement and not re-modelling.**

**Management and ongoing improvement of the intervention and its delivery, should be undertaken by staff with knowledge and understanding of the subject. The Central Prevention Support function has this knowledge. Quality of visits**

**Points 82, 143 and 144** suggest that Safe and Well targets imposed a focus on quantity rather than quality. This is not true. When Safe and Well was introduced, targets were completely removed to facilitate a focus on quality and subsequently the number of visits delivered dropped to an unacceptable level and so targets were reinstated to support crews to manage priorities.

The target is currently one visit per pump per shift, equating to approximately 31,500 visits per year across GM. This is only around half of the target number of visits pre Safe and Well, allowing a focus on quality. In 2018/19 crews completed 0.75 visits per shift – 7610 below target.

**We agree that Safe and Well targets should be reviewed and determine a better way, working with partners, to better target our operational resources.**

**We recommend maintaining a target of some description to support staff to manage workloads and give a level of priority to Safe and Well.**

CLT input to staff on the OBC showed that visits take/should take an average of 20-30 minutes. Our statistics show that visits actually take anything from 20 minutes to 3 hours. A recent pilot evaluation showed that the average visit by an operational crew (including travel and admin) took 59 minutes, whilst a Community Safety Advisor (CSA) visit took 99 minutes.

The same evaluation showed that CSAs complete more question fields and receive more disclosures from occupiers, suggesting a better quality fire risk assessment. This suggests that the evidence on which the latent capacity of a firefighter has been calculated is flawed. A quality Safe and Well visit, including travel time should never take 20 minutes – that would barely get you to the property and back and this proposal undermines the OBC's own claim about improving quality of visits.

**To be more than just lip service, the visit itself, even in a low risk property should take 30 minutes minimum. A more reasonable figure for visit/travel and admin would be 60-90 minutes. The target operating model must take this into account if we are committed to quality visits.**

The work of the Central Prevention function (supported by the Community Safety Training and Development Team and Community Safety Managers and Team Leaders and a data analyst) to improve the quality of visits has been extensive. We have provided face to face and electronic training, delivered in house and by partners. We have provided Safe and Well Service Directories for every borough, supporting guidance, coaching, webpages, learning events, record keeping guidance and training, fire



safety literature and a constant offer of support if required. Unfortunately, Safe and well has not been prioritised or supported adequately by the wider organisation, corporate communication has been poor and performance management almost non-existent meaning that none of the guidance, training or resources actually being applied.

**We recommend that to achieve improvements, central coordination is maintained by staff with the right skills, knowledge, time, and expertise. The organisation needs to mobilise its vision, mission and purpose, employ stronger governance, and improve leadership and performance management to ensure that all staff see Safe and Well as an asset.**

### **The role and value of Community Safety Advisers**

Whilst operational staff deliver the bulk of Safe and Well visits, it is worth noting that only 3% of their visits in 2018/19 were joint visits with partner organisations, in comparison to 43% of CSA visits. Joint visits are often crucial to work with partners, carers and family members to reduce fire risk in the home. CSAs delivered over 1884 follow-up visits for people who required more than a single visit to mitigate fire risk. In a single borough over 900 follow-up calls were made to consolidate fire safety interventions. They provided over 900 pieces of fire risk reduction equipment (in addition to smoke detectors). This work requires the flexibility to work around partner organisations and occupiers – something which operational staff could find difficult to do. CSAs will never get called out and, for some occupiers, are a less daunting prospect than a pump and a crew turning up at their home

## **7. Prevention Function – proposed roles/structure**

The following roles have been identified in the OBC as potentially forming the management support for a Prevention function:

- GM Prevention x 1
- Prevention Managers x 5
- Senior Partnerships Officers x 3
- Community Partnerships Officers x 5

### **GM Prevention**

The OBC does not provide any rationale for a uniformed, operational role at GM level in Prevention in Service Delivery. There already exists five Borough GMs, supported by Borough SMs, so it is difficult to understand what the purpose of this role is other than to line manage five Prevention Managers (which the OBC indicates are temporary transitional roles).

There have been no uniformed GMs in Prevention for a number of years and the previous GM Prevention Service Delivery role was disestablished some years ago, and replaced by a non-uniformed role, in recognition of the fact that significant prevention skills, knowledge and experience were more relevant to this role than operational experience. Other progressive neighbouring FRs have also adopted nonoperational specialists to coordinate and manage prevention activities. If The OBC suggestion is simply to 'allocate' a GM to a role in order to provide sufficient numbers of GMs across the organisation for incident command, then this is a flawed approach and simply repeats the mistakes



the organisation has previously made, by not putting the right people with the right skills in the right roles.

### **Prevention Managers**

The OBC suggests these roles will be temporary and their role will be to progress the 'ownership' of prevention and partnership direction in boroughs. This appears to duplicate the expectations of the Station Manager role in relation to prevention activities and place based delivery. We believe these roles should be permanent, and would be more effective by working more closely with a central development function (see below).

### **Senior Partnerships Officers and Community Partnerships Officers**

The OBC provides very little information about the expectations of these roles and it is unclear how the numbers of roles has been decided, what the job purposes are, and how responsibilities will be apportioned across the roles. If the organisation wishes to continue to provide the Prevention support and workstreams that are described in Section 5 above, then some or all of these roles could develop this work. However we believe there is a better way to support effective development AND delivery, to support stations and boroughs and to provide consistency across Greater Manchester.

It is also confusing why the Senior Partnerships Officers, sitting at a strategic level (para 663) helping shape the future of 'place' to drive the prevention agenda, are shown as being under Service Improvement when Prevention / Place Based Working has been aligned to Service Delivery. Previous strategic decisions, which committed GMFRS delivery staff, to work in areas they were not familiar with was a situation quoted numerous times in the OBC (feedback from Mayoral visits).

### **Proposal**

We propose combining the five area based Prevention Managers and five Community Partnership Officer roles into ten Prevention roles, that will each hold a fire or other emergency reference or portfolio, and will also be allocated one of the ten GM boroughs of Greater Manchester as a reference, to support effective delivery.

The function should develop and coordinate central Prevention policy, guidance, approaches, safety messages, resources, campaigns and so on. Each member could have a portfolio of responsibilities spanning the many aspects of fire, road and water safety (as well as potentially YE and volunteering if these are not being resourced elsewhere).

The team should also develop, coordinate and/or support our Prevention partnership approaches at national, regional, GM, borough and neighbourhood level.

Each member of the team should be allocated to a borough supporting the Group/Station Managers to lead our integration into 'place' at local level and to support the delivery of partnership/prevention work and the development of local skills and knowledge.



The team would not need three senior managers – such a top heavy proposal in a cost saving exercise is not necessary Two would suffice - one to lead on Prevention services/product development and one to lead on partnerships and place.

The exact references or portfolios would need some additional work, but could for example cover the following:

- Smoking, Drugs and Alcohol and fire
- Mental Health and fire
- Physical Health and fire
- Road Safety
- Water and wildfire safety
- Campaigns and Events
- Bridging Cultures
- Fire Crime and Disorder
- Home Safety, risk reduction equipment and technical support - Place Based delivery

All the above roles would:

- Develop strategy, policy and guidance
- Provide risk analysis and stratification
- Develop and co-ordinate partnerships
- Support Station and Group Managers
- Support station based subject matter 'champions'
- Attend Greater Manchester meetings
- Support regional and national work as required

It is envisaged that the two Strategic Prevention leads:

- Provide expert policy support to GMFRS/CA senior corporate and locality leadership -  
Provide direct line management of the above roles
- Act as the organisation's reference holders for prevention topic areas
- Responsibility for the implementation of the organisation's agreed prevention strategy
- Responsible for quality assurance of prevention strategy and corporate KPI's
- Build relationships with national and GM partners and the voluntary sector to encourage closer collaboration between fire and partners
- Support the development of the required prevention skills and training requirements



